In December 2025 the Trump administration releases the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025. A fundamental component of the report sets the US national security priorities, especially the great power competition with China. Trump 2.0 security arrangements are visibly departing from Trump 1.0 in the context of the U.S. posturing toward China. Trump 1.0 had declared China a strategic threat, but Trump 2.0 marked China as an economic competitor.
Nonetheless, the document reiterated China as the second-largest military and economic power after the United States and would remain a challenge to U.S. strategic and economic interests. Moreover, it also highlights that the economic engagement rather than confrontation would be the pathway for the U.S. to deal with China in the Asia-Pacific region. The question is how the US allies interpret this new strategic trajectory of the United States, as their interpretation will determine the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region in the future.
In the same vein, the Pentagon’s 2026 National Defence Strategy no longer views China as a top security concern. Instead, it shifts focus to the Western Hemisphere, marking a departure from decades of U.S. foreign policy that treated China as the primary threat to its security and economic interests. The document emphasizes that US allies in the Asia-Pacific region, such as South Korea and Japan should bear their fair share of the collective defence. The document holds that the Pentagon would be influenced by four major concerns, namely defending the homeland, giving up the leading role in security matters in Europe and Asia-Pacific region, strengthening the industrial base and establishing strong deterrence, and dealing with China with strength, not confrontation. Under Biden, the Pentagon declared China and Russia as revisionist powers which pose central challenge to the security of the United States.
The Trump administration would seek security cooperation with allies and partners based on their contributions in terms of resources and money. It shows that the US allies in the Asia-Pacific region such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, and Indonesia would construct their security architecture themselves rather than relying on Washington, though the presence of the US would still be there, not as a leading player but as supporting power.
It now seems likely that the US allies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Australia could veer closer to China. Beijing’s polices accentuates economic interdependence and cooperation, in contradiction to Washington’s long-standing focus on strategic dominance and exclusive security arrangements. Instead of pursuing confrontation, the document stresses deterrence through strength does not force. Through upholding a “strong denial defence” along the First Island Chain to deter China’s threat, the NSS proposed to ensure a decent peace in the Asia-Pacific region. The concept of deterrence in the document is cyclical. Military deterrence complements strategic stability, which enables smooth economic activity, and supports the military industrial base. A strong industrial base then produces the wherewithal for strong military power, reinforcing deterrence and once again ensuring strategic stability.
There are two critical questions. First, would US allies in the Asia-Pacific be willing to substantially increase their military strength against China if the credible and reliable US security assurance becomes uncertain and conditional? For instance, Japan has already hiked up its military build-up, allocating a 58-billion-dollar defence budget for the year 2026, which is 9.4% increase over the previous year. Likewise, Australia is increasing its defence investment, with nuclear-powered submarine related spending projected to rise sharply. Similarly, South Korea enhances its defence spending amid threats from North Korea. These actions reflect real progress, but they have largely occurred with the expectation of US backing. Without reliable and unconditional security assistance, as the US NSD illustrates on burden sharing and burden shifting, the political will to go further with US remains uncertain.
Second, as the document holds that the US would retrench from direct involvement in regional issues of allies, would the allies continue to feel China as a rational threat? China remains a major trading partner for most of the US allies in the Asia-Pacific region, establishing a rational choice for practical engagement with China. The trade volume between China and Japan amounts to 322 billion dollars, while between South Korea and China it stands at 331 billion dollars, with Taiwan 314 billion dollars, 296 billion dollars with Vietnam, and 206 billion dollars with Australia. It seems more probable that the allies would reach out to China, leveraging economic interdependence over prolonged confrontation, while US security commitment weakens, and China is no longer considered as an existential threat due to reduced US interference.
Most importantly, the grey zones such as the South China Sea, Taiwan, and East China Sea are no longer considered as primary security concerns of the United States. This might gravely recalibrate the strategic trajectory of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia. At the beginning of 2026, China has hosted South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo and Irish leader Micheal Marin, who are all traditional allies of the United States, and are disenchanted by President Donald Trump’s policies.
In conclusion, the strategic direction of U.S. allies in the region is likely to be affected by the shift in U.S. strategy toward the region. This shift may create strategic space that China would like to fill, particularly given its strong trade relations with U.S. allies. China can effectively leverage this opportunity to advance its strategic interests. However, the future remains uncertain and is likely to unfold in unpredictable ways.
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