For nearly two weeks, the two neighbouring nations, Pakistan and Afghanistan, have seen a sharp recurrence of hostilities along the porous Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier, exposing the fragility of the relationship between Islamabad and the Taliban authorities in Kabul. The crisis escalated after Pakistan struck Afghanistan on 11th October, alleging that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other anti-state militants enjoy sanctuary in Afghan territory. While the Taliban denied state complicity, subsequently, the situation got tense, resulting in airstrikes and ground clashes that killed dozens of combatants and civilians on both sides before international mediators pressed for a temporary ceasefire.
Human costs have been immediate and severe in the recent crisis. Reports from the local media and humanitarian agencies, civilian casualties, displacement of border communities, and damage to critical crossing points that facilitate legal trade and livelihoods. The disruption of trade and movement compounds humanitarian vulnerability in areas that already suffer from limited state services, undercutting long-term prospects for stabilization. Fractured local governance in border districts magnifies these harms: communities often lack credible protections from either side and are left to bear the brunt of military logic. This is not a distant strategic abstraction but a lived crisis for thousands of families.
Pakistan’s defence leadership has made it crystal-clear that the ceasefire brokered in Doha only holds, if there are no incursions from Afghan territory of militants attacking Pakistan. Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif underlined: “Anything coming from Afghanistan will be (a) violation of this agreement.” The reason for this insistence is well-documented: Pakistani forces have repeatedly thwarted militant infiltration attempts across the border. For example, in March 2025, Pakistani security forces reported the killing of 16 militants trying to cross from Afghanistan into Pakistan near Ghulam Khan. Moreover, Pakistan has asserted that large militant camps and allied networks remain based in Afghan-border areas and that the Taliban administration has failed to dismantle them despite repeated demands.
In addition to terrorism, Pakistani leadership points out that the border itself has been subject to unauthorised constructions, and Afghan forces (under Taliban rule) have at times been accused of firing on Pakistani positions. For instance, Islamabad has protested the building of “unlawful structures” at the key crossing of Torkham and called out Afghan incursions across the Durand Line. Taken together, for Pakistan, its security, sovereignty and stability are under direct threat from a neighbour that is not fulfilling its basic responsibilities as a state actor; to control and prevent non-state armed groups from operating against Pakistan from Afghan territory.
Politically, the relationship is hostage to mutual distrust. Pakistan fears that permissive zones in Afghanistan will allow a resurgence of violence within its own territory, eroding domestic security. The Taliban government, by contrast, faces internal constraints: it does not command full control over every non-state armed actor in Afghanistan and is sensitive to perceptions of being coerced by other regional powers into policing militant groups. Islamabad demands decisive action; Kabul insists on respect for sovereignty, and neither side fully trusts third-party assurances. Regional actors, notably Qatar and Türkiye, have stepped in to mediate, underwriting a fragile truce, but it only lowers the immediate temperature.
Moreover, the Durand Line and decades of porous movement, refugee flows, and unresolved political grievances indicate that border management will remain difficult. External trends matter too: with competing regional patrons and the continuing presence of transnational extremist networks such as ISIS-K and remnant Al-Qaeda affiliates, any local flare-up risks entangling wider networks and drawing in outside actors, particularly India.
There are realistic, limited pathways to reduce danger, but none are easy. First, confidence-building measures that institutionalize communication between border security agencies are necessary to prevent tactical incidents from becoming strategic crises. The recent mediated 48-hour truce shows that third-party facilitation can produce temporary restraint; the hard work is converting episodic pauses into durable mechanisms for incident prevention and verification.
Second, both capitals would benefit from clearer, mutually acceptable protocols for handling militants who cross the border, including joint investigations, transparent evidence sharing, and agreed procedures for neutralizing transnational threats without violating sovereignty. Third, engagement with local communities and traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms along the border can reduce the incentives for militias to operate with impunity. These policy steps are modest and feasible, but they require political will from both sides.
From a strategic vantage, the most worrying possibility is not conventional interstate war, but the normalization of punitive, cross-border kinetic responses as policy instruments. When state actors use airstrikes, drone operations, or artillery to punish suspected sanctuaries, they lower the threshold for deeper escalation and risk collateral consequences that radicalize populations and enlarge recruitment pools for extremist groups. The ceasefire offers urgent breathing room, but unless they are followed by durable confidence-building mechanisms and transparent procedures for addressing militant movement, the cycle of violence will repeat.
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