The Rafale, and the Indo-Pak Security Dilemma

The realist school of thought considers international system as anarchic in nature and structured around self-interest of states. The increase in power of one state is usually perceived as a threat by another state thus generating a response. Repetition of this state behavior leads to a spiral effect which was termed as security dilemma by Robert Jervis in 1951. Jervis has defined security dilemma as, “a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to raising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening”.  The concept envisions the perceptional variability of strategic stability with respect to the competing states, and henceforth explains the purpose of mutual power buildup which can either lead to economic exhaustion – thus forcing the exercising of arms control measures, or can volatile the regional strategic environment ultimately igniting conflict.

The concept was universally followed in Cold War literature to comprehend US-USSR hegemonic power struggle. Even today, it’s a valid concept for understanding the security dynamics of regions where the state borne power struggle is pre-dominantly prevalent, like the South Asia. The history of this region proves the existence of security dilemma, particularly between India and Pakistan, involving both nuclear and conventional axis. Within the conventional realm, the balance of air power has earned pivotal importance thus prompting both Indian Air Force (IAF) and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) to steadily upgrade the combat potential to sustain the conventional force balance in accordance with the state’s supreme interests.

The latest episode of this Indo-Pak security dilemma can be envisioned in the contemporary force modernization programs of IAF and PAF. On July 30, 2020, India received the first batch of five Dassault Rafale aircrafts. The batch delivery marked the initiation of physical realization of Indo-French agreement worth $8.85 billion for 36 aircrafts. These 36 rafale aircrafts, which will be delivered by mid-2022, are meant to equip two combat squadrons of IAF, i.e. one squadron in Haryana and other in West Bengal.

The current Rafale deal – which in turn is a byproduct of now scrapped “MMRCA” Make in India initiative for acquisition of 126 modern fighter aircrafts, has earned significant placement within Indian political, social, public and military apparatus. The enthusiasm, which can be reflected in the speeches of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the statements made by IAF high command and the overwhelming Indian media coverage, has generated a national prestige which envisions Rafale aircraft as a game changer against India’s hostile neighbors. Even if we put recent Indo-China crisis axis aside, the Rafale aircrafts are pre-dominantly meant to occupy a pivotal position within IAF strategic framework to overcome the technological edge of the PAF.

The procurement of Rafale-F3R aircrafts will introduce nascent state of art capabilities to IAF. In simple categorization, four such capabilities can be highlighted. First; Thales RBE2-AESA which is the first combat operational Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar in IAF fighter aircrafts fleet and is generation ahead of existing legacy radars. Second; the integrated Spectra EW-ECM suite, which offers advance Electronic Warfare and Electronic Counter Measure prowess that outclasses other similar regional systems. Third; Meteor BVR missile, which utilizes ramjet propulsion and therefore offers longer engagement range and superior flight profile with greater No Escape Zone (NEZ) than legacy BVR missiles. And fourth; the Scalp ALCM (Air Launched Cruise Missile) exclusive for Rafales in IAF which will allow successful stand-off engagement of high value targets with precision using low-observable terrain-hugging flight profile. In a nut-shell, procurement of Rafale aircrafts will augment IAF prowess in electromagnetic and kinetic spectrum of warfare, and will grant qualitative edge over regional adversaries. However, IAF ability to formulate network centric warfare capability involving French and Russian assets will remain highly dubious.

The deliveries of Rafale aircraft have taken place at time when India is entangled in a historic security crisis with China after a military stand-off at Galwan valley, Hot Springs and Pangong lake. The crisis is primarily the derivative of India’s assertive move of changing the legal status of disputed Kashmir region, and the Indian participation in anti-China U.S. led Asia-Pacific Quad Alliance. In response, China has proactively activated its diplomatic, economic and military apparatus to nullify growing Indian influence in South Asian and Far-East Asian regions. The deepening Pak-China military co-operation has rapidly increased the likelihood of two front war – specifically in disputed Kashmir region – against India, and a realistic evaluation of entire situation suggests that the military capabilities New Delhi is building is not matching up with its political ambitions.

Furthermore, it can be argued that an abrupt Indo-China crisis has highlighted two major concerns regarding Rafale deal. First, despite spending massive capital in-terms of economics and time, IAF is getting only two squadrons of Rafale which are not sufficient to counter the risks associated with China and Pakistan; and second, the acquisition of Rafale aircrafts – albeit in limited numbers – has given incentive to PAF and PLAAF to further boast the multi-spectrum capabilities to retain the qualitative combat equilibrium. IAF simply do not have the economic spine and time window available to participate in a two-front arms race. Thus, the gap between the capability required and the capability available is likely to widen even further as far as IAF is concerned.

This is evident from IAF current force modernization route which includes Rafale order completion, 12 Su-30MKI attrition additions, 22 surplus Mig-29 and contract for 83 Tejas Mk-1A aircrafts. Even if all above-mentioned programs materialize, the IAF will have total of 30 combat squadrons by 2024 instead of required 42 squadrons. The primary reasons of this gap are the failure of MMRCA meant for 126 Rafale aircrafts and the delays in Tejas program.

The combat fleet of Pakistan Air Force is neither in obsoleteness crisis nor its following a numeric force expansionist policy. The success of JF-17 Thunder program has allowed PAF to replace a large portion of obsolete aircraft fleet. As far as sustaining qualitative advantage is concerned, Pakistan Air Force Chief has vowed to restore the regional military balance by placing necessary measures against India’s aggressive military procurements. The primary measures involve further expansion of AEWCS fleet, raising of additional ground based radar systems and the ramped up production of evolved blocks of JF-17 fighter aircraft. The possible procurement of ‘high end’ fighter aircraft with capabilities analogous to that of Rafale cannot be ruled out either. Provided that these plans are met within time schedule, PAF in near future will be operating higher number of AESA equipped fighter aircrafts which will be integrated with advance EW/ECM suite, armed with next generation armaments and will be further supplemented by a superior fleet of AEWCS. In brief, it can be argued that unlike the linear approach of IAF, PAF has already implemented a force modernization plan which is directed to enhance the multi-spectrum warfare capabilities at a more diverse scale.

Rafale aircraft, in a one on one comparison, are currently most superior fighter aircraft in South Asia. But the air combat does not involve one on one combat of fighter aircrafts. Instead, modern combat has evolved into a complex phenomenon where numerous combat and combat support assets operate in conjunction to achieve the requisite objective. Therefore, factors like the ability of assets to adhere within a battle-centric environment, the clever placement of assets in the network of combat, the employment of assets to the maximum capacity and a smart strategic planning and mission execution process play the centerline role in determination of combat prowess of armed forces. The lack of sufficient expertise regarding these factors cast doubts that IAF will not be able to synchronize all its assets within an adhered combat environment and hence will not be able to practicalize the advocated capabilities to the maximum.

In sum, the Indian Rafale deal and subsequent Pakistan’s buildup followed by deepening alliance between Beijing and Islamabad is an iconic example of states behavior advocated by security dilemma concept. The prospects of South Asian arms race are evident. However, the regional geopolitical dynamics have steered in a direction which is not favorable to Indian interests. Rafale and other weapons are mere tools meant to implement the state policies. The most crucial factor New Delhi needs to consider is to formulate realistic synchronization between its political ambitions and the net-military capabilities. An increment in Indian military capability will yield an analogous build up by Pakistan for retaining the regional balance of power. Without such balance, this region will be highly vulnerable to political miscalculations which can threaten the regional stability by igniting advertent or inadvertent conflict.

Know Your Enemy, Know Yourself

The philosophy of The Art of War, laid out by Sun Tzu in the 5th Century BCE, is as relevant today as it was thousands of years ago. His military thought has only become time tested and refined, despite giant leaps in technology and arsenal. Military strategists and practitioners pay special attention to Sun Tzu thought during military studies and planning. The lessons learned, translate to desirable results yielded during skirmishes or conflicts.

His thought can be summarized with these central arguments: ‘If you know your enemy and know yourself, there is no need to worry about the result of a hundred battles.’ But, he postulates, if you know yourself but do not know your enemy, then for every victory you will also suffer a defeat. Finally, he cautions that if you do not know your own capabilities and do not know those of your enemy, you will be defeated in every battle.

Knowing the real strength of your enemy in today’s time and age has become easy due to faster means of communication and the online presence of abundant information. However, knowledge of invisible and impalpable capabilities becomes more important and needs to remain the focal concern, if one is to avoid deception and being taken by surprise. To execute deception successfully, the knowledge of intangibles gains enhanced significance.

The post-Pulwama spat between India and Pakistan during February 2019 added weight to Sun Tzu’s philosophy of knowing and understanding one’s enemy. The battle for ‘claim and counterclaims’ continues between the two nuclear rivals as tension simmers in South Asia.  More recently, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi revealed that India is likely to launch another attack on Pakistan, going so far as to mention the dates of April 16-20.

Almost a month earlier, India launched an air strike in Balakot, and Pakistan and claimed to have killed 350 militants belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammad. The Modi government has not provided either the general public or the international media with any proof for this claim in the shape of video, pictures or satellite images. A few days later, the Pakistan Air Force claimed to have shot down two Indian aircraft, a MiG 27 and a SU-30. The world also witnessed the Indian pilot who was caught by Pakistani forces and later returned to India as a gesture of goodwill.

The scenario is revealing and should be worrying, to say the least, for Indian war planners. While the Indian media has been busy in jingoistic anti-Pakistan rhetoric, there is a serious need in India for soul searching. Blaming Pakistan or even provoking through wishful surgical strikes will not change reality. And the truth is that there are some fundamental problems in the obsolete Indian arsenal, military morale, as well as the politicization and the Saffronization, to a great extent, of the Indian armed forces. The dissenting voices betraying increasing disenchantment and disassociation within the military might are being silenced, either through lack of media coverage or by labeling them as pro-Pakistani.

India’s flying machines are akin to museum pieces and its arsenal could rightly be termed as ‘vintage.’ This confession and warning came from a member of the Indian Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, Gaurav Gogoi, who admitted that with almost 68% vintage equipment and only ten days’ worth of supplies, Indian troops are expected to fight on multiple domestic and international fronts.

2019 has exposed the outdated Indian arsenal of war. The year started with an Indian Air Force (IAF) Jaguar crashing in Uttar Pradesh due to technical failure. A few days later, on 1st February, a Mirage 2000 crashed in Bengaluru due to a technical flaw. On 12th February, an IAF MiG 27 crashed near Pokhran range, again due to a technical fault. On 20th February, two Hawk trainers collided mid-air during rehearsals for Aero India in Bengaluru. Almost a week later, an IAF MiG 21 was shot down by the Pakistan Airforce JF-17 Thunder during aerial combat. The Pakistan Airforce claims to have shot down one more IAF aircraft (probably a SU 30MKI during the same confrontation). Yet another IAF Mi7V5 helicopter was shot down, reportedly by a Surface to Air Missile fired by Indian Air Defence Systems, near Sri Nagar on 27th February. On 8th March, another IAF MiG 21 crashed in Rajasthan due to technical failure. All of this has occurred in the first quarter of the year, and when Modi may be planning another (mis)adventure before the election, as claimed by Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi.

Due to constant engagement in suppressing almost 36 active separatist movements in India, morale in the Indian military is effectively headed South. Videos recording discontent among soldiers over not getting enough rations surfaced in 2018 on social media. Instead of finding a solution to the problem itself, the soldier was expelled from the Army; ironically, he is contesting Modi in the 2019 elections.

India’s military problems are exacerbated by repetitive deployments and fighting domestically. There are pockets of serious unrest in Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, and Maharashtra. The Indian Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act has been used as a carte blanche by the army to kill, rape, torture and injure their fellow countrymen, women, children, the elderly and the disabled in Kashmir. Instead of introspection on the failed cross-border operation, Modi tried to score points by firing an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapon. The launch of ASAT proved to be more of an egoistic move to kill an ‘enemy’ no one had seen and which, other than NASA, very few probably really cared about.

To return to the importance of knowing oneself, another important lesson from Voltaire seems to have been forgotten by the Indians, which states that in a society with no space left for tolerance, civil war is likely to ensue. The Sangh Parivar focused on spreading Hindutva ideology, labels all Muslims as Pakistanis and all Pakistanis as enemies. Movements such as Shuddhi, Ghar Wapsi, Love Jihad, and Saffronization provide the worst spectre of human rights violations. This, coupled with the dangerous rise of the religious far-right in a nation carrying nuclear weapons, is not good news for domestic peace, nor for regional stability.

The dangers of excessive political dominance over Indian military decision making are also worrying. In the context of India and Pakistan, both armed with a dangerous nuclear arsenal, there is a need for leaders to know their own and their neighbour’s capabilities. Modi’s complete lack of comprehension and knowledge of domestic and regional military affairs, combined with nuclear weapons under his control, is a precursor for domestic unrest and poses a dangerous challenge to regional peace.

In 2019, PM Imran Khan stated on the National Assembly floor that if India continued with its aggression, matters could lead to war and would get out of the hands of both the leaders. Before that, the DG ISPR had said in a press conference that ‘Pakistan will always dominate the escalation ladder.’

Yet there is one school of thought in Pakistan which actually wants Modi to win and stay in power in India because Modi has done a great favour to Pakistan. And that favour is uniting the entire nation behind one cause – defend Pakistan! Those behind such thinking hope Modi wins again and stays in power. One hopes, however, that he doesn’t continue shooting himself in the foot.

Waseem Iftikhar Janjua is a PhD Scholar at National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan

Related Topics

Pulwama Crisis and the Indian Dilemma

Appraisal of Indian Army’s LWD – Would It Remain Relevant In The Post Pulwama Period?

Pulwama Crisis 2019: India’s Continued Ambition for Limited Strikes Under the Nuclear Overhang

Like many crises in the past including the more recent Pulwama crisis of 2019 between the two South Asian nuclear-powered states indicate both India’s continued ambitious for limited strikes against Pakistan and the existence of an acute inter-state rivalry between the two rivals. Also, this reflects that although nuclear weapons have deterred and still continue to deter bigger wars between India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons have certainly not deterred the crises and dangers of escalation to serious conflicts in South Asia. Non-state actors, terrorism, cyber espionage, border skirmishes, and multiple crises are challenging the core ingredients of nuclear deterrence.

These challenges would require alternative and correct strategies to fight against these emerging challenges rather than merely letting these threats to escalate to a level of unthinkable. It is up to the South Asian leadership to opt for right strategies against these odd threats that undermine the peace and stability of the region. That being noted, nuclear states need to be extremely careful not to blame each other directly because of these emerging challenges without actionable evidence, and plausible strategies to cope with these threats without crossing the defined red lines. Dangerous escalation between the strategic rivals could lead to bigger military confrontation and unthinkable miscalculation. When it comes to cost and benefit analysis, the cost certainly can be much higher than the benefits one may tempt to gain.

Pulwama episode that certainly endangered a serious crisis escalating to a military conflict between India and Pakistan reflect the shared weakening of confidence-building measures. Failure of learning credible lessons from the past crises, and dangers of more crises in future between the two South Asian rivals despite possessing deadly weapons bolstered with sophisticated delivery systems that can mutually destroy each other which neither South Asian rationale leadership would want this to happen in the first place.

The key question is: why India continues to be assertive and ambitious for waging limited strikes and possibly a limited war against parts of Pakistan under the credible nuclear overhang in South Asia. Also, it is imperative to know whether or not India calculates the strategic consequences of its self-perceived strategy for the so-called surgical strikes by achieving its military and political goals? There can be multiple reasons for Indian ambitious civilian and military leadership to achieve their political and military goals, but some of the plausible factors remain significant that provide India the confidence and incentives to go for, even though it may lack the credible capability.

Over Ambition for Carrying Out Surgical Strikes.     When it comes to essential ingredients of deterrence –that is, capability and intention, capability and the application of capability matter much more than intention because intention can be changed overnight. But, ambitious intention with poor capability can cause the dangers of escalation and risk of war in South Asia. For example, a state may intend to be extremely ambitious, say, India in the wake of Pulwama incident to strategize and preempt parts of Pakistan from the Line of Control (LOC) to achieve its limited goals, without intending to provoke Pakistan to react. India however, failed to achieve both its military and political goals the way it might have wanted. It rather instantly provoked Pakistan to respond against India’s act of aggression across the LoC by at least shooting down two of its Mig 21 fighter jets. Unnecessarily, this could potentially trigger a major military confrontation between the two rivals.

The failure of producing credible evidence of what Indian security leadership intended to reflect India’s internal structural and technical weakness despite India’s consistent increase of its defense budget and increasing billion dollars strategic partnership with major leading countries including the US. Theoretically, India might have intended to achieve specific ambitious goals through its so-called surgical strike planning, but in practice India had to quickly de-escalate, show restraint, and back-off from its failed strategy especially when the Pakistani nation got united, and its armed forces responded befittingly by declaring that it can do so “at the time and place of its choosing.”

Ambitious strategy and intention with poor capability often doom away, but they also risk the dangers of escalation between the two rivals particularly when they are in acute inter-state rivalry. Next time around, India’s act of aggression across both the LoC and international border while penetrating deep into Pakistani territory can be extremely dangerous in South Asia. India, as a self-proclaimed responsible state with aspiration, to rise as a regional power cannot strategize to preempt Pakistan possessing strong conventional and nuclear forces because of the crisis that India could possibly prevent in the first place.

Escalation Dominance and Power Projection.          Like the classic Cold War strategic imperatives where both the US and the Soviet Union endeavored to retain their escalation dominance and power projection against each other, particularly when each side built thousands of nuclear weapons along with their delivery systems trying to outpace each other in such a strategic competition; India attempts to retain both escalation dominance and power projection against its potential adversaries in the broader Southern Asia. India can neither be the former Soviet Union nor the US, and it may not exactly match with what the Cold War superpowers strategized to practice.

With its growing strategic partnership with major powers and becoming one of the largest arms imported countries, power projection and escalation dominance tend to become the hallmark of its strategy against its adversaries. Retaining escalation dominance and power projection elements might have encouraged India to instantly undertake the dangerous route for strikes and escalation in the wake of Pulwama incident. Post-Pulwama India’s option for striking inside the territory of Pakistan and mobilizing of its naval forces closer to Pakistani cities for preemptive strikes purposes clearly reflect its perceived power projection and escalation dominance against its potential adversaries. However, this further activates the security dilemma, an arms race, and crisis instability between the South Asian rivals.

Overconfidence on Increasing Strategic Partnership.          India with its economic boost, growing economic ties with many major countries across the world including its strategic rival China, and its potential strategic partnership with many leading countries such as the US, Russia, China, Israel, and France most probably have provided India major incentives to expand its strategic outreach, even if it risks to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighboring states.

India exploits this timely and turns these opportunities to the fullest of its strategic advantages having the confidence that major countries stakes are higher because the kind of money India spends to buy nuclear technology and advanced conventional weapons from these countries that help shape the international politics. Why would these leading powers oppose India’s strategic motives in South Asia when each of these countries would compete in an evolving Indian economy and supports India’s aspiration to rise as a regional power?  Whether or not India possesses the right type of capability and has a correct strategy planning for limited strikes against Pakistan, its growing strategic partnership with major powers certainly boosts up India’s confidence to exploit crises for escalation to its advantage even if it may lead to a dangerous miscalculation. In doing this, India tends to erode the deterrence stability of South Asia by raising the ante to its strategic favor.

Arming for Counterforce Targeting.       Although still far from the classic counterforce targeting strategy as this would require much more refined technological advancement and major conventional force modernization, post-Pulwama crisis and India’s consistent struggle for its so-called surgical strikes reflect India’s motives to advance its capability for counterforce targeting. The internal debate in India and the current political sentiments indicate that India might be marching towards such a strategy to become a counterforce cow-boy planning to hit as many Pakistan’s deterrent forces as it can in a preemptive first strike without even provoking Pakistan to use its nuclear weapons first and later use its retaliatory forces.

Many in India may perceive that India strategic planners may have the confidence to protect India through its deployed defense systems against the remainder 5% to 10% of Pakistani forces. However, the tragedy with evolving counterforce strategy is that it has no substantial empirical evidence. Also, it is not guaranteed whether or not State A possessing overwhelming technological advancement and counterforce targeting forces could destroy all of the targets of State B in one go without provoking the latter to retaliate effectively particularly when the latter is extremely good at producing effective countermeasures. This even becomes more difficult and complex between two credible nuclear weapon states.

Both the Soviet Union and the US produced thousands of nuclear forces for achieving first strike capability, but they have never used preemptive counterforce strikes because even few forces used in retaliation could become unacceptable to both the US and the Soviet Union. The Cuban Missile crisis still remains a classic example in this context, and there are plausible lessons for South Asian nuclear rivals. They were under Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) despite their capabilities for counterforce targeting.

MAD has arrived in South Asia. The counterforce cowboys for South Asia have yet to wait to collect concrete evidence before correcting and proving right their side of the story.  In doing this, it may be simple to draw the theoretical framework for such a strategy, but it becomes more complicated when it comes to practice. MAD causes mutual vulnerabilities when it comes to counterforce targeting strategy between nuclear weapon states. Post-Pulwama air strikes by India may encourage India to strategize for counterforce targeting, but it certainly cannot be guaranteed whether or not India will remain successful in doing this.

Revisiting the Dialogue Process and Restraint Regime.       India and Pakistan must sit together to discuss all issues including the longstanding issue of Kashmir. We have also observed that the consistent absence of regular talks between the two rivals has also produced many crises in South Asia. It cannot be wrong to mention that the more India and Pakistan get away from direct talks, the more this creates communication gaps, and the worse the gaps are exploited by non-state actors.

Leading powers including the US still need to play a balancing role without taking sides. Nuclear deterrence is very much in place deterring bigger wars in South Asia, though the risk for more significant escalation to nuclear level cannot be ruled out, and more importantly, there is a need for both India and Pakistan to bilaterally undertake serious and concrete steps towards de-escalation, normalization, and prevention of future crises.  Therefore, there is a need to revisit the proposed strategic restraint regime what Pakistan earlier proposed and India rejected. It will be in the mutual benefit of South Asian nuclear rivals to sustain peace and stability and ensure deterrence stability.

 

Dr. Zafar Khan (Ph.D. Strategic Studies, University of Hull, UK) author of the book Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy: a Minimum Credible Deterrence (London and New York: Routledge, 2015). Currently, he serves as an Assistant Professor at the Department of Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Islamabad where he teaches nuclear strategy and strategic studies. His papers have appeared in various international peer-reviewed journals such as Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Comparative Strategy, Washington Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary China, and Contemporary Security Policy.

 

Related Articles

India and Pakistan: Need to move beyond skirmishes

Sensational Media Can Aggravate Indo-Pak Crisis

Pakistan’s JF-17: New Force to Reckon

Pakistan shot down two Indian Air Force Mig 21 aircraft on Feb 27, 2019, by using its JF-17 aircraft, also called as Thunder. This would go a long way in establishing the primacy of this lightweight, single engine, multi-role aircraft that many countries are evaluating for their air forces.

 

JF-17 aircraft is a joint production of Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC). JF-17 can be used for different roles and can carry advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles and other ordinance of varying dimensions and warheads, and other precision-guided munitions. The aircraft is powered by turbofan engines with afterburners. Due to its peculiar aerodynamics, the aircraft is highly agile and is considered in many ways a strong competitor with the U.S. made F-16s.

 

JF-17 was inducted in the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in 2011 and has an impeccable safety record over the past many years. Earlier, the aircraft has been extensively used by Pakistan against the militants along the Afghanistan border but was never used in actual aerial combat in the past.

 

The recent aerial success by JF-17 aircraft is likely to interest many potential buyers, including Malaysia that is already engaged in talks with Pakistan to replace some of its ageing Mig 29 aircraft. Due to its affordable price of $ US 32 million, as compared to other aircraft in this category, JF17 seems to be the best choice for many medium-sized air forces, especially once it has established its credentials as a deadly machine in the air.