The most recent round of Pakistan-Afghanistan negotiations in Istanbul this month verified what the security set-up at Islamabad has long believed to be true: Kabul is unwilling to dismantle the militant infrastructure threatening the safety and security of Pakistan across the border. The diplomatic process can go on as long as form dictates, but the strategic result has already been identified. Pakistan is entering a prolonged period of restrained conflict on its western side, where a dialogue will be needed, but deterrence will determine stability.
The context is well known yet warrants reiteration. Islamabad showed impressive restraint following the cross-border attacks of October 2025 by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that claimed the lives of dozens of Pakistani military personnel. Instead of creating an escalation, it chose diplomacy through involvement in Doha and later Istanbul, facilitated by Qatari and Turkish mediation. However, following three sessions of negotiation, including individual talks involving top military officials, Kabul remains elusive towards any written promises. The Taliban foreign ministry is declaring that it will not permit the Afghan soil to cause harm to others, yet they deny all the practical mechanisms that have been put forward by Pakistan to make their claim credible. Additionally, several senior Afghan Taliban leaders attended funerals of TTP militants killed by Pakistani forces, a stark signal of ideological and operational alignment rather than neutrality.
This is not a failure of Pakistani diplomacy; rather, it is an Afghan duplicity. Islamabad has been patient and has offered dialogue, de-escalation and even trade facilitation in order to maintain stability. Taliban leadership, on the other hand, still considers the TTP a domestic Pakistani problem; a mere rhetorical tool that allows Kabul to get away with a free pass, whilst continuing to provide protection to militants. This is an unacceptable position for Pakistan. The TTP attacks are launched from the territory of Afghanistan, which are organised by commanders who are openly working in the regions of Kunar, Paktika and Nangarhar. Therefore, origin or intent is of no doubt.
Even worse, current intelligence reports and open-source news indicate that there has been a new dangerous development; a militant network called Jabhat al-Ribaat Afghanistan (JRA) has taken form, publicly urging TTP fighters to be accommodated and sponsored in Afghanistan. Its communiques direct local leaders to furnish food, shelter and finances to returning militants, including registering them and bringing information to the office of the main emir (leader). As it tolerates or permits such activity, Kabul therefore conveys to the world that it is ready to shield the enemies of Pakistan while continuing to seek diplomatic cover abroad. Moreover, Taliban‑aligned actors have revived the ‘Greater Afghanistan’ narrative, injecting a new element of territorial challenge into Pakistan–Afghanistan relations.
The deadly suicide blast in Islamabad, said by Pakistani officials to have been orchestrated via Afghan-based networks and Indian proxies, starkly highlights how militant sanctuaries across the border are translating into domestic urban insecurity. This situation is further complicated by the growing Indian presence in Afghanistan. The reopening of its embassy in Kabul and the reinstatement of diplomatic and development activities indicate an effort to spread its influence on Pakistan’s western border alongside its eastern border. Such dynamics strengthen the Afghan authorities to condone militancy as they recalibrate against Islamabad, making the bilateral negotiation process more difficult and increasing the threat to Pakistan.
This has far-reaching implications for Pakistan’s security calculus. First, it shows that the internal unity of the Taliban prevails over its regional stability; addressing the TTP would divide their own networks, many of which have tribal and ideological connections to Afghan Taliban commanders. Second, it reveals the hollowness of Afghan sovereignty. If the Afghan Taliban are unable to suppress the activities of TTP in provinces bordering Pakistan, then their claims of territorial control are mere fiction. Third, it confirms the long-held perception in Pakistan that dialogue alone will never serve to secure the frontier. In the event that diplomacy is ineffective in securing compliance, then deterrence should fill the vacuum.
Islamabad has started to evaluate itself, to its credit. At this point, it is implementing an approach of layered deterrence: continuing to keep the ceasefire as a diplomatic umbrella, but working on operational preparedness along the border. Cross-border surveillance, intelligence integration and fencing the borders have been hastened. This is no aggression; it is anti-aggression at its best.
Pakistan has been criticised by some critics abroad as being prone to a hard-line policy. However, this criticism overlooks Pakistan’s history of restraint and support. Millions of Afghan refugees had settled in Islamabad over the decades, humanitarian assistance has been provided, and the freezing of Afghanistan’s assets has been petitioned. Pakistan opted for dialogue rather than destruction even after recurring provocation. However, goodwill is not a replacement for security. By remaining a haven of the TTP, the Taliban regime will lose the moral and diplomatic space that it seeks.
All in all, the recent Pakistan-Afghanistan negotiations have reinforced that while diplomacy is essential, it cannot replace security. Pakistan’s measured response, combining continued dialogue with reinforced border security, intelligence integration, and calibrated deterrence, reflects a responsible strategy: it rewards cooperation, counters provocation, and asserts that goodwill alone cannot substitute for the protection of national sovereignty and frontier security.
Be the first to comment