Pakistan’s Strategic Export Control: Implementation and Enforcement

Pakistan’s Strategic Export Control: Implementation and EnforcementThe concept of export controls is very old; societies have always endeavoured to preserve their limited resources and protect their security by enacting such measures. The export of crossbows was prohibited in medieval times, and gunpowder export was banned from China in 900 AD. In 1775, the US banned the export of goods to Great Britain; these, considered to be first American export controls, were since followed by numerous others[i]. Collective efforts to impose export controls began after World War II. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) was established in 1949 to restrict exports from the West to the east. This organisation, however, was dissolved after the end of the Cold War and a new organisation, the Wassenaar Arrangement, was created to control the exports of dual-use military technologies from the developed world to the developing or underdeveloped world[ii].

While the Cold War ended, the globalisation of the economy, increased interdependence among states, technological developments and the threat of terrorism to international peace and security, have enhanced sensitivities towards the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). In the post – 9/11 world, the international community’s desire to maintain peace and security across the globe led to initiatives like the UNSCR 1540, which obligates all states to have robust national legislation for controlling the export of sensitive technologies. However, such controls need to be balanced by ensuring that legitimate trade is not impeded unnecessarily.

The Non-proliferation regime is considered to be based on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).  Pakistan, while not a signatory to NPT, has always supported the cause of non-proliferation while remaining committed to the non – transfer of nuclear weapons or weapon-related materials and technology[iii]. However, Pakistan is a signatory of both the CWC and BWC as a non-possessor state. It is determined to safeguard its national security and foreign policy objectives and has exhibited this commitment by fulfilling its international obligations as a responsible nuclear weapon state pursuing effective export controls[iv].

A robust and comprehensive legal framework and an efficient state structure provide the basis for implementation, enforcement and attainment of national objectives with regard to effective exports controls. This paper aims to focus on the implementation and enforcement provisions of Pakistan’s Export Control framework, and the Pakistani capabilities that have been augmented for effective implementation and enforcement to meet its international obligations in this regard.

According to international standards, an export control legal framework consists of nine essential elements, which include legislative purpose or intent; establishment of jurisdiction over territory, transactions, people and items; authority to implement export control processes; assurances of transparency; responsibilities of the parties; requirements for documentation; confidentiality and procedures for information sharing and authority to enforce the law and penalties for violations[v]. Most of these require expertise in legal drafting, as well as knowledge of international export controls regime and best practices. However, implementing export controls and enforcing them are the most important aspects.


Soon after the overt nuclearisation of South Asia, Pakistan began deliberations to implement a comprehensive national export control mechanism. However, pending the finalisation of such mechanisms, which required the involvement of all national stockholders, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), after its creation in February 2000, realised the importance of the issue. Since all the strategic organisations involved in the research and development of Pakistan’s strategic capability were under its operational control, SPD in September 2000 issued comprehensive ‘Export Controls Guidelines’ to all strategic organisations for strict compliance[vi]. In the meantime, efforts to develop legal documentation for implementation continued in an inter-agency process. Finally, a draft bill was put up to the Cabinet for approval and placed before Parliament in mid-2004. After following the normal process, in September 2004 the bill was approved by both houses of Parliament;the Pakistan Export Control Act on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and their delivery system Act 2004 was enacted[vii].

Pakistan’s Export Control Act 2004 includes all important elements of an effective national export control system. Some of the implementing and enforcement provisions of the[viii]are discussed below.

1The Act applies to every citizen of Pakistan or a person in the service of Pakistan within and beyond Pakistan or any Pakistani visiting or working abroad, or any foreign national while in the territories of Pakistan and any ground transport, ship or aircraft registered in Pakistan where ever it may be.This implies that anyone and everyone who is a Pakistani citizen,a foreigner on Pakistani territory, including the territorial waters and also all means of transport registered in Pakistan, are to abide by the Act.


2Federal Government is to delegate authority to administer all activities under this Act to such Ministries, Divisions, Departments and Agencies as it may deem appropriate; establish a government Authority to administer export controls established under this Act.There is an inbuilt flexibility in the Act to ensure effective implementation of an evolving system. A Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) has been established as the authority to administer export controls established under the Act. However, other ministries, divisions, departments and agencies could also be delegated some responsibilities.
3Federal Government is to establish an Oversight Board to monitor the implementation of this Act, and the Government is to designate the agency or agencies authorised to enforce this Act.The Oversight Board has been established, comprising senior officials from relevant ministries and departments. The Board could act as a body to resolve disputes on the issue of licenses and could hear appeals in this regard.
4Rules and regulations are to be notified by the Government which are necessary for the implementation of this Act.Strategic exports being a new dimension of Pakistan’s exports would require detailed rules and regulations to ensure that the exports are strictly in line with national laws, commitments and obligations.
5Officials of the designated agency or agencies are authorised to inspect consignments declared for export and review, acquire or confiscate records of persons engaged in the exporting or holding an export license under this Act.A function assigned to any enforcement agency at the exit points of a country as per the procedures in vogue.


6The Federal Government may vest any investigatory powers and powers of arrest authorised by law in officials of the customs administration or other appropriate agencies.This provides a legal basis for the enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute violators of the Export Control Act 2004.
7Control lists shall be reviewed periodically, and revised or updated, as required by the Federal Government and notified accordingly.Preparing a national control list for the purpose of strategic exports and keeping it updated as per international standards is a requirement of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.
8The Act provides a framework for the licensing procedure to be developed/improved and notified.This allows the Government to develop and notify the licensing procedure and related necessary documents.
9An exporter is under a legal obligation to notify to the competent authority if the exporter is aware or suspects that the goods or technology are intended, in their entirety or in part, in connection with nuclear or biological weapons or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.A ‘Catch all’ provision to ensure that export of those items which may not have appeared on the Control List, but may have military applications, is controlled and regulated.


10All exporters are required to maintain all records pertaining to export transaction and report these to the authority. Government agency or department involved in export licensing procedure are also required to keep records of their recommendations and decisions. These records are required to be made available to other departments involved in export licensing when requested.Across the board requirement of record keeping by both the exporters and the government departments involved in strategic export licensing ensures transparency, which is one of the nine elements required for an international standard legal framework.
11The offender could be awarded imprisonment for a term which may extend up to 14 years or a fine up to five million or both. In addition the offender’s property and assets could be forfeited to the Federal Government.The penalties laid down are one of the most stringent in the world for offences related to strategic export violations, demonstrating the resolve the Government has in ensuring non-proliferation of WMD related items, equipment, materials and technologies.


Following the enactment of the Export Control Act 2004, a National Export Control List (NCL) was notified vide SRO. 1078 (I)/2005 on 19 October 2005[ix]. The list is based on the EU model. The EU has developed a system of integrating the list associated with the four technology control regimes, i.e. the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group. This provides for a common commodity classification number and avoidance of repetition of items, which may be common in more than one list. The NCL incorporates items as listed in NSG Part I and II, while the MTCR and Australia Group list as related to biological agents and related dual-use technologies. Pursuant to the Export Control Act, Section 4 (2), the NCL is revised periodically, with the most recent revision having been carried out in 2018 and notified in the Gazette of Pakistan Vide SRO. 891(I)/2018[x]. An Oversight Board and the Strategic Export Control Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs further improves and strengthens the implementation and enforcement of the export control framework.

The Oversight Board was established to monitor the implementation of the Export Control Act 2004, vide S.R.O. 639(I)/2007 dated 11 July 2007. It is chaired by the Foreign Secretary and the members are from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior, the Cabinet Division, the Federal Board of Revenue, the Security Division National Command Authority, the Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Branch Strategic Plans Division, and the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority; also includeda Pakistani expert having experience in export controls.

The Strategic Export Control Division was established at Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the approval by the Prime Minister. It is headed by a Director General and is organized into three directorates, to look after all matters related to policy, licensing, regulations and enforcement, including investigations and prosecutions. Under the Export Control Act the broad functions of this Division could be to:

  • Develop a national export control policy;
  • Establish rules and regulations for licensing process, investigation and prosecution, administrative penalties, appeal proceedings, record keeping or any others as are necessary for implementation of the Export Control Act 2004;
  • Maintain, review and update the NCL as and when required;
  • Ensure pre-licensing end user verification procedure;
  • Set up a national database for industrial potential in dual use items, material, equipment, software and technologies, and conduct industrial outreach to keep the industry informed about the latest developments in export controls in Pakistan as well as the possible military uses of dual use items, equipment, material, software etc.


National laws relating to imports and exports are traditionally enforced by National Customs Authorities the world over. Pakistan Customs is thus the primary government department entrusted with the implementation and enforcement of the Export Policy of the Federal Government, inclusive of the restrictions imposed under the following:[xiii]

  • ‘The Arms Act-1878’
  • ‘The Explosives Act-1884’
  • ‘The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance-2000’
  • ‘The Drugs Act-1976’
  • ‘The Prevention of Smuggling Act-1977’
  • ‘The Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery System Act-2004’.

The legal authority to perform this function is drawn from the Pakistan Customs Act of 1969. Some of the important provisions of the latter[xiv]are:

  • “The [Federal Government] may, from time to time, by notification in the official Gazette, prohibit or restrict the bringing into or taking out of Pakistan any goods of specified description by air, sea or land”. This provides a legal cover for the enforcement of any export restriction by the Federal Government through a notification in the official Gazette.
  • “Detention, seizure and confiscation of goods imported in violation of section15 or section 16”. Customs authorities can detain, seize or confiscate any goods attempted to be exported in violation of notifications issued by the Federal Government.
  • “Obligation to produce documents and provide information”. Any information and documentation related to export can be asked for by the customs official to determine the legality of exporting such goods.
  • 32 & 32A. “False statement, error, etc.… and Fiscal fraud”. Any false statement or a declaration in terms of quantity, specification, destination or the economic value is a punishable offence.
  • “Transit of goods across Pakistan to a foreign territory”. Provision of this section authorises an appropriate officer of Pakistan Customs to allow any goods or class of goods to be transited through Pakistan by land or air, subject to the provisions of the rules as notified by the Federal Government in the Official Gazette from time to time.
  • “Offences and Penalties”. This section lays down the details of possible offences related to the Pakistan Customs Act 1969 and the corresponding penalties notwithstanding any other punishment which may be applicable under any other national law.
  • 161 – 163. “Power to Arrest and Search”. These sections provide Pakistan Customs with the powers to arrest, detain and search, and in certain cases even without a search warrant.
  • 157, 168 -171. “Extent of Confiscation and Seizure”. These sections lay down detailed procedures and powers of seizure of the suspected goods, the way these should be handled and their confiscation.

While Pakistan continues to revamp and improve its existing export control mechanism, it has adequate implementation and enforcement capabilities to ensure that national and international obligations are met. Accepting the challenges of present day international environment and information technology requirements, Pakistan Customs has established an end to end automated solution for custom operations including risk profiling of all exports declarations at Pakistan Customs.

Exports can only be made from the places notified in the official Gazette[xv], which are Karachi for exports by sea; Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, Peshawar, Multan and Quetta for exports by air; and Torkham, Chaman, Taftan, Panjgur, Sost, and Wagha for exports by land. This notification of specified places for exports is to facilitate the customs’ operation along a coastline over 1000 km long and the 6774 km of borders with Afghanistan, China, India and Iran[xvi]. Transportation of commercial cargo is not allowed from any other place. An attempt by anyone to take any cargo out of Pakistan from places other than those mentioned above, would be considered smuggling and thereby liable to legal proceedings against the offender under Prevention of Smuggling Act 1977 Section 2 (f) & 10 and Pakistan Customs Act 1969 Section 156.8. (i), 161(2) and 163(1)[xvii].

While Pakistan Customs is the primary enforcement agency, there are other agencies which support such operations along the entire length of the 7820 km long coastal and land border. The Maritime Security Agency enforces the national and international laws, agreements and conventions on and underwater in the maritime zone, and cooperates with and provides assistance to customs[xviii]. Pakistan Coast Guards monitor smugglers and stop smuggling activities (inbound as well as outbound) throughout the sea routes. They are equipped with modern communication and surveillance equipment, including radars, to perform this task[xix]. Retrieved from “”

  • In doing so, the PCG complements the surveillance on the seas by the MSA and helps Pakistan Customs in case of any unauthorised movement. The Frontier Corps closely watches the western and north western borders with Iran and Afghanistan. Its omni-presence and infrastructure facilities greatly support the checks across difficult terrain at several border crossings. This agency is capable of monitoring and controlling cross-border movement and supports enforcement of all export controls[xx]. Pakistan Rangers similarly cover the eastern border with India, being in possession of capabilities and functions similar to those entrusted to the Frontier Corps[xxi]. The Airport Security Force specialises in the security of all airports in the country. In pursuit of this function, it complements all relevant agencies entrusted with performing export control functions[xxii].

Other Exports Control Initiatives

In view of the increased volume of trade, changing international requirements of safe commerce, ensuring international peace and security, national commitments, international obligations and safeguarding our national security and foreign policy objectives, Pakistan entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States for the implementation of the Container Security Initiative (CSI) at Karachi. CSI is an initiative of the US Customs and Border Protection to help host government Customs Services; this facilitates them in examining high-risk maritime containerised cargo at foreign seaports, before they are loaded on board vessels destined for the United States[xxiii]. The project has been completed, and Port Qasim at Karachi is now a CSI compliant port. All US-bound cargo is scanned here before it is loaded on to a ship to ensure that no unauthorised/illegal export, especially of sensitive, nuclear or radiological material and equipment is carried out[xxiv].

United Nation Security Council Resolutions

Pakistan actively participated in the deliberations on the United Nation Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and supported its final adoption. Responding to the requirements of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, Pakistan submitted its first report to the UNSCR 1540 Committee in October 2004[xxv]; it conveyed its strong commitment to the objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation, along with full support for appropriate and effective measures to prevent non-state actors from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. This commitment and support have been reiterated publicly by Pakistan’s leadership and the Government. The Report highlighted the comprehensive administrative, legislative and security measures undertaken by Pakistan to ensure the safety and security of sensitive materials, facilities, technologies and equipment. It has also been emphasised that Pakistan remains a partner in efforts to stem proliferation and illicit trafficking of WMD-related materials. Pakistan further submitted the supplementary report comprising 125 pages[xxvi]; enlisting in detail the measures are undertaken and the supporting legal framework as required by the UNSCR 1540 Committee through the matrix is forwarded to the member states.

Pakistan shared its third and fourth report with the UNSCR 1540 Committee in June 2008[xxvii]and May 2017[xxviii] respectively, informing it of the additional measures taken. Keeping its commitment to the non-proliferation of WMDs and the war against terror, Pakistan has taken a number of measures in all aspects, some of which are detailed below.

  • The National Command Authority Act 2010: The National Command Authority (NCA) Ordinance 2007, which was rendered ineffective because one of the Supreme Court rulings, was revised and enacted as the National Command Authority Act 2010[xxix]. It further strengthens and augments the National Strategic regime, providing for the legal basis of security and safety measures over all matters concerning nuclear and space technology, strategic establishments, materials, systems, relevant personnel and information.
  • The Anti Money Laundering Act of 2010. This was enacted in March 2010, and has a bearing on proliferation, financing and unauthorised strategic export financing[xxx].
  • The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Rules, 2010. The Rules lay down detailed procedures for the production, accounting, storage, import and export by the industry, as well as for inspections by the inspectors[xxxi].
  • The Export Control (Licensing and Enforcement) Rules 2009. The Strategic Export Control Division issued Export Control (Licensing and Enforcement) Rules 2009, defining the procedure for registration of exporters, licensing process, enforcement and prosecution[xxxii].
  • The Licensing Review Committee. To streamline the licensing process, a licensing review committee has been established to access, review and evaluate any license application referred to the committee by the Strategic Export Control Division for consideration. The committee has eleven members from various ministries and departments[xxxiii].
  • The Internal Compliance Programme and Strategic Export Control Policy Guidelines. To develop and inculcate a self-regulating culture in the entities, institutions, companies and other relevant individuals, Internal Compliance Program guidelines were notified in October 2014[xxxiv]. To strengthen the strategic export control mechanism and in furtherance of its commitments to non-proliferation norms and principles, Pakistan notified its Policy Guidelines on Strategic Export Controls in May 2016.[xxxv]
  • Regulations Covering Various Aspects of Nuclear Safety and Security. The Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) has adopted/revised a body of national regulations to bring these in line with the existing IAEA standards[xxxvi].
  • Physical Security Training Academy. A state of the art physical security training academy has been established with almost all possible training facilities for the physical security of strategic facilities, material and equipment. The academy has been providing training since the beginning of 2012[xxxvii].
  • Specialized Security Force. Measures have been put in place to train a specialised security force of highly trained security personnel to protect strategic facilities and material in all possible eventualities; training are conducted at the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) Training Academy and other training establishments of Pakistan Armed Forces. In April 2012 the strength of this specialised force had reached the figure of 20,000[xxxviii].
  • Special Response Force. A Special Response Force (SRF) has also been established to deter any adventurism against Pakistan’s strategic capability by any internal or external forces. The SRF has been trained by Pakistan’s elite Special Services Group and other experts in security and crises management. SRF also has an aerial component[xxxix].
  • Nuclear Security Training. The National Institute of Nuclear Safety and Security (NISAS) has been established by the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) to train a sufficient number of highly skilled human resource to perform regulatory functions[xl]. Additionally, courses on Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, Nuclear Security and Physical Security Systems have been included in the Curriculum of MS Nuclear Engineering at the Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Science (PIEAS) for the enhancement of nuclear security culture and expertise in the country at the graduate level[xli].
  • Border Controls. In March 2012, a program for the deployment of Radiation Portal Monitors (R.P.M.s) at key exit/entry points to deter, detect and prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials was launched[xlii]. The program will be completed soon.

As a result of measures taken by the Government of Pakistan, it has improved upon and strengthened its export controls and security regime, and now it stands among the top ranks of United Nations member states with higher than seventy-five per cent implementation and enforcement status. During the comprehensive review of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which was completed in 2016, it was found through the United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 matrix analysis of Operating Paragraph 2, 3 (a) & (b) and 3 (c) & (d)[xliii] for Pakistan, that 268 measures have been recorded out of a total of 332; this makes Pakistan over 80%percent implementations and enforcement compliant state.

To fulfil its other national and international obligations, Pakistan has promptly responded to all UNSC Resolutions adopted in relation to North Korea, which is still under United Nation sanctions. In pursuance of UNSCR 1718 concerning North Korea, adopted on 14thOct 2006, Pakistan notified through a Statutory Regulatory Order (dated 16 October 2006), the implementation and enforcement of operating paragraphs of UNSCR 1718 with immediate effect. This included banning any export or transit through Pakistan of all weapons as described in the UN Arms Register and equipment, and technologies related to weapons of mass destruction. All concerned ministries and departments were directed to take necessary actions as authorised by the United Nation Security Council Act, 1948. The follow up resolutions, 1874 (2008), 2094 (2013), 2141 (2014), 2207 (2015), 2270 (2016), 2276 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2345 (2017), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017),are also being adhered to;the Security Council Committee, established pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) is being accordingly informed, the last report having been submitted on 22ndMarch 2018[xliv].

In addition to the above-mentioned steps to strengthen the national export control mechanism by the Government of Pakistan, a Coordination, Review and Monitoring Committee has also been notified to ensure the enforcement of the United Nations Security Council sanctions regime. This committee comprises representatives of twenty-one ministries and departments as members[xlv].

Challenges of Export Controls System

The accomplishment of tasks and the achievement of desired objectives is always embedded with challenges. In developing an export control system at par with international standards, Pakistan has faced challenges and difficulties. Some of these challenges included improvement & harmonisation of export control rules and regulations, development of human resource and a team of trainers, long borders, lack of technical assistance, training in skills and concepts, infrastructure improvements and awareness campaigns. Concerted efforts have been made to remain engaged with friendly countries that possess developed export control systems, and the international community, in general, to learn from their best practices. However, the development and improvement of policies, rules and regulations as per national requirements and the continuously changing international environment remain an ongoing process.

Strategic export controls is a comparatively new area of national security; the need for human resource for implementation and enforcement is far greater than the capacity to suitably train the required manpower. Protecting the borders against possibilities of illegal and unauthorised exports is always a dilemma for enforcement agencies, particularly when the borders extend over inaccessible and difficult mountainous terrain. Pakistan’s north and north western borders are extremely difficult, sometimes inaccessible and porous. It will be a daunting task for the enforcement agencies of Pakistan to ensure detection and seizure of attempted illegal export of items covered under the Export Control Act 2004. For this, Pakistan will need to build technological capacity, which is presently being monopolised by the developed world and mostly controlled and denied. Pakistan will have to seek international cooperation and assistance in building this capacity. Another important aspect is the general awareness within the government functionaries and the people of Pakistan in understanding the gravity of possible threats that stem from sensitive items falling in the wrong hands.

Despite these enormous challenges, it seems that the commitment to develop an excellent export control system according to Pakistan’s requirement is second to none. However, it will surely take time as various follow-on measures for effective implementation are being actively pursued. It is in the interest of Pakistan to increase the pace of measures in the pipeline if it wants to enhance its defence-related legitimate exports and responsible trade while ensuring that all sensitive materials, goods and technologies remain in firm governmental control.

Nothing in this world is perfect, and there is always room for improvement. So is the case with Pakistan’s export controls. A detailed analysis of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) matrix would reveal the gaps which need the attention of concerned policymakers. Early enactment of the Biological Weapons Convention implementation act, which is outstanding since long, would cover most of these gaps.

While at present only the public sector industry is involved in the development and production of strategic material and equipment, in the near future and with the Governments’ efforts to revive economic and industrial development in the country, the private sector industry is bound to enter into this field. It would be therefore timely to augment capacity building in national and international export controls within both sectors. Similarly, capacity building efforts should also be enhanced in the legal community and enforcement agencies with regards to exports controls and their responsibilities in investigation and prosecution of violators of the national laws on strategic exports controls. Although the national capacity building is the responsibility of the state, the task could be made easier if the concept of public-private partnership is adopted. There exist international models which can be modified to suit the national requirements.

Strategic export control is a subject area not yet well understood by the general masses. There is a lack of awareness of the subject in the industrial sector, and also within some government departments which are not directly related to security trade. To raise the general awareness amongst all segments of the society, there is a need to integrate public and private universities and the blooming electronic media of the country in a national strategic export control awareness program.

In the contemporary globalised trade environment, where timely availability of national products in the international market is paramount, physical clearance of cargo at the exit points cannot be resorted to. Also, to guard against the possibility of unauthorised exports, especially of strategic items, it is imperative to develop the technical means both for smooth and quick clearance and also for the screening and scanning of cargo. Pakistan Customs has developed end to end automated solutions. The national authorities must ensure that the initiative launched in 2012 for the installation of Radiation Portal Monitors is completed as soon as possible and is integrated with the Customs automated solution of import and exports.

In the contemporary world, due to the challenges and threats being faced by the international community, interdependence cannot be overemphasised. Despite the technological gap between the developed West and the rest of the world, the survival of one is dependent on the other. This relationship of inter-dependability has to be based on principles of mutual respect, cooperation and equality, not on hard power and coercive diplomacy. It is imperative for the international community to admit the realities of today, leave the past behind and support the efforts being made by Pakistan to fulfil its national and international obligations.

The international community, especially the Western world has to understand the socio-economic and security compulsions of Pakistan and also recognise its geostrategic importance in the region before outlining policy preferences. Pakistan is a developing country rich in human and other resources. The past has proven that as a nation faced with challenging situations, Pakistan is second to none. Political and diplomatic cooperation from the international community to accommodate Pakistan’s concerns would help contribute to international peace and security.


Zawar Haider Abidi is a for a member of the Group Expert to the United Nations Security Council 1540 Committee, presently he is Senior Research Fellow at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad, Pakistan. He can be reached at; [email protected]


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[ii] ‘Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls and the Wassenaar Arrangement’, at, accessed on 19 June 2019

[iii] ‘Pakistan committed to non-proliferation: Kasuri’, Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri on Tuesday[12 December 2006] reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to non-proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), at; also see Statement by Ambassador Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the Security Council Open Debate on Global efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Non-State Actors (28 June 2017): at, accessed on 19 June 2019

[iv] Export Control on Goods, technologies, material and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and their delivery systems Act 2004, at

[v]‘ Legal Authorities for an Effective Export Control System’, p-2; at,  accessed on 19 June 2019

[vi]Salik Naeem, ‘The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan Perspective’, Oxford University Press 2009, p288

[vii]Author’s personal recollection being part of the interagency group involved in the drafting and getting it enacted by the Parliament.

[viii] Export Control Act on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Means, 2004, Sec 1-8, at, accessed on 20 June 2019.

[ix]‘ Introduction; Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV), paragraph 2’, at accessed on 20 June 2019.

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[xxxiv] accessed on 27 June 2019

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[xxxviii] ‘ISPR press release No PR-91/2012-ISPR, dated 19 April 2012’, at on 27 June 2019

[xxxix] ‘ISPR press release No PR-99/2013-ISPR, dated 10 June 2013’ at on June 2019

[xl]‘National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS)’ at accessed on 27 June 2019.

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[xliv]‘Pakistan’, at, accessed on 27 June 2019

[xlv] SRO. 1067(I)/2018 and SRO. 1093(I)/2018 at on 28 June 2019


About Zawar H Abidi 3 Articles
Zawar Haider Abidi is a for a member of the Group Expert to the United Nations Security Council 1540 Committee, presently he is Senior Research Fellow at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad, Pakistan. He can be reached at; [email protected]

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