Tag: Asia

Kartarpur Corridor and Ayodha Judgement: A Tale of Two Events

Inauguration of Kartarpur Corridor. On 9th November, Prime Minister Imran Khan inaugurated the Kartarpur corridor which enabled Sikh pilgrims to visit their second-holiest site without a visa. The inauguration was held two days prior to the 550th birth anniversary of Guru Nanak Dev, the founder of Sikh religion. The shrine is where Guru Nanak spent 18 years of his life and is his final resting place. The opening of this corridor would enable 5000 Indian Sikhs to visit the holy place daily. Moreover, on the initial day there was no requirement of a passport, the entrance fee of $20 was waived off and the pilgrims did not need to register themselves 10 days earlier, as would be generally required. Ultimately after 72 years, the distance that originally took around 125 kilometres was reduced to 4 kilometres. Not only was the opening of the corridor special for the Sikh living in India but it also served as a morale booster for the Sikh community residing in Pakistan.

The Indian delegation that came to Pakistan included the former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who led the Sikh delegation as they crossed into Pakistan through the Corridor. Former Indian Cricketer Navjot Singh Sidhu was also present at the ceremony and applauded this monumental initiative. Interestingly, the Bollywood actor Sunny Deol who is known for doing anti-Pakistan films also attended the ceremony. A larger number of Sikh pilgrims from different states such as the USA, UK and Canada also arrived for the event.

The Indian side tried its best to make this initiative controversial, yet circumstances resulted into Modi himself inaugurating the corridor on the Indian side. At this moment, Modi was forced to praise and thank Imran Khan for this initiative. Before the first delegation from India set off, Modi addressed the Sikh community and lauded the opening of the corridor. The Indian PM stated, “I also thank Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan for understanding India’s wishes and turning Kartarpur into reality.”

The ongoing year has marked a new low in the already strained India-Pak relations. At a time when tensions were running high with a curfew still imposed in Kashmir, Pakistan took a colossal step. The US State Department also welcomed the initiative and gave a statement on the day it was opened. “The US welcomes the opening of a new border crossing between India and Pakistan, the Kartarpur corridor, US State Department Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus said in a video posted on her official twitter handle.

Under a bilateral protocol signed in 1974, the two countries agreed to facilitate cross-border visits to holy sites. The list included 15 sites in Pakistan and 5 sites in India, yet Kartarpur was not on the list. The initial discussion for the corridor began in 1998, yet it failed to precipitate any concrete results. However, the incumbent government of PTI was determined and the structure was finished in a record time of just 12 months.

This initiative is a milestone achievement for Pakistan. Firstly, it augments the fact that Pakistan wants peace in the region. While India is doing its best to erect and spread an anti-Pakistan narrative, the corridor highlights that it is Pakistan which is undertaking measures that would propagate regional peace. Pakistan has dispatched a message of peace as the Kartarpur initiative survived, despite events that signalled that the corridor could be a victim of the India-Pak tensions.

Secondly, Pakistan reasserted its position on Kashmir. Even though Pakistan did not call off the corridor despite the strained relations yet it reinforced its stance on the Kashmir issue. Imran Khan highlighted that it’s been 100 days since the Kashmiri people were placed under curfew. The Prime Minister urged his Indian counterpart that the Kashmir issue should be resolved for the betterment of the South Asian region. Moreover, the issue should be resolved while taking into consideration their right to self-determination. The Prime Minister also signalled that lifting the curfew could pave way for a dialogue between both of the states. Ergo, it becomes evident that opening the Kartarpur does not dilute Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir issue.

Ayodhya Verdict.       Ironically, the day Pakistan opened the door for Sikh pilgrims to visit their holy site also encompassed the verdict passed by the Indian Supreme Court in favour of Hindu hard-liners by allowing them to build a temple in place of Babri Masjid, a 16th century mosque at Ayodhya Land. The dispute over the land dates back to decades as certain Hindu segments have claimed that the mosque was built on the birthplace of Ram, a Hindu deity. The mosque was demolished by Hindu extremists in 1992, killing around 2000 people, the majority of whom were Muslims.

The Supreme Court allowed the building of a temple at that site despite acknowledging that there was no Hindu temple beneath Babri Masjid, thereby dismissing the claims that the mosque was built on a Hindu temple. Muslims on the other hand were given a 5-acre land as compensation for building the mosque. Indian right-wing militant organizations, such as Vishwa Hindu Parishad, asserted that the verdict on Babri Masjid is not the end, rather it is the beginning and we should now continue with other mosques as well.

The Babri Masjid was in possession of the Muslim community for centuries and there was no legal dimension to give it for the construction of a temple. The narrative that the mosque was built over a Hindu temple was advocated so staunchly by Hindu hardliners that people are not willing to believe that it was a myth, despite the Supreme Court stating it openly.

At a time when Pakistan extended the 5-acre land of Kartarpur to 42 acres and spent millions on the initiative, the Indian Muslims were ordered to accept the inexplicable decision given by the Indian Supreme Court. Hindu hardliners even harassed Sikh pilgrims coming back from Kartarpur at this occasion. There are chances that this precedent might invoke other extremists to further squeeze the level of toleration for minorities. Vinay Katiyar, a member of parliament for the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), told the media, “There is not much difference between Taj and Tej [Mandir]” referring to a claim made earlier that Taj Mahal was built after demolition of a Hindu Temple. He further added, “Taj Mahal will be converted into Tej Mandir soon.” These claims reveal the level of unacceptance for Indian Muslims that is intensifying in India with every coming day. On the contrary, in April 2019, the Pakistani government announced that it would be re-opening the temples that have been closed since partition in 1947.

Such judgments will further sow the seeds of hatred and violence in India, as the decision was rejected by the Muslim community of India. In the long run it will be the focal point of the Hindu-Muslim tensions paving way for religious polarization. This can be proven from the fact that after the judgement, internet facilities were cut off in Aligarh where a large number of Muslims reside. The rationale of choosing the same date for this controversial judgment was to divert the debate towards this issue and avert attention from the Kartarpur initiative. On the contrary, this attempt did not bear any fruit and the Kartarpur initiative was appreciated widely.

Conclusion.     This corridor did not break the ice between India and Pakistan, yet it made it clear who actually wants peace in the region. Although the ceremony at the Indian side attempted to take equal credit, the actual credit goes to Imran Khan for making it possible as it could not have materialized without the firm willingness of the Pakistani government. With this initiative Pakistan has indeed manifested the statement given by its founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah, “You are free; you are free to go to your temples. You are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the state.”

Meanwhile, the so-called secular India is ostracizing its Muslim community. When prominent Muslim personalities raise their voices against this oppressive behaviour, they are labelled as Neo-Jinnah by the ruling party in order to silence them. Indeed the atrocities that have been executed on Kashmiris are now spreading towards other Indian Muslims by the Hindutva republic.

Strategic Stability in South Asia

South Asia can be termed as the harbinger of the 2nd Nuclear Age post World War II. With grand strategic designs and desires, India acquired nuclear weapons and induced a security dilemma which forced Pakistan to go for nuclear weapons as well. As of today, Pakistan, India, China, North Korea, and aspirant Iran, are states with varying shades of nuclear and strategic weapons which have direct implications on the strategic stability of the region. India and Pakistan are on top of the list, involved in a perpetual strategic competition based on history, culture and grand designs. There is a brief analysis in the succeeding paras to identify the nature of strategic stability existing in South Asia, focusing on India and Pakistan.

As per the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Strategic stability usually refers to a state of affairs in which countries are confident that their adversaries would not be able to undermine their nuclear deterrent capability”. However, with the advent of other weapons and their regimes (Ballistic Missiles, Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles, Anti-Ballistic Missiles, and Tactical Nuclear Weapons), the scope of this concept has been expanded, especially in context of South Asia. Post-World War II and during the Cold War era, nuclear weapons were solely responsible for the concept of strategic stability and seldom the conventional weapon(s) became part of this discussion overtly. However, in context of India and Pakistan, this debate has roots in conventional asymmetry and overt nuclearization.

Some of the factors which have direct bearing on the strategic stability in South Asia are discussed ahead.

One, Indian aspirations and hegemonistic designs based on Chanakiyan thoughts of Akhand Bharat were always the sole driver of its foreign policy which was adopted accordingly. Subsequently Nehruvian thoughts of India as a regional super power and of-late net security provider in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) are important cardinals driving the strategic stability conundrum.

Two, Pakistan is the only nation in the South Asian region opposing the Indian supremacy. 1948, 1965, 1971 and Kargil were clear indications of this rivalry. It is in this backdrop that there is an arms race in conventional weapons. The asymmetry in the conventional capabilities was accentuated with Indian nuclearization which was addressed by Pakistan’s overt nuclearization in 1998. Other realms of foreign policy in interstate relations also exhibit similar rivalries.

Three, the Kashmir issue has been simmering since independence and, to a large extent, has casted shadows on the strategic situation between both the states. Wars between both the states had roots in Kashmir. Even the present stand-off between India and Pakistan is over Kashmir-related differences.

Four, Indian Armed Forces continue to strive to use their conventional superiority in kinetic forces, from the Sunderji Doctrine to the Cold Start Doctrine, the evolution is impacting the strategic equation of the region.

Five, in the evolving geo-political situation, Afghanistan imbroglio, Indo-China power contestation, US-China multi-realm wars, Russian resurgence and ingress, evolving Gulf situation with the interplay of Pakistan and Indian domestic politics, have further mutated the strategic stability equation and a number of variables have started impacting the outcomes. Interestingly the impact of variables is so inconsistent across both sides of the spectrum, that its beyond prediction and comprehension.

Six, the obsolescent unipolar world and the increase in populism is greatly affecting Indo-Pak strategic stability. Modi is completely engrossed in Hindutva – an epitome of populism, and the US and Israel are following the same stride. Hence, Pakistan struggled to offset this imbalance, and this led to the precarious Kashmir situation and Indo-Pak standoff. All these developments impact regional and global stability as well.

Strategic stability is not a fixed proposition and there is always an effort to maintain the equilibrium. There are various factors in the context of South Asia and Indo-Pak affecting strategic stability. One, with the blurring boundaries between various generations and categories of warfare, the concepts of hybrid warfare and grey hybrid have crept in, which are more lethal in their effect and tend to alter stability to a great extent while remaining short of application on direct strategy, where the pull is felt towards conventional or strategic capabilities.

Two, a new debate of multi-domain or cross-domain operations is taking place, which will soon be relevant in context of South Asia. China and the US are already grappling with the idea of multi- or cross-domain operations and deterrence. India, by virtue of its advent in other important domains such as space and artificial intelligence, would soon be joining the club. Three, at times the advent of new weapon systems also becomes the cause of altering the strategic equation. Hyper velocity and multi-entry launch vehicles are a point of concern. Four, the global race for fossil fuels and energy security has taken over all other aspects and is also impacting the strategic stability of the region.  The US, China, Gulf and Middle East are experiencing energy security issues. In Pakistan, energy, food and water security are being threatened by nefarious Indian designs; hence, strategic stability is directly or indirectly impacted. Lately the echoes of the “water manoeuvre”, which may lead to the abrogation of the Indus Water Treaty, would be a greater germination of strategic instability.

Five, the Indian Ocean region, the Pacific, and now Africa, are experiencing the race of global powers to extend their reach and project a global role. The US’ positions in the Indian Ocean region, the Gulf, and the Pacific is gradually being hedged by Chinese bases (termed a String of Pearls). Pakistan is an important player in the China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which is hurting the strategic interests of the US and India. This indirectly affects Pakistan and its position in the global arena. Perpetual positioning of the world power has a latent and overt effect on the strategic calculus of the region, and this is much more pronounced in the context of Indo-Pak. The presence of US forces in Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean region and the Gulf, amidst Indian and Chinese hedging and counter-hedging are matters of concern.

In order to ensure that there is a minimum acceptable degree of strategic stability, deterrence must never fail – no military action should take place between India and Pakistan or India and China for that matter. Relations between India and China are neither good nor bad, but chances of a military confrontation are also predicted by nuclear deterrence. In the case of India and Pakistan, post-Kargil no major military action has taken place and is again based on nuclear deterrence which is very effective. However, at times, certain incidents tend to tilt the balance in this strategic stability, like Uri, Pulwama, and developments thereafter.

Hence, in order to ensure that the static stability in this region is maintained certain steps can be taken. Firstly, although there are arrangements between both the states to ensure strategic stability and obviate any miscalculation from both sides, yet the veracity and sincerity of the communications would be very essential for success of these communications. Secondly, Indian Land Warfare Doctrine 2018 and Indian Nuclear Doctrine 2003 are both very offensive in nature and the paradox of credible – minimum against China and Pakistan threatens strategic stability. On the other hand, Pakistan’s ambiguous nuclear doctrine and its developments in Tactical Nuclear Weapons are all for ensuring national sovereignty and strategic stability. There is a need to carve out policies ensuring stability. Hegemonism and offensive attributes are to be curtailed.

Thirdly, both Pakistan and India should ensure a robust command and control system of strategic weapons. Any loopholes must be addressed to assuage the concerns of either side. A transparent policy would be very advantageous. Unlike the US – Russia model, a model which is suitable for Pakistan and India in line with the geographical realities, historical baggage and evolving global challenges would be of a much advantage. Fourthly, as of now both states have yet to join the global arms control regimes (NPT, CTBT) based on mutual reasoning. In case both become signatories (which appears to be a remote possibility), further de-escalation in conventional asymmetry would help in ensuring the strategic stability.

Further to all this, until both the states do not address the issue from the lens of reality, mutual acceptance and co-existence, strategic stability will appear as a dream. Economy, trade, education and tourism through apt diplomacy may become a source of panacea. Regionalism instead of globalism can further the advantages. India and Pakistan are already members of SAARC and SCO, which could be exploited to accrue the desired stability while taking help from Russia and China besides other Central Asian Republic states.

Strategic stability in current times is not as simple as it was 20 years before or when the likes of Bernard Brodie or Kahn wrote their treatises. It is much more complex and a lot of other variables have entered the equation. The E=MC2 of strategic stability has been replaced with much more complex alphas and betas and gammas which are directly and inversely proportional. Yet the basics to disincentivize the use of nukes are sought for prevention any military conflict between India and Pakistan. This also entails doctrinal development, responsibility of restraint and adherence to regimes, and domestic control mechanisms besides the much-wanted political emancipation.

Future of Global Politics

One of the most pressing questions faced by academics and policymakers alike is what will be the direction of global politics in coming years? The intellectual and political turmoil of the existing global liberal order, the rising power of China, the increasing salience of Asia and the rise to power of populist/anti-status quo politicians in major capitals, have accelerated the urge for answers to complex questions. As world politics is dynamic in nature because of the changing influence of major powers over it, it would be pertinent to assess the direction of these major powers to determine the direction of global politics.

The United States emerged as the sole super power after the demise of the bipolar global order that was centered on U.S.-Soviet Union competition. Its identity is linked to free market ideology and liberal democracy, and it defined the unipolar order post 1989 on these values. Today, however, U.S. power is waning relative to other major powers and America is less enthusiastic in its support for the institutions it helped create to manage post WWII spoils. The U.S. still has a cutting edge military and is also leading several scientific and industrial innovations. But other powers are catching up and affecting the ability of the United States to steer politics in its direction, a challenge unprecedented since 1989. The ‘Trump Sentiment’ in the U.S., though anti-establishment in its domestic outlook, shares common perceptions about external outlook.

Russian policy from the early 1990s till 2005 was aimed at recovering from the shock of the demise of the Soviet Union. When it recovered, it found the U.S. embroiled in the quagmire of Iraq and Afghanistan; it used this time to consolidate the gains made under President Putin and rebuild and renovate its energy and defense sectors. The U.S. being consumed in undermining the Arab Spring and sustaining the Sykes-Picot order in the Middle East provided additional breathing space to both China and Russia to expand their influence in their neighborhood and global institutions. All these elements have enabled Russia to cooperate and compete with the U.S. largely on its own terms. The emergence of China as a major global power on the world stage has enhanced Russia’s bargaining position with both the U.S. and China. Thus, its current approach of selective positive engagements and competition with China and the U.S. will continue under Putin.

Europe has played a leading role in the intellectual and political development of the ‘Westphalian State model’ and the ‘Concert of Europe’. The Concert of Europe, the European way of organizing international relations via international conferences and multilateral agreements, has evolved and transformed into the present global institutions, international law and multilateral treatise. It is interesting to note that the principle driving factor (and the challenge) of Europe’s post-Westphalian revolution has always been same: preventing the rise of a single hegemon on the European continent. The European Union is the latest manifestation of such a project since its inception till date. But the political and economic forces underpinning the EU are under stress from both internal and external elements. The danger of a return to major power conflict within the European block is real. BREXIT has undermined European cohesion and the current trajectory of a rising Germany has raised more doubts than assurances for the European question. Thus, with these difficulties, Europe is trying to manage increasing hostility from the U.S., Chinese economic outreach and a resurgent Russian bear to the North.

China is the new entrant in the club of major global powers. With hard earned wealth, it is building political and strategic clout conducive for its development. China is closing the technological gap with the West in both the commercial and military fields. It has taken its time to launch its own economic and financial initiatives to support its growth in the form of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Development and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB). But despite the impressive success story, China faces formidable domestic and external challenges to its rise. Domestically, the contradiction of one communist party managing a market economy remains unresolved. Externally, the U.S. and the West in general enjoy more cultural and political support in other nations as opposed to the “Chinese Model”.

Another important and often overlooked aspect of current global politics is the intellectual vacuum. There is a general resentment against neoliberalism as well as the international institutions sustaining it. The 2008 global financial crisis only amplified this resentment. The “Chinese Model” is as vague as it is unattractive to the majority of nations. The intellectual void, thus, is essentially the lack of new ideas/alternatives for the management of global economy and politics. The current wave of populism against the “status quo” is merely an emotional phenomenon that lacks intellectual depth. The intellectual struggle therefore will also shape the outlook of global politics.

The battle for identities has also staged a comeback in the global arena. The intellectual vacuum at the global level has, in many ways, facilitated the internal conversations of many nations struggling to determine their national direction under competing visions. Europe is struggling between nationalism and a singular identity; India is under the grip of exclusionary Hindutva politics; and the Muslim world is debating the role of Islam in politics away from the current unstable organizing structures of Westphalian origin. Thus, much of global politics will now also be determined by the conclusion of these raging internal debates in nations on the question of identity.

These existing global political trends can lead to the following outcomes:

  1. With further deterioration of major power relations in sight, Europe can be expected to move away from NATO towards its own military structure. The political consensus for such a security arrangement is a work in progress.
  2. A new balance of power emerging from ongoing major powers’ struggle will be more relevant than existing global institutions managed through so called international law. The exact outline of this new balance cannot be drawn but its emergence is inevitable.
  3. Increasing tensions will emerge between the regional players aligned with major power competition, thereby further exacerbating both the nuclear and conventional arms race in regions.
  4. The Russia-China strategic collaboration against the United States will intensify.
  5. The prospects of gold replacing the dollar as the global financial instrument will pose a serious challenge for the neoliberal economy, and unleash further conflict in the political and economic domains.
  6. The increasing salience of identity has the potential to make the emerging balance of power more ideological than Machiavellian.

 

The march towards a new political order is unmistakable. The preservation of territorial integrity has been a key pillar of the existing order, but its crisis is visible where regional maps are either changing or being forced change, as is the case, for example, in Kashmir, the Middle East, Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. The old maps represented the consensus of division of influence amongst major global and regional powers. That consensus is waning fast.

Afghan Deadlock

The latest twist in the torturous path to an Afghan peace has been the failure to implement the much anticipated prisoner swap as expected on 15 September, which was announced by the Afghan government a few days earlier. This exchange – 3 Taliban prisoners held by Kabul for an American and an Australian in the Taliban’s custody – was projected as a key US condition for resuming the American-Taliban dialogue, suspended by President Trump in early September. As a result, the Afghan peace process has hit yet another deadlock. Given the complications involved, such a setback will also defeat efforts to put the Afghan peace efforts back on track, thereby continuing the misery of the Afghans who have been at war for over 3 decades. The continuing Afghan conflict will also prolong Pakistan’s problems arising from the instability in Afghanistan.

Despite fighting the longest war in its history, the US has failed to defeat the Taliban for 18 years. During the Obama presidency, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, tried to find a political solution after recognizing that there was no military solution possible. However, these efforts were undermined by the American security establishment, especially the Pentagon, which was determined to pursue the military option. Even President Trump, whose election campaign promise was to extricate the US from “costly foreign wars”, was initially persuaded by his generals to intensify the offensive against the Taliban to secure a military victory. When that proved elusive within a year, Trump changed his approach and in a major departure from past policies, agreed to talk directly to the Taliban.

The ensuing dialogue over about a year led to a potential agreement envisaging a phased US and allied troop withdrawal in return for a Taliban commitment to cut off all links to terrorist groups and ensuring that Afghan soil would not be used to attack the US or its allies. Once this agreement was signed, the Taliban also undertook to accept a ceasefire and engage in an Afghan peace process with all Afghan factions, including the Afghan government, in a departure from their earlier rejection of any dialogue with the “puppet” Kabul regime. Most significantly, given US concerns about “protecting” its “gains” in Afghanistan, the Taliban consented to an initial US withdrawal of 5,400 troops within 135 days and a drawdown of the residual 8,500 troops within 16 months, depending on security conditions. This remains the best possible deal that the US can get under the circumstances.

But, once again, American hardliners in the establishment, Congress, media and think-tanks have scuttled the agreement and Trump, using a Taliban attack in Kabul in which an American soldier was killed, called off the talks, declaring them as “dead” on the eve of signing the agreement. Criticizing Trump for bad faith, the Taliban have maintained that killing of the American soldier was an untenable argument since neither side had agreed to a ceasefire and the US and Afghan forces continued to target Taliban fighters as well.

Apart from American critics of the agreement, this set-back has suited the Afghan government and Afghan opponents of the Taliban such as the Northern Alliance dominated by ethnic Tajiks who do not want the mostly Pashtun Taliban to be in power again. President Ghani’s government had, therefore, insisted on being a party to the US-Taliban talks and when it was kept out at the Taliban’s behest, refused to endorse the dialogue outcome. Ghani also insisted on going ahead with holding the postponed Afghan Presidential elections as the mechanism for an Afghan peace settlement. But the low voter turnout in the elections, opposition to the polling by the Taliban and the contested results of the election, especially between President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah of the Northern Alliance, have all put the election route in jeopardy.

Since another round of polling will be required, this option will almost indefinitely delay start of the Afghan peace process. Meanwhile, other important Afghan leaders like Gulbadeen Hikmatyar and former President Karzai are opposed to this track and are pushing for an intra-Afghan dialogue with the Taliban. In other words, the internal Afghan situation remains murky and complicated to say the least.

For Pakistan and other countries like China and Russia, the best way forward is to resume the US-Taliban dialogue and conclude the agreement that has already been negotiated. Pakistan approached both the Taliban and the Americans to restart their negotiations. Informal meetings between these 2 sides have also taken place. While the Taliban are ready to reengage and conclude the agreement, the US has asked for additional measures by the Taliban, perhaps to give some face saving to Trump. One of these conditions has been the exchange of prisoners that was aborted at virtually the last minute.

Meanwhile, American opponents of the agreement have not relented. They continue to maintain that the potential agreement is flawed and that “no agreement is better than a bad agreement”. Their fundamental objection is that the Taliban cannot be trusted to break their links with Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups, with which they claim the Taliban continue to maintain close relations. Accordingly, they advocate a “Plan B” which is to continue maintaining an American troop presence in Afghanistan and supporting the Afghan government – which is actually no alternative plan at all since this is the same old failed policy that the US has pursued over the last 18 years. More of the same will not bring about different results. Moreover, the advocates of this approach ignore the fact, perhaps intentionally, that the most serious terrorist threat confronting the US and Afghanistan today is not from a depleted Al-Qaida but ISIS, whose ranks have been joined by Al-Qaida and Taliban defectors, and is in confrontation with the Taliban. If the US truly wants to win over the Taliban, it should actually cooperate with them against the spreading influence of ISIS. But the Americans have chosen not to do so.

If President Trump survives the campaign currently underway to impeach him and contests the presidential election next year, he will need to fulfill his promise to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan for which there is growing support from his electoral base and is also increasingly endorsed by American war veterans. In the absence of an agreement with the Taliban, on which progress on an Afghan peace process also depends, Trump may decide to withdraw troops unilaterally or at most maintain a reduced presence.

In such an eventuality, the situation in Afghanistan will deteriorate with an intensified civil war in the country. This would be disastrous for Afghans as well as for the region, especially Pakistan. To avert such an outcome, Pakistan needs to continue with its efforts to ensure conclusion of an American-Taliban agreement together with a renewed Afghan peace process. This involves not only convincing the US and the Taliban to move forward but also working with other regional powers like China, Russia and Iran to jointly support a power sharing agreement among the Afghans to end their decades long fratricide. But eventually, it will be up to the Afghans themselves to decide their own fate and come out of the current deadlock.

(The writer is a former Ambassador of Pakistan. The views expressed here are his own).

India-Pakistan Crises and Nuclear Escalation Dynamics

The February 2019 military crisis has once again exposed the fragility of the India-Pakistan deterrence relationship that continues to remain under stress for various internal and external factors. The long history of wars and the propensity of both countries to indulge in military crisis in a nuclearized environment with increasing frequency poses a major challenge to strategic stability in South Asia.

Contextualizing Deterrence Stability.           Deterrence is a coercive strategy used to persuade the adversary that it must not act in a way that could be considered detrimental to own security interests. Deterrence, as a concept predates the advent of nuclear weapons, but in the nuclear age, it is mostly associated with the use, or the threat of use of nuclear weapons, to achieve the desired political objectives.

Nuclear weapons are considered to be ‘political’ weapons and must never be used, unless the very existence of the state is at risk. Nuclear deterrence nevertheless faces inherent dilemma – nuclear weapons deter by the very fact that they remain useable, and if a nuclear possessor state continues to insist that it will never use these weapons, it will no longer be able to perform their primary function of deterring the adversary.

Nuclear deterrence can be divided into two main categories: deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Former promises punitive retaliation to discourage and prevent the adversary from pursuing an undesired path, while the latter aims to complicate the cost-benefit calculus of the adversary and reducing the incentive for pursuing an undesired path that is viewed detrimental to own security interests. There is yet another form of deterrence known as the ‘compellence’ strategy, which aims to coerce the adversary to adopt a certain course of action under the fear of nuclear retribution.

Due to the complexities involved in deterrence by the punishment model, most nuclear states prefer to opt for deterrence by the denial model by building their conventional capabilities and raising the nuclear threshold. Conventional deterrence, nevertheless, has its own inherent limitations and could be challenged by the adversary. This does not necessarily mean that the contestable nature of conventional deterrence makes it less credible, or the incontestable nature of nuclear threat would always be more credible.

Nuclear Deterrence and India-Pakistan Nuclear Crises.      Pakistan and India have fought three wars since their independence (1948, 1965 and 1971). After the nuclearization of the region, there has been no major war between the two countries, however, both countries have engaged in a series of military crises, which included 1986-87 (Exercise Brasstacks); 1999 (Kargil Conflict); 2001-02 military stand-off (Twin Peak crisis); 2008 (Mumbai Crisis); and the most recent one of February 2019 (Balakot Strikes).

The increasing frequency of crises has been attributed to a phenomenon known as ‘stability-instability paradox’ – if there is stability at the strategic level, adversaries would have greater incentive to engage at a lower spectrum of conflict with each other. There is however no conclusive evidence to corroborate whether the past crises were a result of stability-instability paradox or an outcome of different perceptions of each other’s capabilities and intent.

Despite experiencing several military crises both countries were deterred from engaging in a major military conflict mainly due to the presence of nuclear weapons. During the two major crises of 1986-87 and 2001-02 where India had threatened to launch a major military offensive, Pakistan resorted to ‘deterrence by punishment’ model; whereas in the rest of crises (1999, 2008, 2019), ‘deterrence by the denial’ model seems to have prevented both sides from climbing up the escalation ladder.

During the recent military crisis, the Indian leadership did threaten the use of nuclear weapons, but these statements were seen mainly intended to appease the domestic audience and to build BJP’s nationalist credentials. Such rhetoric could however influence Pakistan’s strategic thinking and could be destabilizing for the region.

Challenged Assumptions.      The Balakot crisis has also challenged some of the prevailing assumptions about the nuclear South Asia. It was generally assumed that after the introduction of the Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) posture by Pakistan, there is no space for ‘any’ military conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. On the contrary, India not only claimed to have launched a land-based surgical strike in 2016, but also carried out an aerial surgical strike in February 2019. Pakistan did not respond to the 2016 surgical strike and negated India’s claim, but opted to provide a matching response after the 2019 aerial surgical strike, which led to the shooting down of two of the Indian Air Force aircraft. This aerial battle may help strengthen the prevalent Indian perception that space for a limited conventional military conflict does exist between the two nuclear armed adversaries.

Another commonly held assumption was that in response to India’s military aggression, including a limited conventional strike, Pakistan would be forced to use its nuclear weapons. Instead, Pakistan not only opted to respond proportionally with a counter surgical strike, but also demonstrated visible restraint in its nuclear signalling. This not only helped re-establish the credibility of conventional deterrence between the two countries with asymmetric conventional potential but may have helped reinforce Pakistan’s FSD posture.

There was also a belief that in case of a military conflict between the two countries, India would be willing to escalate conventionally and launch its much-trumpeted Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), while avoiding Pakistan’s perceived nuclear redlines. But after suffering military humiliation during the 2019 Balakot crisis, India seemed to have deterred from further escalation and did not attempt to widen the conflict across the international border.

Lessons for the Future.    Some of the lessons from the Balakot crisis that may be useful to predict the trajectory of future crisis: One, existence of nuclear weapons would continue to remain a major determinant in deterring a major war between the two nuclear possessor states, but the perceived instability at the lower spectrum of conflict could lead to uncontrolled escalation and miscalculation in an emotionally charged political environment. Two, non-state actors have the potential to precipitate a military crisis, especially if the political environment in the Indian Occupied Kashmir continue to remain unstable for longer periods. Three, the growing influence of extremist Hindu ideology in India’s decision-making process could lead to miscalculation and unintended escalation that may be difficult to manage.

Conclusion.     India and Pakistan have managed to avoid a major war since the nuclearization of the region, mainly due to the presence of nuclear weapons and the role played by the international community during the past crises. Growing distrust between the two countries; India’s drift towards extremism; and the reluctance by the major powers to intervene in a future India-Pakistan crisis have heightened the risks of uncontrolled escalation between the two regional adversaries. It is therefore important for the leadership on both the sides to help reverse the current negative trajectory that could unnecessarily end up into a serious military crisis with consequences for regional as well as global security.

Opening of Kartarpur Corridor: A Gesture of Peace

The Kartarpur corridor was opened for Sikh pilgrims living in India and across the globe on 9th November 2019, the eve of the 550th birth anniversary of Baba Guru Nanak. It is a historic development for regional peace and intercultural exchange in South Asia. More than 5,000 Indian pilgrims will arrive in Pakistan through the visa-free Kartarpur corridor to visit Gurdwara Kartarpur Sahib, which is four kilometres from the Pakistan-India international border in the Central Punjab region of Pakistan. Gurdwara Kartarpur Sahib is a religiously sacred place of the Sikh community but was closed since 1947.

The Indian Sikh community and the Sikh diaspora living across the world had repeatedly requested Pakistan for opening this religious site for them to come and worship. This peace corridor was announced by Pakistan’s Prime minister and the COAS during last year’s oath taking ceremony of the PM as a gesture of peace toward India. The Indian civil society and the Sikh community have positively reciprocated it but Indian state authorities, especially premier Modi and the military establishment, have tried to scuttle it from its onset due to their Hindutva conformist ideology.

The Indian Sikh community’s response has been overwhelming. They have raised banners in the Indian city of Amritsar, and across Punjab and Haryana, with PM Imran Khan’s picture and with notes of thanks for opening this corridor and religious place. Pakistan has issued special tickets for this occasion.

The corridor is an important initiative, but a real challenge for Pakistan is to build on it as a soft power tool keeping in focus the sensitivities of the Sikh religion. Kartarpur is a diplomatic master stoke of Pakistan which has improved its international image as a peace-loving nation.

The 140 million strong Sikh community has reciprocated this peace gesture of Pakistan, which is a great source to further build on Pakistan’s image in India and across the globe. 86% of this Sikh community lives in India. This situation has compelled India PM Modi to thank Pakistan and PM IK for this peace overture. A challenge for Pakistan and India is to sustain this intercultural exchange.

However, the Indian national print and electronic media is propagating an extremist narrative on this development, following guidelines of Hindutva by giving negative media coverage to the opening of Kartarpur as a security risk, and projecting it as a stage managed propaganda tool of Pakistan to support Sikh centric Khalistan separatist movement. PM Imran Khan has offered peace to India through dialogue in order to settle issues through negotiations, including on Kashmir, but the Indian approach is topsy-turvy. PM IK has rightly highlighted the Kashmir issue during address at the opening of Kartarpur corridor.

It is an exaggerated narrative that the Sikh separatist Khalistan movement will get strength through opening of the Kartarpur corridor. The Khalistan movement as an ideology and social movement survives outside India, but as a political movement it has weakened inside India due to the repressive actions of India during 1980’s and 1990’s in Indian Punjab and Haryana which were once its strong support bases.

But Pakistan and India need to negotiate on hard issues in order to sustain the impact of such soft exchanges. Modi’s domestic political compulsion of getting support from the extremist Hindu vote bank in the elections do not allow him to normalize relations with Pakistan. Therefore, he will maintain tensions with Pakistan by creating false claims and stage-managed political dramas like surgical strikes and the February 2019 limited aerial combat against Pakistan.

The Indian SC decision in the Babri mosque case has vindicated the two-nation theory. India has legally settled the case, but it will flare communal violence and riots because it is not religiously and politically resolved. Those Indians who claimed a Mandar at the Babri mosque site have also claimed Mandars on the sites of many other mosques in different cities of India. The Indian SC decision as a precedent will guide verdicts of other decisions of similar cases, which will eacerbate the law and order situation in India and discredit the justice system. The timing of the SC decision in the Babri mosque case is significant. This is the decision like an Afzal Guru decision given by SC based on sentiments and conviction of a particular belief system instead of facts.

The improvement of bilateral ties depends on Indian behaviour in IOJK. The Indian role there is shameful as gruesome violations of human rights continue since the imposition of a curfew in the region after 5th August 2019. Pakistan has expressed pluralism for all other minorities while India has locked Jamia Masjid in Srinagar and does not allow Muslims to offer Friday prayers; this is a blatant violation of the right to worship which is a basic human right. The Indian SC announced the Ayodhya verdict on the historic day of the opening of Kartarpur corridor to divert attention from this event of religious tolerance and intercultural exchange. This is a manifestation of domination of majoritarianism in India under the currents of Hindutva ideology.

The Indian SC decision will lead to internal escalation. All minorities felt unprotected but there was hope in the form of Indian secular constitution and secular political party Congress which guaranteed to protect their rights; but now a state of despair is visible for minorities in India. The Indian Army works in liaison with the political agenda of BJP government, including its narrative on Kashmir and the treatment of minorities.  In such a scenario, the SC’s decision has further disappointed them. The Indian SC and judiciary, which was last hope for minorities of India, has joined Modi to give message to Muslims, Sikhs and other minorities. Such actions in India vindicate the two-nation theory and the Muslim leadership’s urge to create Pakistan.

To the Moon and Beyond

Space has traditionally been the domain of great powers, as the costs attached to space technology preclude smaller states from pursuits in this domain that are independent of major states. However, this is changing rapidly now due to dependence on outer space and technological know-how.  A transformed global focus on space has led to the development of new technologies and a major shift in the way states think about their space programs.

The Apollo 11 moon landing was a catalyst for the progress made since 1969. Almost fifty years ago, the world was amazed at the idea of human footprints on the moon. It was more than a moment of national pride for the U.S. than technological advancement. However, today we are in an era where the world is moving beyond the “flags and footprints” and looking for lunar resources. An important point which needs serious attention at the global level is of spacefaring nations developing the skill to exploit space resources: are we prepared with the right legal framework for ownership issues?

In the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as well as other parties agreed that the moon is to be considered a “global commons”. The treaty also states that “Earth nations can use the moon and other celestial bodies only for peaceful purposes, forbidding the creation of military bases on those entities and the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space.” It was accepted by all and did not receive any further resistance or challenge, thus leaving many issues unaddressed. The aforementioned treaty failed to address the commercial exploitation of natural resources on the moon and other celestial bodies. Since 1972 no human being has returned to the moon, but for some years now, debate and efforts have been made by various nations to go back to the moon for exploration of resources. Issues of governance in outer space, however, still remain ambiguous. This is a major debate currently going on in the international community, with no explicitly accepted solution in sight. The rapid advancement towards moon exploration is demanding pre-emptive measures with regards to outer space law.

During his election campaign, Donald Trump promised to lay prime emphasis on human space exploration beyond the Low Earth Orbit (LEO). It was aimed at focusing on human exploration of the entire solar system within a century. Vice President Mike Pence, shocked the space community by setting the goal of establishing a permanent human presence on the moon by 2024. Moving further, NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine announced on 25th October 2019 that the agency would send a robotic rover to the moon in 2022 to look for water ice. The Volatiles Investigating Polar Exploration Rover (VIPER) would fly to the moon on a commercial lander through the agency’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program. The $250 million VIPER mission would launch in late 2022 and operate at the south pole of the moon for 100 days.

Following this example, China’s Chang’e 4 demonstrated the first ever human landing on the far side of the Moon this January. Its rover Yutu 2 has survived eight lunar nights and is conducting experiments on a side of the Moon not well known. During lunar day eight, which started on July 25, Yutu 2 discovered an unusual gel-like substance near small impact lunar craters. The Beijing Aerospace Control Center has conducted a closer inspection with Yutu 2’s Visible and Near-Infrared Spectrometer (VNIS) since then, but has not announced any findings so far. Yutu 2 is also carrying a radar that is penetrating the lunar surface to assess the resources there. Chang’e 4 has a radio-telescope as well, placed on the quietest region of the Moon, listening to noises of the universe lost on the lunar near side due to earth-originated noises.

Furthermore, according to Wu Weiren, chief designer of China’s lunar exploration program, “China plans to launch the Chang’e-5 probe in 2020 to bring moon samples back to Earth. The Long March-5 carrier rocket, China’s largest launch vehicle to date, will be used to send the probe into space. The Chang’e-5 probe includes a lander, an orbiter, an ascender and a returner.” The main objective of the mission will be lunar sample collection, take-off from the moon, rendezvous and stopping in the lunar orbit and high-speed re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere. The first two phases have been accomplished, and the next step is to launch the Chang’e-5 probe to collect 2 kg of moon samples and bring them back to the earth. In the fourth phase of the program, China will conduct scientific detection in the South Polar Region of the moon mainly by using high intelligence robots, and understand long-term exploration in the complicated lunar environment.

The spill-over effect has continued. On 7th September 2019, India’s Chandrayaan 2 Lunar mission’s robotic lander Vikram came close to landing near the South Pole of the moon. However, in the final part, when the lander was meant to hover before landing on the lunar surface, all communications were lost between the lander and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). India is still working on it. Along with that, India and another space faring Asian nation, Japan, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on space cooperation. As part of that cooperation, Japan will be a partner in India’s Chandrayaan 3 lunar mission for purposes of resource prospecting and lunar sample return by 2022-2024, a timeline similar to that of China and Russia.

Likewise, earlier this year, a private Israeli space company, SpaceIL, attempted to soft land its lander Beresheet on the moon, but failed in the last few minutes with a crash landing on the lunar surface.  Russia’s Luna-28 mission to deliver samples of the moon soil to the Earth is tentatively scheduled for launch in 2026-2027. Luna-28 will bring lunar soil. Similarly, the UK’s first ever moon rover will head to the lunar surface in 2021.

A lot is going on in outer space. However, questions persist: Who will define the rules and regulations? Who will keep a check on all? What will be the consequences of any accident or violation? How to deal with the issue of space debris? Such questions are spurring debate on the international level about whether it is time to enact new treaties or international regulatory regimes for space activity.

Those who argue for new treaties or an international regulatory regime say existing frameworks are not strong enough to prevent inappropriate behaviour and dangerous exploitation of space by private firms or even national governments. But a large group of space officials, lawyers and analysts oppose renewing the OST or trying to come up with new alternatives. They say the 1967 treaty and three subsequent international compacts provide a solid frame for commercial and non-commercial activity beyond Earth. Moreover, trying to amend the 1967 treaty is less likely to be successful during the presidency of Trump, who disregards existing international agreements.

Coming to the moon treaty, it holds that “the moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of humanity.” It forbids the use of these resources except through an international regulatory body, and it suggests that developing nations should be given a share of the resources found. Several countries without space programs signed up to it because they worried that in the long run, they will be exploited by more powerful nations with access to space resources. But the three largest space powers, the U.S., China and Russia, have refused to sign the Moon Treaty, viewing it as far too restrictive. Another important aspect is Article 11, para-7(d) which states the need for “an equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the moon, shall be given special consideration.”

To conclude, there is a lack of space governance at the international level. Treaties and arrangements to use space only for peaceful purposes are not as effective as they should be. Lack of governance is leading to an alarming situation, and efforts to address it should be made before it is too late.

India Attempting to Appease China on Kashmir

The recent meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi referred to as the 2nd India-China Informal Summit was held in Chennai between 11-12th October 2019. This summit has considerable significance in view of the evolving landscape of the South Asian region, especially since India’s unilateral revocation of the special constitutional status of the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) region. China has openly supported Pakistan’s stance at various multilateral forums such as the UNSC and has criticized the annexation of the region by the Modi led BJP government. On the other hand, greater cooperation with India, specifically in terms of trade, forms a cornerstone of China’s stated policy of maintaining friendly ties with all its neighbours in favour of promoting regional stability.  Based on these dynamics, analysts around the world remain highly curious about the politico-diplomatic outcomes of the summit, especially considering the informal and closed-door manner in which it was conducted, lacking even a joint statement.

The summit has nevertheless created considerable hype in local and international media. India claims it as a diplomatic success against the backdrop of ongoing politico-military tensions between India and Pakistan. It was widely perceived that Premier Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi would likely discuss some specific economic and political issues. These included enhancing bilateral trade with prospects of breaking a deadlock over a proposed free trade agreement and better linkages through the provision of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor.

At the politico-security front, there was also widespread speculation that the summit would afford the opportunity to discuss efforts to resolve borders disputes and strengthen defence cooperation to avoid border skirmishes in the future like the 2017 Doklam standoff. Moreover, according to various analysts, the Kashmir issue and India’s recent move to change the administration of the disputed region whose Aksai Chin area is also claimed by China was speculated to be a crucial agenda item for the summit. As such, it was perceived that India would be keen to resolve its outstanding dispute with China as it would not only lessen the disputed nature of the J&K region as a whole but would also further isolate and weaken Pakistan’s stance over the disputed territory. Especially since many analysts have opined that the bifurcation of Ladakh was to allow India to settle its disputed borders with Pakistan and China separately, such a move would help India eliminate the prospects of a potential ‘two-front’ war that may be centred more on its disputed North-Western borders.

It is worth noting here that China’s territorial dispute with India goes back to 1962 in which India was reportedly humiliated by China in the first-ever and only major confrontation between the two. Moreover, China has facilitated Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir issue at the United Security Council against the backdrop of India’s recent move to abrogate Kashmir’s autonomy. Subsequently, at the UNGA session this year, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated the Chinese position on Kashmir and called for a peaceful resolution of the dispute based on the UN Charter and Security Council resolutions. As per the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act 2019, and its aim of dividing the Kashmir region into two ‘Union Territories’ i.e. Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, China still officially considers such a step as undermining its territorial sovereignty and being in violation of its own bilateral agreements with India on maintaining peace and stability in the border areas.

Another significant point to be considered in this regard is that the Xi Jinping- Modi summit was held right after Prime Minister Imran Khan’s two-day official visit to China in which President Xi Jinping reassured Chinese support to Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir. This was also emphasized in the joint press release issued after which made a direct reference to their position that the Kashmir issue was to be solved under the UN Charter, relevant UN Security Council resolutions and bilateral agreements.

As evident by its rapid and incredible industrialization, China has emerged as the global driver for global economic and strategic realignment over the past decade. President Xi Jinping’s government is working efficiently to expand its global footprint based on strong political and economic grounds. In this regard, China has undertaken the visionary Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) under which China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is one of its ongoing flagship projects with an estimated worth of US Dollars 62 Billion. Both China and Pakistan are cooperating with each other to materialize this project and it seems that the CPEC would likely be completed in the proposed time frame. The project once fully functional would obviously provide a boost to Pakistan’s economy and ultimately become a game-changer for the country.

Hence at the present, Pakistan fully acknowledges China’s vision of economic integration with the rest of the world including India. In the same vein, China has emerged as the only all-out support for Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir against the backdrop of India’s recent constitutional revocation of its special status. Still, the fact remains that Pakistan-China bilateral relations have no doubt proved to be a unique and all-weather strategic partnership that is unlikely to falter amidst any of the changing international and regional politico-economic dynamics. In the current landscape of South Asia, China, based on its strong political and economic standing can further influence India to resolve the long-standing Kashmir issue with Pakistan. By doing so, China would likely facilitate the prospects of long-desired peace and stability in the region which it has consistently espoused as being one of its primary goals as a major regional power.

Shifts in India’s Security Policy towards Pakistan: From Sunderji to Cold Start Doctrine

During 1980s and 1990s, India underwent significant transformation toward the orientation of paradigm of pragmatism in security and foreign policy of India. This resulted in further breakaway from the commitments of non-alignment which were based on anti-West and anti-capitalism. It was the point of departure from Nehru and Indira Gandhi’s influence in terms of political and economic policy, because of the post-cold war scenario, but the security policy dimension of this period remained geographically centric to the traditional “two and half fronts”. China and Pakistan constituted two fronts, while internal security challenges became the basis of the other half front. Conventional military superiority remained India’s chief security strategy during this era.

Conventional power superiority was the military strategy conceived by the Indian Army Chief, General Krishna Swami Sunderji. General Sunderji served as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of India from February 1985 to March 1988. He was the main influence during Indira Gandhi’s regime who advocated conventional military build-up strategy along with the modernization of strategic forces. The influence of General Sunderji resulted in the shaping of key principals in conventional deterrence and the modernization of India’s conventional forces as its chief defence strategy, which became the basis of the military doctrine known as Sunderji doctrine in the military history of India.

The key tenets of the Sunderji doctrine were based on geo-centric conventional military strategy. It advocates integrated use of well-crafted columns of infantry, artillery and armour as a basis of land army structure. Main battlefield tanks flank for swift and sharp strike in the battlefield constitutes another component of this doctrine. Computerized or mechanized infantry columns’ structuring and mobilization during warfare stems another important key aspect of this doctrine. Effective communication of army command and control based on information superiority against the enemy is a critical part of victory in war. This informal doctrinal development in the Indian army resulted in the build-up of a huge conventional force due to military modernization carried out by Indira Gandhi’s administration.

General Sunderji’s advocacy of conventional military superiority against its neighbours resulted in India’s reliance on tank warfare and development of tank army as its main battle strategy. India acquired considerable military gains by applying tactics of tank warfare in 1971 against Pakistan during its military intervention to support the creation of Bangladesh. He played a critical role as Brigadier General Staff of a corps in Rangpur sector of Bangladesh during the Indo-Pak war of 1971. In 1974, he became the first infantry officer in the military history of India who became General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 1st armour division. Later, he became the head of the mechanized infantry regiment of the Indian army. He supported India’s nuclear policy and later wrote its nuclear doctrine after his retirement.

During Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure as Prime Minister of India, General Sunderji served as COAS. The Indian army under General Sunderji’s command carried out Operation Brasstacks in 1986-87 along Pakistan-India border and Operation Falcon along Indian-China border. These operations aimed at projecting India’s conventional military muscle and war gaming practice.

Operation Brasstacks was the largest military exercise carried out by any country in the world, and involving the highest number of tanks, after world war two.  Pakistan conceived it as a direct threat and mobilized its armed forces on Pakistan-India border as a defensive move. Similarly, China responded to Operation Falcon by mobilizing its army and military build-up. These two operations of India to project its coercive military power were neutralized by Pakistan and China. For much of the 1990s, India largely remained reliant on Sunderji’s doctrine for its defence strategy and security needs.

However, a major setback to Indian conventional military superiority came in 2001-2002’s Operation Parakharan which resulted in a military standoff between Pakistan and India. India mobilized its armed forces after an attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 as a coercive measure to change Pakistan’s conceived role in cross border terrorism in India and the Kashmir freedom movement. Pakistan mobilized its armed forces more robustly and swiftly than India to deter India’s perceived aggression.

The US played a critical role in convincing Pakistan and India to settle this issue through negotiations because such an adventure could be catastrophic for the entire region and for global peace, because of the nuclear dimension of Pakistan and India. Another factor was that the US was planning an attack in Afghanistan, and it needed Pakistan’s support to materialize this objective. However, the setback to India’s conventional military strategy against Pakistan and China resulted in the institutionalization of Indian security policy and adaptation of limited military attack strategy below the nuclear threshold popularly known as Cold Start Doctrine (CSD).

The military objective based on Cold Start is to make ‘shallow territorial gains of 50-80 km’ through speedy mobilization of IBGs within 72 to 96 hours inside Pakistan’s bordering territory. The idea of the ‘bite-and hold’ strategy is to ‘extract concessions from Islamabad’ on strategic issues of foreign and security policy. This bordering region has vital national security significance for Pakistan. Pakistan’s major and populous cities are located in this region. Kashmir is a jugular vein of Pakistan. Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan (Retd), former Director ACDA, reiterated that the aim of CSD of targeting a thin line of Pakistani territory is of strategic value (to Pakistan) as most of the major cities lie within that limited range. India established a special command for this purpose.

India carried out military modernization of its conventional armed forces and strategic forces in order to materialize the Cold Start Doctrine. Interdependence among conventional forces (army, air force, navy) and unconventional forces (cyber security force, information warfare force, satellite or space modernization community) all constitute this spectrum. IAF practiced its capabilities to carry out combined operations with the Indian Army. It could be assessed from last 6 years that IAF and Army may have developed synergy to some extent for joint operations. Such a development is essential for any offensive operations against Pakistan under the Indian CSD.

Indian army has introduced future infantry soldier (F-INAS) as a system based on advanced technology, enabled with light but sophisticated arms having night vision goggles and information superior army in its cadres for swift military offensive. Acquisition of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) technology makes the monitoring of military operations effective. India’s offensive war-fighting capability-building against Pakistan, continues.

From 2004 to 2014 alone, India has carried out ten military exercises along the Pakistan-India border to test and project these capabilities as a coercive message to Pakistan. During 2015 to 2019, skirmishes have increased along the line of control which is the operational border area between Pakistan and India due to repeated ceasefire violations by India. India has made controversial claims of surgical strikes in 2016 and 2018. Similarly, India-Pakistan Pulwama-Balagot military spat, including the ‘dog-fight’ between the fighter jets of Pakistan and India, reflects the relevance of CSD in Indian military strategy and the severe security challenges it poses for Pakistan.

Kashmir Issue At The 74th UNGA Session And The Nuclear Discourse

The Kashmir issue has more significance in view of the nuclearization of South Asia as many security experts around the world consider Kashmir a potential ‘nuclear flashpoint’ between India and Pakistan. The revocation of the special constitutional status of Kashmir by the BJP government on August 5, 2019, also referred to as Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act 2019, and the subsequent lockdown in Kashmir has since considerably increased political and diplomatic tensions between India and Pakistan. India’s recent moves and actions in Kashmir have once again internationalized the Kashmir dispute. This was evident during the UN General Assembly’s 74th Session, where the Kashmir issue remained a crucial agenda item for several countries.

During this year’s session, prominent leaders of the world condemned Indian brutalities in Kashmir. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan criticized the international community for failing to pay attention to the Kashmir conflict and called for dialogue to end this dispute. Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad said that Kashmir “has been invaded and occupied” by India despite the UN resolution on the issue. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also discussed the issue and called for a peaceful resolution of the dispute based on the UN Charter and Security Council resolutions. Based on the grave importance of Kashmir as a potential ‘nuclear flashpoint’ between India and Pakistan, Prime Minister Imran Khan, while addressing the UNGA warned the world community about the dangers of a nuclear war that according to him might break out over Kashmir due to Indian atrocities. The current situation appears to be the most critical time for both the countries and the region as both countries are nuclear-armed.

However, unfortunately, the Indian leaders and media perceived Prime Minister Imran Khan’s warning as a nuclear threat and termed it as ‘brinkmanship’. Contrary to this perspective, it is worth mentioning here that the Indian leadership itself is involved in negative nuclear signaling and war hysteria against Pakistan in recent months. For instance, the 2019 Indian General Election campaign of Prime Minister Modi was largely based on negative nuclear signaling comprising of several threats referring to the possible use of nuclear weapons against Pakistan. Furthermore, as an apparent shift from India’s ‘No First Use’ (NFU) policy, on August 16, 2019 Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, while on a visit to the Pokhran nuclear test site paid tribute to the late former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and asserted that India might review its NFU policy. He stated that a change in future circumstances would likely define the status of India’s NFU policy. Since then there is no official denial of this assertion from India which indicates that India might abandon its NFU policy.

Moreover, India’s offensive missile development programs and its growing nuclear arsenal which include; hypersonic missiles, ballistic missile defence systems, enhanced space capabilities for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance and the induction of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile-capable submarines clearly indicate that India’s nuclear weapons modernization is aimed at continuously enhancing its deterrence framework including its second-strike capabilities vis-à-vis Pakistan. This is also evident from India’s military preparations under its more recent doctrines such as the 2017 Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces (JDIAF) and the 2018 Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) which are also based upon more proactive offensive strategies and indirect threats of pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan.

As evident from the above-mentioned developments, it seems likely that India aspires to increasingly project itself as a regional hegemon and a potential superpower. The BJP government under Prime Minister Modi inspired by the Hindutva ideology is taking offensive measures under the notions of ‘a more Muscular or Modern India’ based on strong military preparedness. In such circumstances, Pakistan’s threat perception would likely remain increasingly inclined towards its eastern border. Pakistan due to its economic constraints would also likely face considerable difficulties in competing with India toe to toe with respect to its military modernization plans. Pakistan is already punching well above its weight, and nuclear deterrence would be the only way through which Pakistan can maintain a precise balance of power to preserve its security. This could only be carried out by deterring India with the employment of both minimum credible deterrence and full-spectrum deterrence capabilities. This posture clearly asserts that since Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are for defensive purposes in principle, they are aimed at deterring India from any and all kinds of aggression.

Hence, at the present India’s forceful annexation of occupied Kashmir and the resultant nuclear discourse at the UNGA has further intensified Pakistan-India tensions. Under present circumstances, the situation could easily trigger another politico-military escalation between India and Pakistan. Prime Minister Modi has bet his political reputation on his move to annex the region and his political career is on the line. The same way Pakistan’s politico-military establishment is equally unlikely back down from its stance on Kashmir. It would be difficult for both countries to come down from the escalation ladder because politico-military reputations would be at stake at both ends. Consequently, Pakistan might be forced to take action before India’s modernization plans get ahead and might respond even sooner.

The nuclear discourse in Prime Minister Imran Khan’s speech against the backdrop of the Kashmir crisis at such a high forum like UNGA would likely keep the issue internationalized. The situation demands the UN fulfill its responsibility of ensuring peace and to prevent billions of people from the dangers of a nuclear war. However, Indian blame game, aggressive behavior and offensive nuclear signaling against Pakistan all present a clear warning of nuclear war. It would greatly limit the prospects for international mediation especially by the United Nations whose resolutions on Kashmir clearly provide a right of self-determination to decide Kashmir’s future.