No, First Use!

A policy of No First Use (NFU) asserts that the nuclear arsenal of that state would only be used in response to a nuclear attack and never in response to a conventional attack. Out of all the nuclear states, only India and China have claimed to have NFU policy, thereby declaring that the use of nuclear weapons as the very last resort. However, recent statements from Indian officials assert otherwise.

Speaking to a ceremony in Pokhran, the Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh stated that while India remains firmly committed to the No First Use doctrine, what happens in the future would depend on the circumstances. This is India signaling yet again that it’s No First Use policy is neither absolute nor permanent. Indian leaders have periodically shown their discomfort with this stance, yet each time the debate was neutralized by arguments on or justifications of the respective matter. However, Singh’s remarks seem to have been pre-scripted and a clear indication of India departing from its previous stated policy.

These remarks will have a wider impact as they have been made by a sitting, high-level government official and come amidst heightened tensions between India and Pakistan with India’s revocation of the special status of Indian occupied Kashmir (IOK). Following the February standoff after Pulwama, relations between the two states are fraught.

The reference to “future circumstances” not only negates India’s own NFU claims, but also create space for India to manufacture situations where it can carry out preemptive strikes on Pakistan. This policy change has not been abrupt; rather, the policy has been gradually diluted over the years complemented by the periodically expressed skepticism of many Indian leaders towards this policy. In 2003, as a result of the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security’s review of the policy, an amendment was made which stated that if India or Indian forces present anywhere were attacked with chemical or biological weapons, it reserved the right to use nuclear weapons. In 2010, the Indian National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon rephrased NFU as “no first use against non-nuclear weapon states”. In 2016, the Indian Defense minister, Manohar Parrikar spoke about India’s nuclear policy stating, “I wonder why we say that we don’t use nuclear weapons first. It doesn’t mean India has to use them but why rule out”. Although Parrikar later clarified that these comments were his personal views, Rajnath Singh has not issued any such statement; in fact, he reaffirmed the stance through a tweet shortly afterwards. Likewise, General Balraj Singh Nagal, former Commander in Chief of the Indian Strategic Force, command has also advocated for abandoning NFU as a whole and adopting a policy of ambiguity.

During his election campaign in 2019, Modi pointed it to the nuclear policy and even stated, “Every other day we used to listen ‘We have the nuclear button, we have the nuclear button’, what do we have then? Have we kept it for Diwali?”

Vipin Narang, a nuclear affairs expert at MIT rightly pointed out in an interview that a policy of NFU gives an assurance of peace and stability to the international community. Whereas an ambiguous policy serves the purpose of deterring the enemy. Narang points out that India is clearly shifting from a policy of assurance to an ambiguous one thereby opening up the possibility of pre-emption and rendering the NFU completely hollow.

India may not renounce its NFU policy officially as this “tag” allows it to appear as a responsible nuclear state and, at the same time, has provided various privileges such as nuclear deals and an NSG waiver despite it being a non-signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Hence, the strategy that is employed is to create so much ambiguity around the NFU that it is rendered ineffective and obsolete without formally being changed.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, it never gave much credence to India’s so called NFU; the fact that there were absolutely no measures to verify the stated policy created lack of a strong argument to support the assertion. In the aftermath of the statement by Rajnath Singh, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi stated, “The substance and timing of the Indian Defense Minister’s statement is highly unfortunate and reflective of India’s irresponsible and belligerent behavior. It further exposes the pretense of their no first use policy to which we have never accorded any credence”.

Modi is not inclined to dilute his ardency for the fascist Ideology he espouses, even at the cost of India’s international standing. Singh’s statement might be very euphonious for the RSS, but it has created ambiguity in India’s nuclear policy at the international level and has exposed the absurd claims that India is a responsible nuclear power.

In addition, India has made huge investments in its nuclear capabilities and is continuing to do so at an expedited pace. On the other hand, Pakistan’s nuclear program has always indicated that it serves defensive purposes and it is aimed at deterring any sort of aggression from the Indian side.

India’s revision of its policy will unleash a never-ending arms race in the region which will have dire implications.  It will have a devastating impact on the strategic environment of South Asia, fracturing deterrence stability in the region. It creates an additional dilemma as the Indian side is indirectly building the narrative that it might launch a pre-emptive strike on Pakistan, something which will force Pakistan to boost its readiness to prepare against the eventuality of an Indian attack. The danger lies in that if a crisis becomes nuclearized, there might be an incentive for both sides to commence the attack first.

Existing tensions coupled with talks of use of nuclear weapons from the Indian side indicate that it can likely change the status of their nuclear readiness from “peacetime” to “crisis”. On ground, this involves the three components of a weapon i.e. warhead, missile-delivery system and fissile material core to be assembled or brought closer to where they need to be ready for launch. Such measures might intensify the prospects of a nuclear conflict. This is fueled by the fact that there is plenty of space for conventional encounters as recently there have been repeated exchanges of fire at the Line of Control and use of cluster bombs by the Indian side targeting civilians in Azad Kashmir. At any point, these encounters can escalate and give way to the possibility of a full-fledged conflict.

The Balakot strike, the anti-satellite weapons test, the abrogation of Article 370 and the recent clampdown in Kashmir which has been lingering for more than a month now, demonstrates India’s willingness to take risky measures without considering their long-term implications. Likewise, there is a probability that India might also renounce the Indus Water Treaty unilaterally. Hence any bold and aggressive Indian action by the Modi regime will not be very surprising.

While there are many in the international media and politics who do not think that India would be the one to start a lethal adventure in the region, what is being ignored is that India is in the hands of a very aggressive leadership which adheres to a Hindu supremacist ideology and does not shy away from perilous measures. The Indian government has brought India and Pakistan once step closer to a nuclear conflict while sowing seeds of hatred and lack of trust which will be difficult to root out in the future.

The New York Times article written by Prime Minister Imran khan has indicated that he has striven on all avenues to normalize relations between both countries through trade and resolving the Kashmir issue; but after about one year in office, Khan is convinced that Modi is not ready for talks and speaking to India will not precipitate any productive results.

Moreover, Khan points out that the silence of the world community is similar to the appeasement of Adolf Hitler and which led to World War II. Khan has highlighted that the threat is far more potent this time as a nuclear cloud is hovering over South Asia which will have everlasting impacts not only for India and Pakistan but for the whole region.

 

The K Cause: Interplay of Pre-Modernism and Modernism

The genesis of Kashmir conflict is rooted in the clash of two civilizations which are diametrically opposite in their ideology, driven by the two-nation theory: Hindus and the Muslims. The erstwhile Muslim-majority princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was expropriated by India through an instrument of accession signed in 1947 with its ruler. This sinister move was motivated by Hindu ascendancy over Muslims, their long-developed urge to rule over Muslims in a bid to pacify their inherent depreciation and sooth their historic roots of statehood. Otherwise, not a single convincing reason had been presented to annex the sole Muslim majority area into Indian dominion.

The genesis of conflict thus, is to be looked through the vantage point of history. The very cause of the conflict is a major hindrance to its solution and likely to persist. The forces of Hindu ascendancy are very vivid and willfully striking on the basis of Muslim nationhood. The vantage point of history reveals that Hindus had not been able to consolidate their rule over subcontinent since 712 AD. Their urge to consolidate Hindu rule over the subcontinent pitched them against Muslim rulers but unable to overthrow them. The British colonization of the subcontinent in 1857 raised their hopes to materialize their ruling dream at any point of decolonization, but there had been an unexpected outcome for Hindus: the partition of the subcontinent. The foremost requisite of any political philosophy is the degree of inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness but exclusion has been a predominant feature of Hindutva. On the contrary, Muslims of subcontinent were not accustomed to be ruled by other nationals, be it Hindus or the British, thus a civilizational clash was fueled between the Hindus and the Muslims.

This ideological divergence leads to the interplay of pre-modernism and modernism where the genesis of conflict is rooted in pre-modernism wherein its outwardly features have been modernized. The pre-modern sense of self-worth in Hindus has evolved into modern Hindutva ideology, which is much more fierce and impedes inclusiveness. Muslims had been the rulers in the subcontinent, and thus constituted a force unchallenged by the Hindus. After the partition of 1947, India resorted to establish its political predominance over Pakistan in power politics and was subsequently challenged by Pakistan. The chronological history of subcontinent suggests that Muslims remained predominant psychologically, and had never been subjected to Hindu ascendency, which establishes the compelling reasons for Muslims to act the same now and challenge nefarious Indian designs.

Muslims ensured their survival in the subcontinent as an ideological, social and political entity until they remained in power. Once Delhi had fallen in the hands of the Britain, Muslims had been fighting to preserve their ideological, social and political identity in the subcontinent. The interplay of pre-modern and modern conflicts is being derived by an ideology where the root causes remained intact. Charles Darwin contemplated in his treatise, Origin of Species, that “In the struggle for survival, the fittest of species win out at the expense of their rivals because they succeed in adapting themselves best to their environment.”

The partition of the subcontinent provoked India to expropriate the Muslim majority state Jammu and Kashmir, by instrument of succession in 1947 and preserved the move through a legal cover of Article 370 under her constitution. Arguably, India deemed Pakistan weak, being a newly born state striving for its establishment and ensuring its political stability and national security. Earlier this month, India scrapped Article 370 from its constitution making Jammu and Kashmir a union territory to be governed from Delhi. The motive behind the move is not something surprising, rather it is evident and was anticipated.

The premodern Hindutva driven by a long-held urge to subdue Muslims reflects the clash of civilization, as Kashmir is not a chunk of territory primary to Indian national interest, rather it is a notion to pacify their innate extremist Hindutva ideology. India went on to justify the move, terming it an internal matter, but the position they took was blown out by the special session of UNSC on Kashmir, which acknowledged the disputed nature of Kashmir yet to be resolved.

The abrogation of Article 370 and the annexation of IOK into India did not pacify Modi’s Hindu supremacist base, Hindutva in modern terms, which led Modi’s regime to extend their claim up to Pakistani administered Kashmir, unjustifiable by all means. Pakistan articulated its response by rejecting any unilateral move to change the status of Kashmir and reinforcing its diplomatic efforts to reverse the status of Jammu and Kashmir while extending its moral, political and diplomatic commitment to Kashmiri people.

The chronological history of Pakistan’s commitment to Kashmiri people suggests that Pakistan stood firm to its policy up to the extent of fighting multiple wars with India. The systematic and behavioral approach to the study of the international system validates the generalities that Pakistan had been justifying since its inception, which does not make further war for the just cause an exception. On the contrary, the premodern Hindu nationalism had always been seen Muslims as occupiers and made themselves subject to Muslim rule over centuries, yet could not win over Muslims, and the battlefield decided the course of history. In 1996, Huntington presented his thesis claiming that future conflicts would be fueled by civilizational disagreements driven by ideological confrontation which often ends with the annihilation of confronted ideology.

In the wake of the above numerated arguments, the conflict between Pakistan and India appeared to be perpetual and unending. The very conflict over Kashmir obligates both India and Pakistan to finance their military buildup in a bid to maintain power equilibrium. If, in an extremely ideal and highly unlikely scenario, the Kashmir issue is resolved in favor of Pakistan, would Pakistan cease to compete with India? Would India cease to subdue and seek isolation of Pakistan? Any degree of mutual interdependence and liberalism would not be able to mend the natural course of history. The need of the hour is to fight modern narrative of Hindutva the way Pakistan fought for Muslim identity by differentiating Islam and terrorism. Pakistan has disseminated a counter-narrative terming Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India, a fascist and identical to Hitler, in efforts to appeal Western conscience, but given Western biases to Islam and Muslims, it brings no good for Pakistan. The premodern Hindu urge of supremacy and modern racist Hindutva ideology needs an ideological and practical rebuttal which can only be constituted by employing all means at the disposal of the state. Pakistan, by any means, is not bound to restrain itself if subjected to aggression of any type and degree.

In modern dynamics of international politics, physical wars are also fought under the guise of superior ideas.  It is time for Pakistan to stand on the right side of history and exert its position in the most dynamic way. The war of ideas is to be won by turning the world on its side and leaving India no space for political and diplomatic maneuvering.

Humanitarianism in Zarb–e–Azb : The new normal in Post Conflict Development and Rehabilitation in North Waziristan

Military operations and the Humanitarianism are considered as oxymoron and generally do not appear in same reference. However, the desire to deal with the region which was once known as the “most dangerous place on earth” and “wild than the wildest West”, has been long overdue. As the Americans are (once more) in the process of making final deal with the Taliban, to chalk out a face saving exit strategy from Afghanistan, many questions are being raised about the future and stability of the region. Pakistan has been concerned about the law and order situation in its own territory, especially in the erstwhile FATA area. To normalize the new formed seven districts (Bajour, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan, South Waziristan and Orakzai), KPK’s provincial and the federal governments, alongside Pakistan Army have been making concerted efforts and have made significant progress.

Right or wrong, the history of this (FATA) region has been amply covered in number of book volumes written about these districts, besides and increasing number of papers and articles. Volumes on history of this geo-human wilderness have been penned in The Problems of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908 by Christopher Davies, Sir William Barton’s India’s North-West Frontier,  and The North-West Frontier: People and Events 1839-1947 by Arthur Swinson, Charles Miller told the story of the imperial headache in Khyber: British India’s North-West Frontier: The Story of an Imperial Migraine, Victoria Schofield’s Every Rock, Every Hill: The Plain Tale of the North-West Frontier and Afghanistan, and more lately Jules Stewart’s The Khyber Rifles: From the British Raj to Al Qaeda, and The Savage Border, The Story of the North Western Frontier, and last but not the least, Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of Bin Laden 1849-1947 by Andrew Roe to count a few.

Notwithstanding the age old and traditional stigmatizing and stereotypical approach towards understanding the locals, Sir Olaf Caroe, the Governor of the North Western Frontier Province from 1946-1947 referred to the Wazir and Mehsud Tribes (two of the major three tribes, including Dawar Tribe) in Waziristan as wild predators, calling Wazirs as Panthers and Mehsuds as Wolves. “Both are splendid creatures. The Panther is slyer, sleeker and has more grace: the Wolf pack is more purposeful, more united and more dangerous”. These tribes might have existed in state of perpetual conflict through the ages, however, mostly they remained united in the face of external invasion. Starting in 1850, British wanted to create a buffer zone (between the British India and Russian Empire) in the region and invaded these tribal territories. All six expeditions launched by the British to subdue the locals between 1850 and 1880 failed. Finally in 1893, a border treaty was signed, on behalf of the British Empire, by the British diplomat Henry Mortimer Durand and King Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan. This defined the border between British Raj and Afghanistan.

The control of this unruly region remained a dilemma for most of the British rule and in 1872, a set of rules known as the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) was promulgated to segregate these “wild tribes living in the hills” from the colonial judiciary system and create a division between them and the more “civilized” subjects of the Empire. These regulations effectively encapsulated these tribes in their own age-old customs and traditions such as Jirga, Pashtunwali and Melmastia etc. Arguably and ironically, these tribes were punished if they violated (customs and traditions) as ordained by the colonially sanctioned FCR. They were punished one more time as they decided to strictly follow the same customs and traditions (for example their traditional hospitality towards their guests). Further discussion on this aspect remains the subject of another paper. FCR remained in effect even after the independence of Pakistan in 1947, only to be abolished, after almost 150 years of its promulgation, in 2018 by the government of Pakistan. In 2018, the KPK government also passed the FATA Merger Bill, and the regional agencies got the status of Districts on the existing national footings.

After Russian invasion of Afghanistan, the porous Afghan-Pakistan border offered an easy entry and exit between the two countries and this region became a sanctuary for the global rogues, including Uzbek, Tajik, Turkic nationals, besides scores of North Africans and Middle Easterner (not to mention Americans and many Westerners). During the last decade of previous century, the region remained lawless and a fostering ground for multiple crimes. Post 9/11 US invasion of Afghanistan and the presence of large number of ISAF forces in Afghanistan, resulted in large crime spillover from Afghanistan into these regions, and necessitated Pakistan Army’s presence in these agencies. Pakistan Army’s intermittent presence created some semblance of normality but the situation generally remained volatile and crimes returned whenever Army departed. Finally, with a resolve to bring peace in the region, and remove all undesired elements, Pakistan Army launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb after the 2014 attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar. Most of the region on Pakistani side was cleared through successful operations (baring North Waziristan). However, the absence of the Afghan and NATO forces on Afghan side of the border, the void in the effective border management mechanism, kept bringing the miscreants back to Pakistan, and North Waziristan remained a popular abode for them. Resultantly, this district has been the sanctuary for TTP (Tehirk-e-Taliban Pakistan) besides many others who wanted to create unrest and spread terrorism in Pakistan. The Army had a realization that the country cannot have peace till the time North Waziristan region is also cleared off all undesired activities and elements. The bounds of this operation were thus extended inside North Waziristan as well.

The tough decision taken to pacify this district included a multi-pronged strategy. This strategy included both kinetic and non-kinetic operations. Over half a million local population was asked to evacuate their villages and were settled as Temporarily Displaced People (TDPs) at Baka Khel near the town of Bannu. The aim was to clear all possible pockets of resistance from all villages and towns in North Waziristan. The second, and simultaneous prong of this strategy, was the enactment of an effective border control mechanism including fencing the entire over 2400 Kilometers border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Fencing is likely to be completed by end of 2019 or owing to the severe weather in rugged mountainous regions, by early 2020. Fencing is aimed at ensuring a controlled entry and exit, and it does not mean complete shutdown of the cross border movement. Presence of major traffic crossing point at Ghulam Khan and fence gates every 2 to 3 kilometers, will ensure a more controlled and regulated movement on either side of the border.

Armies around the world are trained to fight and carryout kinetic operations in conflict zones. Humanitarian operations are performed by the armed forces mostly under the umbrella of UNO through Peace-Keeping operations. Such operations generally occur as a consequence of successful Peace-Making process and after cessation of hostilities. Incidentally, Pakistan has been one of the largest Peace Keeping Troops Contributing Countries for a very long time. All members proceeding on such UN duties undergo special training before their departure at the Center for International Peace and Stability (CIPS) at the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST). This training, and its practical manifestation through involvement in humanitarian operations for extended durations at UN platform, has instilled a clear sense and methodology of “how to” of these operations. As a result one can witness successful employment of same strategy by the Pakistan Army in North Waziristan. In a third prong of North Waziristan normalization strategy, the post-conflict rehabilitation activities are underway, and Pakistan Army is bringing the local population back to the villages in phases. Compensation is given to the locals as assistance in resettlement through political process. Besides building of the markets, shops and an elaborate two way black-top road infrastructure, Pakistan Army has been intricately involved in humanitarian ventures such as establishment of schools, dispensaries and frequent medical camps. Distribution of books, uniforms and toys among the school children, creation and maintenance of orphan homes, financial assistance to the needy families, creation and encouraging the youth offering them jobs, and organizing sports galas, creation of girls schools and female health facilities are only few efforts to mention. Travelling through North Waziristan, one cannot miss to notice bustling local markets and heavy traffic movement involved in reconstruction and infrastructure building. Besides developing rapidly growing road infrastructure and one of the major achievements of Pakistan Army in North Waziristan has been normalization through local inclusion. Locals are being involved at every tier of development and decidedly this inclusivity fosters a sense of ownership in development projects. The overall peace in the district does not perfectly match the neighboring districts, however, the life is fast returning to normal.

The best way to know the reality is to travel through the region, because the accounts mentioned in most of the recent papers and books are poor regional guides. As a result the critiques of humanitarian role of Pakistan Army remain twice removed from reality, once by reading such biased secondary accounts and secondly by lack of personal observation. The role of Pakistan Army in conflict- and disaster-induced humanitarian crises in this geo-political setting, definitely deserves appreciation.

Article 370: What Made PM Narendra Modi do it?

The Indian government led by PM Modi under BJP rule revoked the special status of Jammu & Kashmir by scrapping Article 370. This act of Modi may have surprised people but it was not at all surprising for those who have been in touch with Modi’s election campaigns for his second term in office, and the agenda he was following with the mind-set of a true RSS follower. If one takes a sneak peek at Modi’s backup team, three people would come on top as Machiavelli’s hands. One is the Minister of Defence, Rajnath Singh; the second is the Minister of Home Affairs, Amit Shah, who is leading the BJP as its President since 2014; last, but the most instrumental among all three, is Ajit Doval, the national security advisor and father of ‘’the Doval Doctrine’’, which principles non-kinetic use of force against Pakistan. Mr Doval has been an eminent and successful IPS officer and has served as the director of the Intelligence Bureau in 2004–05, after spending a decade as the head of its operations wing. This trio, along with many unnamed people, tried their best to end an affair that was long-standing between India and Pakistan, and was more of an Achilles foot for the latter. Apparently, the unresolved issue of Kashmir has walled India from becoming a regional power vis-à-vis Pakistan, and it is the only significant area where it can overpower its next door neighbour symbolically.

This is the second time that the months of July and August have brought a worsened situation for the Muslims of IHK, in the second half of the decade. First, when young freedom fighter Burhan Wani was killed by the Indian military on the fifth day of July in 2016, the region witnessed massive resistance and large scale protests by the Muslims of the valley. These protests were met with the Indian army’s pellet guns, tear gas, and wooden sticks, leaving thousands of people wounded, blinded and traumatized. The practice of abducting young boys & adults and accusing them of hurting Indian soldiers gained momentum. It is said that in a fight between two strong sides, it is the weaker who gets burned, but here the two strong forces are from the same side and are allies of each other: the Modi Government in Delhi and Indian Armed forces in the valley.

Three years ago, Narendra Modi was serving his first term in office. This year he came to the same seat with more confidence, which was gained by a major vote bank from the Indian people. But what hastened the ultimate aggressive and non-constitutional move that would take back the Indian stance on Kashmir to the times of 1947? Since BJP’s manifesto of 2014 and 2018 included that Kashmir will be made part of India with all of its land territory. No apparent planning or talk was on the surface about the fate of Kashmir. There are ten other states, excluding Jammu & Kashmir, who fall in the special category status list. The incident that made Modi and his trio go lethal on Kashmir was the Pulwama incident. On February 14th, a young Kashmiri boy, a resident of Pulwama District, blew himself up in the midst of a large convoy of vehicles carrying security personnel, resulting in the deaths of 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) officials. The boy was identified as Adil Dar, who had lived his short life a few minutes away from the place where his conscience asked him to bring an end to his life. Everyone in the sub-continent is well aware of what happened post-Pulwama but if one has to recall in a few lines the chronology of the events, it would start from the Pulwama attack, preceding the Balakot episode from India (an air attack that was solely targeted on environment), followed by a dog fight between Pakistan Airforce (PAF) and Indian Airforce (IAF), in which PAF shot down two Indian aircrafts, capturing Wing Commander Abhinandan and releasing him as a good will gesture from Pakistan. Amid all these major events bilateral trade, which always becomes the first victim of a crisis, was stopped between both countries; Pakistan blocked its air space for India; High Commissioners were called back home; and last, but the most alarming, was the shift from conventional to nuclear posturing.

The event of Pulwama was the ultimate decider that made Indian government take the extreme step of revoking Article 370. Modi’s government has already seen the effects of Burhan Wani martyrdom in the form of reignited resistance from masses, they had seen how Adil Dar blew himself up and the sub-continent was at the brink of a conflict between the two nuclear states. BJP Government cannot afford a third episode in Jammu & Kashmir, the deaths of Wani and Dar had sensationalised Kashmir’s freedom movement in the Muslims of the valley, especially amongst young boys, and before the matter gets out of hand and add further humiliation & backlash to already controversial BJP government, the issue of J&K needed a final solution.

The COAS General Bipin Rawat subordinates became weary of tackling insurgencies in the country and need some place where their stationing will bring not only a soothing effect to their minds, but also a sense of achievement as well. And for this matter, Kashmir valley was the best answer. Now all major players are actively involved in this intense game, which they started with the aim to win and save face, not only in regional dynamics but on an international level too. The scrapping of article 370 has taken away the right of self-determination of the people of Jammu & Kashmir. Moreover, this action has also taken away the proof with which India got its hands and writ on the valley at first place. It was the Article 370 that legitimized the instrument of accession scrapping of article means scrapping the instrument of succession.

India will keep on referring the Kashmir matter as an internal issue all the while unleashing every act of violence against human lives. Meanwhile, the exodus of Hindus from mainland India will start and the Muslim majority of the valley will be turned into a minority, under the guise of Hindu pandits and other non-Muslim families who fled the region because of any good or bad reason. However, no pandit families are communicated on this matter and their name will be used as a Trojan horse. This will be the very first strategy of Modi government.

The next step would be to legitimize the illegitimate. An election will be orchestrated in the valley. A possibility of different scenarios could take place. First, BJP may come up with its former alliance, the coalition government with Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party (JKPDP). This coalition will be used as a pawn giving the impression of a Kashmiri leadership ruling people of Kashmir since it was BJP that abandoned the coalition not Mehboba Mufti, and if given an opportunity she would prefer a government rather than a no government.  Second, in case JKPDP and Jammu & Kashmir National Conference (JKNC) come into a mutual consensus and together in order to save kashmiris from BJP evil scheming and would not contest elections at all. In this case, BJP will make sure the intra Kashmir migration has taken place and Hindu population will be in majority for a referendum.

Coming towards what measures India will take to stop Pakistan from highlighting India’s atrocities on Kashmiri people and the scrapping of the article 370 in front of International community? After the successful observation of Kashmir hour on Friday 30th of August by the whole Pakistan has impacted the world hugely. International media, political leaders and humanitarian organizations have started to speak on the plight of Kashmiri people. The non-availability of food and medicine, the lack of access to communication channels, the disappearance of almost 10,000 people and the arrest of more than 4,000 individuals, has raised serious questions on the Indian state, where its citizens and Prime Minister practise yoga in front of the world, showing internal harmony. Recalling the Doval Doctrine, India will carry targeted attacks in Balochistan, especially along the border of Iran. CPEC zones and routes would be targeted. And most important activity in the region taking place right now is Afghan Peace Process in which Pakistan is playing a pivotal and influential role. It will face serious threats from maligning Indian strategy and India will try to sabotage Pakistani efforts.

Apart from this, Modi’s government needs urgent execution of all anti-Pakistan and Kashmir plans before any hearing can take place in the Indian Supreme Court, either by suo motu or by any petition filed by the sane people of the Indian society.

The Repulsive Face of Ultra-Nationalism

In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, a nationalist deal looked very attractive even though nationalism was leading to horrendous conflicts on an unprecedented scale. However, everything changed in 1945, with the unfortunate event of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The intervention of nuclear weapons sharply tilted the balance of the nationalist deal. People no longer feared that nationalism would lead to mere war, they began fearing that it would lead to nuclear war. With these events, the nationalist genie was squeezed at least halfway back into its bottle.

Later, with the end of the cold war, neoliberalism seemed to be the irresistible wave of future. However, the biased approach of the international community and their inability to punish mischief-makers, compelled states to stop expecting results from international entities. For instance, the first genocide of the 21st century, the Darfur genocide in Sudan, has caused the deaths of approximately 400,000 Darfuris, and displaced more than three million people. The United Nations took several years to collect enough evidence to prove that the president of Sudan was involved in these crimes against humanity.

For many decades, in a world drugged with hyper- capitalism, politics has been majorly driven by economic interests. The stronger the nation becomes economically, the more rogue behavior it exhibits – that has become the brutal truth. In the race of promoting and pursuing a states’ national interest, the problem started when benign patriotism morphed into chauvinistic ultra-nationalism. People were encouraged to fanatically become loyal to their own group and hostile towards the other which, on the other hand, fueled xenophobia.

One must consider that loyalty towards a group is not imprinted in human genes but developed through socially constructed attitudes, which are sometimes driven by exploiting religious sentiments and most of the time politicized. Once again the phenomenon of ultra-nationalism is trumpeted openly. People are in favor of putting in power the most extreme and most outrageous of the right-wing ultra-nationalists’, who are now plaguing the hemisphere.

As truly depicted in Mark Twain’s famous phrase ‘History does not repeat but sometimes rhymes’. Hitler’s political autobiography “Mein Kampf,” sometimes referred to as the bible of the Nazi Party, professed the superiority of the Aryan race, Hitler’s plan for Aryan world rule, and a narrative that the Jews were destroyers of the world. This phenomenon propelled the concept established in the so called bible of RSS written by M.S. Golwalkar, in which he supported the Nazi standpoint and its treatment of Jews. BJP stands out in inculcating the same approach into its politics. The concept of Great India unified under Hindutva and the stewardship of Modi, would lead to greatness portrayed in Mahabarta – This complemented the mushrooming of saffron-clad vigilantes.

On top of that, the BJP government and right-wing organizations have created a religious and caste-based tension upon any prevailing opportunity and the victims are mainly Muslims, Dalits, and other minorities. The standard set of becoming a true Hindu in India under BJP, is to prove bigotry and hatred towards minority groups, especially Muslims or to demonize them.

The hype was created by establishing resentment towards Muslims. Modi has played the politics of historical revenge, which ultimately generates a fear of Muslim domination over Hindu populace. Muslims are growing in numbers immensely. For instance, in Uttar Pradesh alone, there are 44 million Muslims, which is the combined population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE. Muslims living in various parts of India are facing communal violence organized and supported by state government.

Referring a historical context, the exacerbation of Hindu-Muslim animus was one lasting effect of British imperial policy that employed a “divide et impera” (divide and rule) strategy to incite religious conflict to aid continued imperial rule. The same is applied by the BJP government to rule, as it has failed to uplift the quality of life for Indians, intensification of poverty prevails, rural to urban migration influx as well as failure to provide a stable atmosphere for the economic growth of the country.

At the start of World War I, the city that was known as St Petersburg in imperial Russia, was renamed Petrograd in 1914, because authorities thought its original name sounded too German. The same has been done under the BJP government. In August 2018, India’s Hindu nationalist BJP government renamed the historic Mughalsarai junction railway station in the state of Uttar Pradesh after the right-wing Hindu ideologue Deen Dayal Upadhyaya, most likely because the existing name referred to the Indian Muslim Mughal dynasty.

According to the Global Impunity Index, India was ranked second last out of 69 countries, in 2017. Mob lynching and mob rule has become new norm under Modi’s government. Taking the incident of the Dadri lynching, the accused was seen, sitting in the front seat with Yogi Aditynath at a rally.  According to the Human Development Index, India has remained in its lowest slots, and the reason behind that is the growing gender inequality.

Saffronisation of public places and educational curriculum is the last nail in the coffin, for the identity of minorities. The syllabi of history was distorted by the central government in India. Historical events and even results regarding military campaigns have been changed. A report in India Today stated that the education board of Rajasthan rewrote history by changing the results of the battle of “Haldighati” (in favor of a defeated Hindu ruler).

These indicators are sufficient to portray the repulsive face of secular India. By 2024, BJP would complete a decade of its rule. Although it is premature to conclude, but it is evident that India will become anything but secular, endangering the notion of ‘shared value’ similarity, on which it is entertained by the western world.  The question which needs to be asked is, does ultra- nationalism offer real solutions to the unprecedented problems within and outside India? Once the threshold is crossed, in a world filled with ultra-nationalists, would there remain a demand for a supra-nationalist league?

Pakistan’s Decisive Time to Act on its Weakening Kashmir Cause

The scenic vale of Kashmir with a population of over 7.5 million Muslims is firmly in India’s fist like never before. The struggle for freedom has been brandished as a terrorist insurgency with groups fighting in Kashmir such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen all firmly in UNSC Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee list under UNSC resolution 1267, labelled as terrorist organizations with all of their aliases. Furthermore, the Islamic State of Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK) and Al-Qaeda have also delineated the Kashmiri struggle from one of the right to self-determination to one linked with Global Terrorism. The international community, once active in the Kashmir dispute has quietly reclined over recent times to label it as a ‘bilateral matter’. This is a far cry from the dispute’s status in its early days when it was high on the international community’s agenda for people fighting for the right to self-determination. Under international law, Common Article 1(1) of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), it is imperative that everyone has the right to self-determination and that right is inclusive of the right to determine their own political status and pursue their social, economic and cultural development without interference. Interestingly, India had an objection to signing these covenants with these articles in their present form. However, states such as France and Germany (erstwhile East Germany) were adamant that these articles should be included in their original form. However, gone are those days of the 60’s. During that decade, after its humiliating defeat at the hands of China in 1962, India also proposed to come to a solution that would seem very favorable to Pakistan in present day. However, the rigidity of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the military regime at the time to have the entirety of Kashmir left that solution beseeching.

The trajectory that the Kashmir dispute has followed has been one garnering multilateral fora’s attention to being relegated as a bilateral dispute, following Shimla agreement, to its present day status where India unilaterally holds in abeyance Article 370, a critical component of Kashmir’s accession to India. Presently, in complete violation of resolutions 91, of 1951, and 122, of 1957, India has adopted unilateral actions to change the status of the state through the Presidential Order C.O 272.

It wouldn’t be wrong to acquiescence with Kapil Komireddi in his article ‘The Kashmir Crisis isn’t about territory. It’s about a Hindu victory over Islam’ in his Washington Post article. This is largely true as the position of Ladakh and Nagaland point to this fact. India is holding talks with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) [NCSN(I-M)] under Modi appointed governor R.N Ravi, a former intelligence officer, on one hand in order to grant special concessions to Nagaland such as its own flag and constitution, while withdrawing the same special concessions from the state of Jammu & Kashmir. Similarly, the state of Jammu & Kashmir has been bifurcated into two union territories comprising Jammu &Kashmir on one hand and the territory of Ladakh on the other hand. This was much to the chagrin of Muslim Majority Kargil district residents in Ladakh.

Additionally, this bifurcation has been in complete violation of the Indian constitution, a bifurcation that demands the opinion of the state assembly, which is required under Article 3 of the Indian Constitution, and considering Kashmir’s special status, according to Hyderabadi Indian law Professor Faizan Mustafa-in his interview to thewire.in – the assent of the Jammu & Kashmir legislative assembly was necessitated in this instance. The only previous bifurcation of any state in India-against the wishes of the legislative assembly of that particular state- was that of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh in 2014. This bifurcation was done to a state that did not have any special status in the Indian constitution; A status held to be permanent by Indian Courts on multiple occasions and that was taken away from Jammu & Kashmir by a mere Presidential Order.

Another example of India maligning its minority Muslim community is in Assam where India has passed an order to revoke the citizenship of around 4 m Muslim; those who cannot verify that they were in the state before 1971. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines having a nationality as a right, forbidding countries to arbitrarily deprive someone of it. A UN convention from 1961 goes further, banning the withdrawal of citizenship based on race, religion or politics, and also banning it in cases where doing so would leave a person stateless. Thus, the Assamese case is another example of Kapil Komireddi’s allusion to ‘Hindu victory over Islam’ in direct breach of international law.

Henceforth, these examples show that Narendra Modi’s Hindu Nationalist BJP has sought to tighten the nozzle over Kashmir in direct usurpation of the rights of Muslims in Kashmir in particular, and in India in general. This has concurrently weakened Pakistan’s ‘Kashmir claim’ as Indian highhandedness regarding dealing with Kashmir has become more forceful. In the past, the region was dealt with cautiously due to the nature of the international dispute, currently India has found it acceptable to single it out and make changes to its status.

Internationally, the Kashmir cause has also attenuated over the previous decades. Once, seen as the harbinger for the rights of people looking for self-determination including those in Palestine & East Timor, it has now been labelled as a ‘terrorism backed separatist movement’ with little appeal in the Muslim world lest say globally. An example of this is the UAE & Bahrain awarding their highest civil awards to Modi in the midst of the current crisis. Weak, if any, statements have come from across the Muslim world. India has successfully linked it to Islamic terrorism internationally and as a separatist insurgency linked with movements such as that in Balochistan bilaterally, while in talks with Pakistan. Considering its downfall from prestige is the fact that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) does not even give it a serious formal session anymore, whereas previously i.e. before the Shimla agreement, 18 resolutions of the UNSC have been passed concerning the dispute. It has, through successful Indian diplomacy, been relegated to the sidelines of International fora; who are more concerned with loopholes in the Pakistani financial system, which gives rise to terror financing, than the rights of the Kashmiri people.

Touching upon the breach of International law that India is doing in Kashmir, it is to be seen that while the law governing international armed conflict under Article 2 to the Geneva Convention necessitates applicability of International Humanitarian law and Human Rights law to Kashmir, India has instead resorted to quietly sidelining this jurisprudence in direct flouting of international law. Curfews, Communication blackouts, forced detentions and complete media censorship violate international conventions such as ICCPR and ICESCR. The right to freedom of expression in particular is provided under Article 19 of the ICCPR, and it is being blatantly violated by Indian authorities in the region. The current spate of gross fundamental rights violations can trace their trajectory back to July 8th, 2016, when a mass uprising against the Indian state started due to the extrajudicial killing of Burhan Wani. These atrocities being committed have been outlined in detail in the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in a report on the situation of human rights in Kashmir. Indiscriminate use of pellet guns -what has been referred to by Mirza Waheed in his article in ‘TheGuardian’ as World’s first mass blinding-, preventing Muslims from performing their religious obligations such as the sacrifice of cows during Eid-ul-Adha or performing Friday prayers are some of the violations that have increased since this report came out. The report also outlines in detail the injuries caused due to pellet gun usage. The most discriminatory law in the shape of the Armed Forces Special Protection Act (AFSPA) in usage since 1990 has prevented Indian military personnel from being tried by a court of law or redeemed and provided impunity to them from atrocities committed in the state from even internal inquiries. In one particular case the officer who tied a young stone pelter in front of his jeep and drove around was honoured with the Chief’s commendation certificate instead of being put on trial. Such travesty of justice was not even afforded to American forces in Iraq or Afghanistan.  Additionally, India looks set to violate Article 49 of the 4th Geneva Convention which calls for an occupying power, India in this case, not to deport or transfer parts of its own population into the territories it occupies. This violation will lead to changes in the demographics of the Kashmiri state and the UN mandated plebiscite will be held in a drastically altered population if the nefarious designs of BJP succeed.

The truth of the matter remains that Pakistan’s cry for its brethren in Kashmir has lost steam. Through a cross-domain strategy, Indians have successfully delegitimized the Kashmir cause under the garb of religious terrorism by delineating it from the cause of the right to self-determination of an oppressed people to one which is unrepresentative of the Kashmir populace. However, the reality could not have been more misconstrued as instead, it is the Hindu fundamentalists of RSS & BJP that are hell bent on terrorizing the peace-loving populace of the vale and subjugating them. The time for Pakistan to come to the aid of Kashmiris is now or never. History will not be forgiving to the current Pakistani leadership if it sits silently on the wall and makes only meagre diplomatic and legal efforts while Delhi marches on towards a silent genocide of the Kashmiris. It is only a matter of time that Nazi-inspired concentration camps ripe with firing squads spring up under the Hindutva motivated BJP. Before events take a turn for the worse, the state of Pakistan must decisively act for the freedom of Kashmir in order to ensure long term safety, security and autonomy of the Muslims of the subcontinent.

 

Democracy and Presidential Elections 2019: Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan

Regular elections in Afghanistan are a right step towards flourishing democracy. While Doha peace process between the Taliban and the US is almost ready to bear fruit, the intra Afghan dialogue is a prerequisite for durable peace in the country. Ethnic divide based elections has ruined the basic foundations a prosperous society. It’s the high time that neighboring countries play a positive role in peace and conflict resolution of Afghanistan. It’s possible once democratic institutions are strengthened, civil society is developed and international community urges on free and fair elections.

Mainstreaming Democracy in Afghanistan.       In 2001, under the United Nations Security Council’s ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’ Afghanistan ushered on the path of democracy. Dubbed as the ‘Bonn Agreement’ though brokered by the UN, was the brainchild of the US that paved way for a political road map for the conflict-ridden country. Continuous nine days closed door negotiations led to the signing of Bonn Agreement. The agreement excluded the outgoing Afghan head Mr. Rabbani and Taliban. As per the agreement, Afghanistan went through a drastic change with Mr. Hamid Karzai being selected as the interim head of state and a three-year political and administrative plan for the formulation of state institutions. The aim of the agreement was to endorse Afghanistan’s future political processes and institutions of governance based on ‘the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice’ (United Nations Security Council, December 2001). The Bonn Agreement was followed by an Emergency Loya Jirga (grand council) in 2002 that laid the foundation for transitional government, the ratification of 2004 Afghan constitutional framework, the 2004 and 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections. The following image provides a pictorial overview of the process:

                   Fig 1: Bonn Agreement ( Source: https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930600902991)

 

Despite the fact, that the Bonn Agreement introduced the notion of democracy it failed to create a state that could not uphold its legitimacy outside Kabul. Rather it harbored a tribal set up divided on ethnic lines.

Afghan Presidential Election and the Supreme Law of the state.       502-member assembly in Kabul approved the constitution of Afghanistan on 4th January 2005. The constitution created both an Islamic and democratic state. It provided for a Presidential system of government based on the US model. Power is divided between the President, Supreme Court, National Assembly and the Grand Assembly. Articles 60, 61 and 62 in chapter three of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan enunciate the eligibility of Presidential candidates. Under the aforesaid articles the President:

  • Shall be the head of state of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, executing his authorities in the executive, legislative and judiciary fields in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. The President shall have two Vice-Presidents, first and second. The Presidential candidate shall declare to the nation names of both vice-presidential running mates. In case of absence, resignation or death of the President, the first Vice-President shall act in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. In the absence of the first Vice-President, the second Vice-President shall act in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. (Art 60)
  • Shall be elected by receiving more than fifty percent of votes cast by voters through free, general, secret and direct voting. The presidential term shall expire on 1st of Jawza of the fifth year after elections. Elections for the new President shall be held within thirty to sixty days prior to the end of the presidential term. If in the first round none of the candidates gets more than fifty percent of the votes, elections for the second round shall be held within two weeks from the date election results are proclaimed, and, in this round, only two candidates who have received the highest number of votes in the first round shall participate. In case one of the presidential candidates dies during the first or second round of voting or after elections, but prior to the declaration of results, re-election shall be held according to provisions of the law. (Art 61)
  • The individual who becomes a presidential candidate shall have the following qualifications:
  1. Shall be a citizen of Afghanistan, Muslim, born of Afghan parents and shall not be a citizen of another country;
  2. Shall not be less than forty years old the day of candidacy;
  3. Shall not have been convicted of crimes against humanity, a criminal act or deprivation of civil rights by court.

No individual shall be elected for more than two terms as President. The provision of this article shall also apply to Vice-Presidents. (Art 62)

Moreover, the Afghan Electoral Law came to force in 2016. Articles 38, 44 and 45 of the constitution lay down the rules for the requirements, restrictions and election for the presidential process. The new Independent Election Commission (IEC) of Afghanistan has delayed election twice due to a number of obligations and reforms. The major obligation is the prevalence of technology in the polls to curb fraud and rigging. In addition, the commission is in the process of overcoming the challenges it faced during the 2018 parliamentary election and the need for new commissioners. Also, for conducting timely election, IEC requires budgetary support both from the government and international donors.

On the IEC’s constant delays and President Ashraf Ghani’s tenure expiration on 22nd May 2019, the Supreme Court of Afghanistan intervened and announced a breakthrough decision in his favor thus extending his presidential term until election. The constant delay and extension of President Ghani’s tenure was unwelcomed by opposition groups. Mehwar-e- Madom-e- Afghanistan, Grand National Coalition, Independent Commission for Overseeing the Constitution, the civil society called the delay and decision unconstitutional and a clear violation of article 61. However, this is not the first time the Afghan government has faced the legitimacy question. A precedent was set in the years 2009 and 2014, when Kabul experienced a similar situation. Subsequently, the Supreme Court extended the term of the then President Mr Hamid Karzai.

Afghanistan is a nascent democracy; the aforementioned constitutional and electoral statutes are a prerequisite for its democratic growth. If article 61 is not followed, this may lead to the notion of “Political Dictatorship”. Time and again, the Afghan parliament and judiciary have failed to maintain a democratic order. Keeping in consideration the sanctity of the constitution, the Afghan polity need to strengthen and protect the constitution.

Overview of Elections in Afghanistan since 2001.          The 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan led to the overthrowing of the Taliban regime and advent of democratic norms in the country. The process of a political settlement began with Bonn Agreement 2001 and continued through 2014 US brokered National Unity Government.

Afghanistan witnessed its first ever Presidential Election on 9th October 2004. A total of 18 candidates filed nomination papers for the country’s top job. Primary contenders were Hamid Karzai, Yunus Qanoni, Rashid Dostum and Muhammad Mohaqiq. It is noteworthy that the major candidates for 2004 presidential polls belonged to four distinct ethnicities: Karzai of Pashtun clan, Qanoni of Tajik faction, Dostum of Uzbek group and Mohaqiq of Hazara community. As an intrinsic response, Afghans rooted for their ethnic representative.

Ethnicity had an explicit impact on the election outcome. As a result, Karzai became the first elected president of the country with 55.4% (Afghanistan Presidential Election Result, 2004) of the total votes in his favor. This presidential poll deliberated that “historical ethnic patterns have long driven conflict dynamics in the county. No candidate received significant support outside of their particular ethno-linguistic group” (Johnson, June 2006). Despite the security concerns, the first election was a momentous victory in the face of insurgents. 70% of registered voters practiced their basic right and out this percentage 40% (Afghanistan Presidential Election result, 2004) were women. This is by far the highest recorded voter turnout in the history of democratic process of Afghanistan.

Amidst insurgency, fraud and media ban, Afghanistan conducted its second presidential poll on 20th August 2009. A total of 32 candidates contested for presidentship. Leading candidates were Karzai, Dr. Abdullah and Ramazan Bashardost. Ethnic dynamics continued during the electoral process leaving afghan voters divided between Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras. Karzai garnered 49.67% (Afghanistan Presidential Election Result, 2009) of the vote while Dr Abdullah emerged as a runner up with 30.59% votes. Since Karzai’s winning percentage was below the required constitutional percentage i.e. 50%, therefore, a runoff vote was held between Karzai and Dr Abdullah. However, Dr Abdullah withdrew his candidature at last minute. Eventually, Karzai was declared as president-elect. Though Karzai won the election for the second time, there were widespread rigging allegations against him. The Electoral Complaints Commission invalidated One third of Karzai’s votes. As compared to previous election, voter turnout was fairly low. According to IEC preliminary result announcement, voter turnout was 38.7 % (IEC Press Release, September 16, 2009).

The third presidential election was conducted in a post conflict set up on 5th April 2014. A total of eight candidates participated in the race for the of the president. Outgoing President Karzai was ineligible to run for the third term. Top rivals were Dr Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah. In the first round of voting, Dr Abdullah gained a leverage of 45% (Afghanistan Presidential Election Result, 2014) votes over Ghani who came in second place with 31.5%. Both the candidates failed to cross the 50% vote threshold; hence, a second voting round was conducted. Ghani emerged as a leading candidate garnering overwhelmingly high number of votes in the second round. 55.6% of votes determined his victory over Dr Abdullah (Reuters. 2016, Feb 24th). Abdullah and his supporters refused to accept the result and alleged that Ghani’s campaign had committed massive ‘electoral fraud’. The issue of rigging is not new to the electoral process of the country. Nevertheless, the 2014’s electoral outcome of first and second rounds showed disparity that was objectionable. The situation turned ugly when Abdullah and his supporters threaten to take to streets. Amidst the anarchic picture, International players led by US and UN intervened at highest level to negotiate a political settlement. US former Secretary of State John Kerry brokered a compromise deal by forming the ‘National Unity Government’. Under the deal, Ghani was given the office of the president while Abdullah was offered an unconstitutional position of Chief Executive officer.

The difference between 2014 and the previous two presidential polls is twofold. 2014 election marked a smooth transition of power from a long reigning president to a new president and administration. Besides, three of the four leading candidates in 2014 polls were Pashtuns. This support the notion of Afghans voting on the basis of ethno-linguistic lines that further led to a sudden swing from the first election to the runoff in favor of Dr Ghani.

Good Governance and Elections in Afghanistan.           The state of good governance in Afghanistan is frail. The concept itself is quite “westernized” to the cursory democracy. There are no visible indictors of good governance in the Afghan set up and has rarely been evaluated. Consequently, there has been an absence of transparency, administrative principles, accountability and rule of law. In addition, after the fall of Taliban in 2001 the democratic governments have failed to formalize good governance. The war-torn country has confronted a myriad of challenges, however, the notion of consolidating the country’s nascent democracy has always been at rear.

A free, fair and transparent election is a prerequisite of good governance in a country. True representatives of the people remain committed to the development and prosperity by their long term pragmatic policy goals and their implementation. The Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan was established in 2006 under article 156 of the constitution of Afghanistan. It has a well-structured hierarchy and is headed by a chairperson who is appointed by the President. The IEC looks after policy making i.e. credibility of elections, oversight of IEC secretariat, logistics and technical aspects of polls. IEC being an independent institute has time and again experienced interferences by the government, which has in turn given rise to doubt.

In February, President Ghani sacked the country’s IEC. The commission failed to announce 2018’s parliamentary polls result thus overshadowing transparency. Seven new election commissioners were appointed along with Ms Hawa Alam Nuristani, first woman chair in the history of IEC. The UN Security Council report on Afghanistan enlisted a number of reasons for the postponement of elections i.e. reconstitution of the electoral management bodies, the new provisions in the amended Election Law and the delays in finalizing the parliamentary election results (UNSC report, 2019 June 14).

A major part of IEC finance is borne by the Afghan government, the UN Electoral Support Project and the international community. IEC chair Ms. Nuristani confirmed the electoral budget. September 2019 polls will cost $149 million, out of which $90 million will be paid by the afghan government (Shaheed, 2019). Technical, logistics and security flaws are manifold. Election observers and opposition candidates are skeptical about the ability of IEC to conduct timely and transparent polls. A recent study conducted by the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA) and Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA) have summed up a number of core issues as follows:

  • Lack of interest from the international community towards the electoral process;
  • The election commission’s “failure” to drop fake names from voter list;
  • Ambiguity about the use of biometric devices in the elections;
  • The nature of relations between the election commission and the government.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing intra- Afghan dialogue, the presidential election has been plagued by constant delays for the last four months. Recently the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan has re-scheduled the electoral process to 28th September 2019. The upcoming election will prove a turning point for the fragile democracy; however, the transition is highly dependent on the peace deal.

Though US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has reflected optimism. While addressing media last month in Doha, Pompeo told reporters that US was hopeful to negotiate a peace deal with Taliban before 1st September (DW, 2019).  Even the Taliban have given a very positive posture about the success of negotiations in Doha. Speaking to Al Jazeera, the Taliban’s political spokesman in Doha, Suhail Shaheen, said the US and the Taliban were finalising the agreement during the ninth round of negotiations. He further said that the deal would see the US and other foreign forces gradually withdraw from Afghanistan in exchange for a commitment by the Taliban that the country will not be used as a launch-pad for global attacks.

After the two sides agree on the two central issues, a separate dialogue on ensuring a permanent ceasefire and a power-sharing agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban are expected to take place in the form of intra-Afghan talks. So far, the Taliban has refused to speak to the Afghan government, calling it a “puppet regime” of the West. The group says any engagement with Kabul would grant the government legitimacy (Aljazeera, 2019). Only a possible political settlement will pave way for peace between Taliban and Afghan government, provided IEC fulfills its duty of conducting timely polls.

The Next Candidates.       The Independent Election Commission published a preliminary list of presidential nominees on 5th February 2019. The list includes 18 candidates out of whom the strongest rivals are, incumbent President Ghani, chief executive Dr Abdullah and former national security advisor Muhammad Hanif Atmar. In contrast to 2004 and 2009 elections, there are no female candidates.

Dr. Abdullah, a Noorzai Pashtun belonging to Kabul was one of the top finishers’ of 2014 polls. He has entered the presidential race for the third time and challenging Ghani for the second time. In the past he has served as foreign minister under Northern Alliance government and President Karzai. Due to his one-time relation with the late Ahmed Shah Masood (leader of the anti- Taliban Northern Alliance), he is infamous among the group. His electoral slogan is Subat wa Hamgerayi (Stability and Integration). Despite his mixed Pashtun-Tajik ethnicity, he’s seen by many as a Tajik.  For the upcoming polls he has garnered support from Uzbek and Hazara leaders i.e. Abdul Rashid Dostum (leader of Junbish party) and Karim Khalili (Wahdat party) (Kumar & Noori. 2019, January 20). In addition, Jamiat-e- Islamic party has announced their support in favor of Dr Abdullah. His first and second running mates both belong to the minority groups of Uzbeks and Hazara, thus his vote bank will balance in between Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara constituencies.

The coming months are crucial for President Ghani’s administration, who is in the race of seeking the country’s top job yet again. His five-year presidency is tainted with hesitant decisions, which resulted in upsetting the ethnic minorities at home. For example, the firing of senior advisor Mr. Ahmed Massoud, sending home the governor of Balkh province General Noor Muhammad (both belonging to Tajik clan) and the forced exile of Mr. Abdul Rashid Dostum sparked tensions amongst the already ethnically divided country.

Moreover, President Ghani is accused of appointing a number of Pashtuns to his administrative team in Kabul as the election is nearing.  Pashtuns make up 42 % of the afghan population and represent a greater political say (2018, June 7). President Ghani, a native Pashtun himself could not do well at the domestic front reason being that the non-Pashtun community though in minority, were placed at powerful positions in the past five years. Apart from that, he has failed miserably to engage the Taliban in intra- afghan dialogue. In spite of that, President Ghani has shown remarkable progress at the international front. As Ayoobi, EK. (2018, Feb 6) stated that President Ghani has time and again raised voice against state sponsored terrorism implying towards Pakistan, at regional and global forums. This has mustered him a bad name in the Pakistani polity where Ghani rejected a friendly hand extended.

Ghani is also very openly favoring India in comparison to Pakistan. Instead of keeping his country away from the cold war between any two rivals, Ghani has preferred India over Pakistan. He has also revamped Afghanistan’s position in regional mechanism, e.g. SAARC, Heart of Asia- Istanbul Process, etc. Hence, he tried to promote the country as a key economic link between South and Central Asia.

On the other hand, Supreme Court of Afghanistan in a breakthrough decision extended President Ghani’s tenure until September election. President Ghani, an Ahmadzai Pashtun is one of the top contenders for the presidential race. His slogan is Dawlat-sazan (State-builders), however he was unable to live up to that during his tenure. Belonging to a strong Pashtun background and having worked in the World Bank and United Nations, it was expected of him to bridge the ever-widening ethnocentric gap. (Contsable, P. 2019) states that, “President Ghani has attempted to build a reputation as a reformist technocrat, economic visionary, democratic modernizer and champion of peace. But his efforts have been undercut by entrenched poverty and violence, especially the deadly Taliban campaign that has persisted despite the presence of thousands of U.S. troops, many of whom may now be withdrawn by President Trump. Ghani has also suffered from his image as an impatient and isolated leader who only trusts a few aides.”

On the contrary, former national security advisor Mr. Hanif Atmar, a Durrani Pashtun hailing from Laghman province has emerged as a powerful contender. Atmar has played a significant role in the country’s political ambit. He is well connected with the grass root level. He has worked as a humanitarian worker in Pakistan’s refugees camp in 1990’s. He has earned the title of ‘negotiator’. He is well known in the Taliban circle and ever since then he has kept open channels with them under various government assignments. In one telling episode, whenever former President Karzai invited Taliban negotiators, messengers, and leaders for negotiations in Kabul, they would meet Atmar for advice and assistance.

In addition, he practiced shuttle diplomacy while in National Security office. He would often shuttle between the office of the President and the office of the Chief Executive to settle their differences and call for unity (Asey, 2019). Apart from that, he is largely credited for the 2014 Bilateral Security Agreement with USA and the 2016 peace deal with Hizb- e –Islami. In addition, Joshi, P. (2018, December 21) asserts that Atmar has built a corruption-free and trustworthy image at home and abroad. That will in turn prove to be significant in convincing foreign donors primarily the US government to continue supporting Afghanistan’s reconstruction programs. Besides, he has served in authoritative positions as minister for rural development and rehabilitation in President Karzai’s government from 2002-2006, education minister (2006-2008), interior minister (2008-2010) and as national security adviser (2014-2018) under President Ghani.

Like Dr Abdullah’s running mates, Atmar has proposed a Tajik and a Hazara for first and second vice- presidentship. His election slogan Solh wa Etedal (Peace and Moderation) is based on his unique attributes of unity, inclusivity, pluralism and conciliator. USA and western powers look forward to a leader with Atmar’s skills in Kabul, who shall be able to forge the country’s political future and deliver to the people of Afghanistan.

Ethnic Politics and Afghan Elections.            Afghan politics and its electoral process is always influenced and marred by ethnic division. It is an ethnically heterogeneous country of 35.3 million population ( World Bank, 2017). Four major ethnicities namely Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras represent the majority population of the country. Pashtuns make up to 42%, Tajiks 27%, Hazara 9% and Uzbek 8%.

Source: https://www.nationalgeographic.org/maps/afghanistan-and-pakistan-ethnic-groups/

The last census was conducted forty years ago. There is an absence of credible data in context of exact proportion of ethnicities. This has led to each group claiming to represent the largest faction of the population. Over the time, ethnic card has been politicized and unconsciously ingrained in the country’s social fabric.

Since the inception of modern-day Afghanistan, Pashtuns have enjoyed the center-stage. Much of afghan history is narrated from a Pashtun lens. They have been favored and given tokens of privileges in all sectors. Tajiks were left with the economic sector and the educational institutions, whereas the Hazaras were marginalized in general. The different treatment of the people went along with the forming of ethnic stereotypes: Pashtuns were considered ‘bellicose’, Tajiks were said to be ‘thrifty’, Uzbeks were known as ‘brutal’ and the Hazaras as ‘illiterate’ and ‘poor’ ( Schetter. 2003, June). However, it is noteworthy that Pashtuns with 42% representation are in plurality not majority. This plurality is often misperceived for their greater say in the political sphere of the country.

Ethnicity is used as an instrument for political demands. Leaders of these ethnic groups stress on economic and political resources disparity. They often tell their followers that survival of their “own ethnic group” is of utmost importance and that their interests have to be safeguarded from “other ethnic groups”. Tajiks blame Pashtuns; Pashtuns have ill feelings for Tajiks and so on. Since resources are concentrated in Pashtun provinces and controlled by Pashtun leaders in Kabul, the   north- south dialogue has exacerbated ethnic patterns. This has further engendered jealousy amongst various groups and tarnished the true essence of nation-hood. Clan politics is prevalent in the country. Often the contesting candidates garner support from tribal heads, who are naturally dominant in their respective tribes.

For the upcoming polls, presidential candidates are covertly using the ethnic card for legitimizing their political existence. Dr Abdullah Abdullah has the support of Tajiks, Atmar has the backing of Pashtuns, Hazaras and Uzbeks while Ghani is standing on Durrani Pashtuns pillar. This shows that the Pashtun votes will be divided between Atmar and Ghani. This will give a numerical edge to Dr Abdullah. Ethnic dynamics is embedded in the afghan society and will continue to play a significant role in the political process.

Role of Women in Afghanistan’s Elections.       For a budding democracy like Afghanistan, the challenge of inclusivity looms large. Universal and equal suffrage as a basic human right is the core of a functioning democracy. The term universal suffrage enunciates the right of every adult to participate in electoral processes regardless of gender, race, religion or any other characteristic. However, the notion of universal suffrage is subject to local traditions in a post-conflict Afghanistan.

Until 1996, women in the country experienced liberty. They were allowed to flourish in education, social and economic spheres. Women were in politics, but they were barred of contesting elections. During the Taliban rule, there was a complete suppression of women’s participation in social life. They were confined to homes and were ordered to observe parda. Under the Taliban rule, women were effectively excluded from public life entirely (Goodwin. February 1998).

The Afghan women breathed a sigh a relief after the fall of Taliban in 2001. In 2000   “Declaration of the Essential Rights of Afghan Women” came into being when 300   afghan women gathered in Tajikistan to formulate a document to end the misery of women in Afghanistan resulting in active participation in electoral process. Later in 2003, President Karzai incorporated the declaration into domestic law. The women rights law lessened the gender gap on paper.

Under the 2004 constitution of democratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, an attempt was made to re-introduce women participation. Increased participation of women in government is enshrined in articles 83 and 84 of the Afghan constitution. As per these articles, 68 seats out of a total of 250 are reserved for women in Wolesi Jirga. While 17 seats out of 102 are reserved for women in Mashrano Jirga. The statute encouraged women inclusion and representation nevertheless, oppression and discrimination did not completely diminish.

In current scenario women in Afghanistan have remarkably progressed. With the assistance of international donors and the gradual change in local perception, afghan women are able to step outside their houses and participate in democratic development. There are barriers but it is noteworthy that they conjured up courage to make their presence felt at formal levels.

The country’s three presidential polls witnessed only three female presidential candidates. In 2004, Dr Masooda Jalal stood for the office of the president. She was the only woman among 18 presidential candidates. She received 1.1% of total vote and female voters’ turnout was an overwhelming 40%. Though she lost but a precedent was set for afghan women. This was exemplified in 2009, when two female candidates namely Shahla Atta and Dr Frozan Fana sought presidency. In 2014, the role of women as candidates and voters was marginalized than in previous elections. The only female candidate Khadija Ghaznavi was disqualified by Independent Election Commission from an initial list of registered candidates. IEC had declined to explain the disqualification.

The country’s fourth presidential election scheduled for September has no female candidate. The situation is worrisome for the viability of democracy in Afghanistan. Women are the pillars of a democratic society and they cannot be secluded in any way. If seclusion practices continue, the essence of a robust civil society fades. In Afghanistan’s case, cultural norms, patriarchy and insurgency remain dominant factors in hindering women empowerment. In addition, women often refrain from contesting on general seats. It is difficult for women to contest as independents in elections as they have to bear the burden of security threats, nomination fee and resources for campaigns. With 48.45% of female population, and with a feeble democracy, women’s refraining from contesting general elections is worrisome for the future political process of Afghanistan.

The aforementioned female presidential candidates are a trio of trailblazers in a post conflict Afghanistan. They are an inspiration for women in other developing democracies in the region, as well as in western democracies. It is interesting to note that Pakistan has only had one female head of government and the U.S has never had a female president. The opportunity now exists in Afghanistan for women to have representation in the parliament, which will validate their participation and diminish patriarchal beliefs in Afghanistan (McQuire, 2015).

Since the fall of Taliban in 2001, women slightly showed signs of improvement and emancipation. With the 18 years of conflict coming to an end, Afghan women still struggle with numerous challenges daily. Key findings from the Asia Foundation’s 2018 survey on Afghanistan are listed as follows:

  • 70% afghans agreed that women should be allowed to work outside the home.
  • 84% afghans favored that women should have the same opportunities as men in education.
  • Almost half of respondents (46%) cite illiteracy and lack of educational opportunities as the biggest problem facing Afghan women in 2018-19 electoral process.
  • The level of support for the cultural practices of baad and baddal continues to decline and support for women in leadership positions—apart from that of the President—has increased marginally.

Despite the country’s numerous struggles, Afghans have manifested optimism. They strongly believe in democratic development as the only solution for Afghanistan’s future. From the above findings it is clear that the people of Afghanistan wish to see their women as empowered and dignified individuals of the society. Besides, attitude of afghan men towards women remain favourable.

Source: Survey of the Afghan People 2018: Asia Foundation

Women rights hold an important position on the agenda of intra- afghan dialogue. The mainstreaming of Taliban in the political ambit has drawn skepticism from various afghan factions. Afghans fear the same humiliation they faced under the seven years rule of Taliban during 1990s. This has led Afghan women and the International community to demand preservation of women rights from the Taliban. Last month in Doha, 50 afghan delegates including 10 women participated in the intra afghan dialogue.

The delegates attended the dialogue in personal capacities. The women delegates raised their concerns with Taliban. Ms Fawzia Koofi, women rights activist and a female delegate at Doha dialogue last month enquired the definition of ‘Hijab’ from Taliban. A Taliban representative responded accordingly: “From our understanding of Islam, the scarf wrapped around your head is what defines how women should be covering up. We don’t have a problem with that. But if Afghan women prefer wearing a burqa, which is part of the Afghan tradition, we don’t have a problem with that too” (Qazi, 2019 July). The reply connoted flexibility in the Taliban’s stance. Women inclusivity does not mean merely having female faces at the negotiating table. They have to be listened to and their demands must be given due heed. Both the Afghans and the international community negotiating with Taliban should ensure that a future agreement safeguards women’s right and social participation. Also, an enforcement mechanism has to be in place to uphold the provisions of an anticipated ‘peace settlement’ in case the Taliban backslide.

Afghan negotiators’ Better Alternate To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) viz a viz women is clear-cut, Taliban have relatively softened their stance. In case of violation of women’s rights, the international community will impose financial sanctions. Most donors view women’s issue as a salient indictor of Afghanistan’s post-2001 democratization process. Without these donors, the country will be unable to maintain financial solvency (Ahmadi. 2019, March). To end, a future peace settlement has to honor the invaluable role of afghan women in social, political and economic realms of the country.

Pakistan: A frontline state once again.            Conflict, peace agreement or elections in Afghanistan; Pakistan has been at the center stage of regional politics since 9/11. Given Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan and the former as a frontline state against global war on terror, it has suffered colossal losses. The bilateral relation has been tumultuous, primarily owing to trust- deficit. In the past five years, President Ghani tried time and again to bridge the gap between both the countries. However, Islamabad missed the opportunities. And when Islamabad extended olive branch, Kabul missed it due to its cordial relations with Pakistan’s archrival, India. Last July, in his inaugural speech, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan stressed on revamping the country’s foreign policy. He highlighted that Pakistan would put in all efforts to bring an end to the Afghan conflict and promote bilateral economic relations. Keeping in consideration past strained relation and the upcoming presidential polls, Islamabad anticipates an inclusive and moderate power-sharing government in Kabul. For this purpose, it is robustly relying on soft means of diplomacy by supporting Doha peace negotiations.

Apparently, it is for the first time that Pakistan’s civil-military equation is on the same page in its policy towards Afghanistan. Islamabad, to its advantage, has influence over Taliban. This influence will turn out positive, if Islamabad brings both the Taliban and the Afghan government to the table. In order to facilitate a smooth transition of power in September 2019, Pakistan has to play a decisive part in making the Afghan Peace Process a success. In July 2019, President Ghani’s visit to Pakistan has been seen by many as an ice-breaker. The agenda of visit had three tiers namely trade and economy, health and repatriation of Afghan refugees. However, the highlight of Ghani’s visit was intra- afghan dialogue. In his reelection bid, Ghani intends to sell to the Afghan voters the success of a potential peace deal with the Taliban (Kakar, July 2019).

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan are twofold. Firstly, the heightened rhetoric of curbing Indian influence in Kabul. Imrana Begum in her book ‘The Legacies of the Afghan- Soviet War in Pakistan’ asserted that Pakistan’s military was aware of the country’s geo-strategic position, it’s close ties with Pashtuns of Afghanistan primarily with the Taliban, made it a frontline state in the region for any US success in Pakistan. Had Pakistan not cooperated with US in the war on terror, besides other hazards, it would have enhanced India’s regional hegemony. Pakistan’s policy viz a viz Afghanistan has always remained India-centric. Vanda Felbaba- Brown has further highlighted this in her research paper on ‘The Predicament in Afghanistan’, Pakistan’s military and intelligence services have always stressed on minimizing India’s influence in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, both the Prime Minister and Foreign Office of Pakistan have rejected the theory of strategic depth. Foreign Minister Quershi in Lahore Process stated that, ‘’Pakistan remains firmly committed to a peaceful, stable, united, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan. We are determined to build our bilateral relationship on the principles of non-interference, mutual respect and common interest” (Qureshi; 2019, June 23rd). Interference in Afghanistan has had a ripple effect on Pakistan.

Secondly, Islamabad is mending its relations with Washington viz a viz Taliban. Pakistani government has to stay vigilant and should not end up as Trump’s scapegoat in the region. Kakar asserted that in international politics, it is only realistic to not put all eggs in one basket. Relying too much on Taliban has done more harm than good to Islamabad. Promotion of Afghan reconciliation process should continue as it is in Pakistan’s interest. However, Islamabad has to let go of ‘dualism’ policy, the more it distances itself from Taliban the more it will win over Afghans. This will in turn engender cooperation and trust-building between both the countries. However, in Doha process, Pakistan being the immediate neighbor of Afghanistan has maintained a neutral stance. Last month Prime Minister Imran Khan on the occasion of President Ghani’s visit asserted that, “there is no blue-eyed of Pakistan among the candidates for the presidential election in Afghanistan and it is up to the people to choose their leader’’ (Abrar; 2019, June 24).

Conducting free and fair elections in Afghanistan is an uphill task. Although the past three presidential elections ensured a democratic transition of power however, the electoral processes were plagued by fraud, massive rigging, poor management and security threats. Samuel Huntington in his Political Order and changing societies paper demonstrated that, “what is the reason of political instability and violence in these countries? … rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions” (1968, p.4). For this reason, instability in conflict ridden countries like Afghanistan is the lack of development of institutional arrangements.

The concept of “Good Governance” is missing in Afghanistan’s political realm. Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy making, a bureaucracy imbued with professional ethos in furtherance of the public good, rule of law, transparent processes and a strong civil society participating in public affairs. Characteristics of good governance are shown in the following image:

                            Source:  What is Good Governance? unescap.org

In order for the upcoming presidential polls to be an instrument of peace-building, the following are key recommendations:

  • Political leadership has to be re-defined. In a post- conflict set up a political leader ought to determine the future of reconstruction efforts. For this purpose, a charismatic leader is the need of the hour. One who is often identified in times of crisis and exhibit exceptional devotion in his field, as well as possessing a clear vision and the ability to engage with a large audience.
  • Political parties have to discard the ethnic card and promote an inclusive environment. Political power is often accumulated in the hands of Pashtuns in Kabul. Peripheral provinces and non-Pashtun communities have to be equally represented in center.
  • The constitution of Afghanistan has to be respected and followed accordingly. 2014 power-sharing fiasco paved way for political rivalry and created problems for the already divided country.
  • Simultaneously, the country’s judiciary shall refrain from meddling in the political affairs. The extension of Karzai’s and Ghani’s tenures have invited criticism from the opposition factions.
  • Last census was conducted in 1979, nearly 40 years ago. An accurate latest census will prove helpful for the country’s elections particularly voter registration process.
  • Afghanistan has been a recipient of billions of aid for electoral programs. However, corruption remains rampant. International donors need to keep a check on the utilization of aid.
  • Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan needs structural reconstruction. Electoral and secretariat staff ought to be trained for their duties. During elections international and local election observers shall closely note their performance.
  • Independent Election Commission shall formulate a gender-working group. Through this group female voter turnout awareness campaign can be conducted and ensured.
  • Security is a grave concern for the country. In order to re-enter the political arena Taliban have to reciprocate a peaceful and safe election.

 

The Afghan presidential election 2019, is a watershed for the international and the regional arenas. International and regional powers have invested in state-building efforts in post- Taliban Afghanistan. Nevertheless, these powers have to realize limitations of their capability. Brown (2013) explains that “externally driven state-building efforts can succeed and have succeeded.  But the time and resource requirements for interveners are very large. It is comparatively easy for interveners to destroy a regime. It is harder for them to build a new political and economic order……..They can only assist in the state building effort. The ownership of and commitment to the effort must come principally from the local population” (p.174). With the peace dialogue underway and growing instability at home, an inclusive leadership in Kabul is the need of hour. In order to avoid a political vacuum a smooth transition of power has to be ensured for a strong, assertive and conflict- free Afghanistan.

 

 

References

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Qazi, S.(28 Aug 2019). US and Taliban ‘close’ to a peace deal: Afghan group’s spokesman, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/taliban-close-peace-deal-afghan-group-spokesman-190828114246759.html (Accessed on 30th August, 2019)

Ayoobi, EK. (2018, February 6). Ashraf Ghani: ‘Philosopher king’ or ethnonationalist? Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ashraf-ghani-philosopher-king-ethnonationalist-180201144845423.html ( 2019, July 4)

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Begum, Imrana. (2018). The Impact of the Afghan-Soviet War on Pakistan. Oxford University Press.

Brown,  Felbab Vanda. ( 2013). The Predicament in Afghanistan. In Brown Seynom & Scales H Robert (Ed), US Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq Lessons and Legacies (p. 174). New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited.

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Constable, P. (2019, January 20). Afghan president and 14 rivals launch race for July elections. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghan-president-and-14-rivals-launch-race-for-july-elections/2019/01/20/bf002466-1c9f-11e9-8e ( 2019, July 4)

Electoral Law (2016).  Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/86577/97848/F592478731/AFG86577%20English.pdf (2019, July 12th)

Ethnic Groups of Afghanistan. (2018, June 7). Retrieved from https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/ethnic-groups-of-afghanistan.html  ( 2019, July 6)

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Karzai’s winning percentages (2004 & 2009 election results). Retrieved July 17th 2019 from http://www.iec.org.af/prs/

Kakar, F. (2019, July 14th). A new beginning. Islamabad, The News.

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Kumar, R. & Noori, H. (2019, January 20). Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah face off again for Afghanistan presidency. Retrieved from https://www.thenational.ae/world/asia/ashraf-ghani-and-abdullah-abdullah-face-off-again-for-afghanistan-presidency-1.815788 ( 2019, July 5)

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Imran Khan: Playing it in the ‘Gaps’ in Kashmir

One of the greatest military minds to-date, Liddell Hart, once said: “Of what use is decisive victory in battle if we bleed to death as a result of it?” Hart’s treatises remain relevant even today. The ongoing Kashmir crisis has brought to the fore a challenge for the Pakistani leadership. After India’s illegal annexation of the otherwise occupied Kashmir, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Imran Khan, was faced with the herculean task of effectively taking on India while avoiding the military route. Despite pressures and criticism from his political rivals and the media, Islamabad has not employed options that are prohibitive or escalatory. This approach has paid tactical dividends that are likely to feed into strategic advantages for Pakistan as it ratchets up its efforts to liberate the Indian-occupied Kashmir from the clutches of India, and help it exercise its right to self-determination.

The revocation of Articles 370 and 35-A was followed by a barrage of criticism on Khan and his government. The opponents forcefully presented the “Kashmir ka Suada” narrative, blaming Khan of agreeing to a fait accompli in his meeting with the US President, Donald Trump, days before the annexation. The accusations proved wrong when the US State Department rubbished such claims. This, coupled with general backlash on social media, did little to disrupt Pakistani decision-makers who joined heads to come up with a response. Diplomatic ties were downgraded and trade was suspended days after India’s Kashmir gambit. PM Khan took it upon himself to fight Kashmir’s case until Kashmiris get their right to self-determination.

One of the things that PM Khan did was use his rapport with President Trump to good effect. Both leaders talked to each other on the Kashmir issue for a good part of one hour. Trump also talked about the Kashmir issue with the US media and the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi. For a country that detests discussion on Kashmir, calling it an internal matter, India suffered a setback when Trump invested his time talking about it. As a matter of fact, Kashmir was the central talking point of the Trump-Modi summit on the sidelines of the G7 conclave. From the White House to the State Department, the US continues to stress a resolution of the dispute, and urges India to end the curfew and the communication blackout. This position taken by the US has repudiated India’s ‘internal matter’ mantra while giving the Kashmir issue much-needed internationalization.

Moreover, PM Khan and Foreign Minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, ably supported by Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Dr. Maliha Lodhi,  have  intensified contacts with their counterparts in various capitals, apprising them of Pakistan’s position on the issue. With China’s help, Pakistan was able to effect a UNSC huddle on Kashmir after a hiatus of 54 years, much to the chagrin of India. None of the members including the P5s bought India’s core assertions, and called for a resolution of the disputed issue. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has released strongly-worded statements that call for the adherence to UNSC Resolutions, and putting an end to grotesquely egregious human rights violations.

Also, in his customary style, PM Khan has led from the front to highlight and expose India’s fascist government. In his tweets, public speeches, and statements, PM Khan has drawn parallels between the ideologies of Nazi Germany and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a party that drives Modi’s iron-fist policies towards the Muslims. PM Khan has warned the world that appeasement of Modi is akin to that of Hitler in World War II. In his piece for the New York Times, and later in his address to the Islamic Society of North America, PM Khan shed light on how Modi’s fascism is a threat to not only Kashmir but India , the region and the entire  world. PM Khan’s campaign leading up to the 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly aims to amplify how Modi’s high-handed policies in Kashmir and elsewhere are rapturing the India that the world believes in. Besides, he is broaching with the international community the issue of escalation between two nuclear-armed states. These messages have made headlines in media houses that were usually soft on India especially when it came to Kashmir. With Khan all set to lead Pakistan’s UNGA campaign later this month, his message is certain of reaching its target audience.

While it may sound perfunctory to some, Pakistan’s abstinence from kinetic options has saved it from reprisals and condemnation that could hurt its chances of coming out of Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) greylist. Pakistan’s refusal to walk away from the Afghan peace process has brought it within touching distance of delivering the goods for the US, something that is integral to resuscitating Pak-US relations. Pakistan can ill-afford to see a US administration on the lookout for punishing it in the midst of a crisis with India.

The pressure to lift the curfew and blockade mounts from all quarters on New Delhi ahead of the UNGA session, placing Modi in a catch-22 situation. Either way, the images from Kashmir would give an impression of a situation that is out of control. Khan, on the other hand, has ensconced himself in a position where he has more in his kitty as compared to what his counterpart has. With this in mind, the Pakistani premier would like to cogently push the anti-Modi forward before and during his stay, speech and interactions in New York.

Indian Maritime Nuclear Ambitions

The Indian quest of possessing a nuclear triad has remained entrenched in its military doctrine. Beginning in the 1970s, the Indian nuclear submarine programme shortly gained momentum after the induction of Skat (Charlie-class) nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), between 1988 to 1991 from the former Soviet Union. The Charlie-class attack submarines were manufactured under Project 670. The programme again witnessed considerable upgrades when India ably leased an Akula-II class SSN for ten years in 2012. Recently, the country equipped its naval fleet with the first indigenously built nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), namely INS Arihant, changing the overall security dynamics of South Asia and the Indian Ocean. This article puts into analysis the Indian aspirations of dominating the security architecture of the region and how it is emphasizing naval modernization.

The induction of SSBN remained critical for India, owing to its global objectives of becoming a world power. Capable of robustly carrying-out missions like anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), the Soviet-made fast attack SSNs allowed the Indian Navy to operate regionally with greater thrust and lethality. However, they did not cater to the requirements of an assured ‘second strike capability’. China’s introduction of the Maritime Silk Route changed the security dynamics, pressing the Indian navy to re-orient itself in the maritime domain and pursue an active strategy for competing with growing Chinese influence both economically and strategically.

The launch of long-range nuclear-capable missile equipped INS Arihant (codenamed K-4) in 2016 proved to be a stepping stone for India to maintain a positive balance of power. Thus, not only ensuring a ‘second strike capability’ but also completing the nuclear triad. The launch of INS Arihant also relates to the Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine’s voyage from China to the Indian Ocean – passing through Strait of Malacca towards Sri Lanka and moving to the Persian Gulf before touching its base in China – during December 2013 and February 2014. Afterwards, the Indian Navy adopted the same patterns for its nuclear-powered submarine and regular deployment of naval ships.

The Indian 2015 Maritime Security Strategy Document ranked deterrence as its first priority, placing war-fighting at the second. Yet, the objective of assuring a second strike capability did not stop the further escalating arms race in the maritime domain. Within a year, i.e. in 2017, INS Arighat was launched that was configured to carry 24 K-15 Sagarika missiles (SLBMs) having a range of around 700 – 750km. It also had compatibility with K-4 missiles as well and could house eight K-4 missiles alternatively.

The Indo – U.S. strategic collaboration terms the increased Chinese assertive behaviour detrimental for their respective national interests that align when it comes to this region. Based on these grounds, the American military assistance towards India is regarded vital for maintaining strategic clout. Moreover, the joint naval exercises conducted by the two countries in the preceding year were also focused on “anti-submarine operations.”

If the sea-based nuclear component is analysed with a broad spectrum, the Indian Navy is also capable of using a ship-based ballistic missile in the form of Dhanush. With a range of 400 kilometres, Dhanush uses a single-stage liquid-fuel short-range ballistic missile configured on Sukanya-class patrol vessels. Each Sukanya-class vessel can home two missiles at a time. Although these strategic weapons have great utility, their applicability faces constraints because of its limited range. The ships have to cruise precariously near their targets for effective strikes.

India’s desires to not only dominate the smaller regional states, but also its equating competitors, has resulted in an intense arms race. The strategic competition has escalated the ladder in a manner that the once considered ‘Zone of Peace’ or Indian Ocean has become a hotbed for nuclear politics. The strings remain attached with an all-out nuclear war if analysed in connection with the recent developments among India, Pakistan and China regarding the Kashmir valley. The advancement of Indian forces in all domains have been instigating skirmishes between India and Pakistan – connected with the spotting of an Indian submarine in Pakistan’s territorial waters – remain critical and related to a future conflict zone.

Through the aforementioned arguments, it can also be debated that the introduction of nuclear-powered submarine has altered the security landscape of South Asia and Indian Ocean at large on the patterns of Cold War. The contending powers have ‘extra eyes and ears’ in the region to contain their adversaries’ strategies or policies. Even though it does not aspire to be a regional or global power, Pakistan’s position in such settings becomes relatively more vulnerable as it does not possess a nuclear-powered submarine. Possessing sophisticated technology and military equipment always pays off when it comes to warfare.

End of Humanity!

On 5th of August, 2019, Narendra Modi and his government unleashed a wave of suffering and punishment often seen in tribal and primitive societies and not in democracies to which India claims to belong. With clever tinkering of Indian legislative process, it did away with the special status that was granted to Muslim-majority Kashmir through the originally fraudulent, but acceptable to India, Instrument of Accession of October 26, 1947. This had been an ambition and election promise of Modi to his Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) fanatics. They wanted to avenge the nearly 1000-year Muslim rule over India preceding the British colonial era. Such perceived “historical wrongs” are usually righted in the name of superior and lofty ideals of restoring the denied rights of a certain community.

The revocation or de-operationalization of Article 370 is tantamount to reneging on the agreements signed and promises made to the UN. Considering the Hindutva ideology of BJP, the legal gymnastics on their part was expected. But the inhumanity of the implementation strategy of their grand design was not. The 8.5 million Muslims of Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) are locked up in their homes for nearly four weeks now. People are dying of hunger, and sickness due to a lack of food and medicine. Their relatives outside of Kashmir have no way of contacting them. The state is cut off from the rest of the world. International media is not allowed to cover the situation in Kashmir from within. Opposition leader, Mr Rahul Gandhi, was not allowed to leave the airport on arrival at Srinagar.

All this is being done ostensibly to make life better for Kashmiris. The world at large fails to see the persecution and violence perpetrated by the Indian state. All those opposed to slaughter of cows and other animals as sacrifice are not moved by the wanton and merciless killing and torture of Muslims. The world that is so bothered by the rights of rats, that all cosmetic and other beauty products on the shelves of supermarkets, bear a certificate that the product has not been tested on animals, but it does not show the same compassion and consideration towards Muslims, and their genocide seems to be acceptable to all non-Muslims barring a very few exceptions.

The video-clips that manage to escape the digital and physical blockade in Indian Kashmir, are too disturbing. The people subjected to torture beg their tormentors to kill them rather than physically abuse them. The tales of torture are too horrendous. The blinding by the use of pellet guns seems a benign and benevolent punishment compared to tying young men and dragging them behind vehicles on roads or making road-rollers crush limbs of living persons. There are other insufferable torture techniques at the disposal of barbaric security forces deployed in Kashmir that one doesn’t have the heart to allude to. How can any human ever imagine doing this to another human, no matter what the intensity of hatred and bigotry!

In the past, there were instances of communal violence between Hindus and Muslims in India. They were provoked by events that stoked anger, but it was never encouraged or supported by the government officials or party officeholders. BJP has transformed the ethos of Indian polity from secular to Hindutva. Now the minorities virtually have no rights. They are expected to live and die at the pleasure and discretion of Hindu mobs backed by BJP and RSS leadership. The fear and fright amongst the victims is total.

Reportedly, teen-aged boys from 6000 families have been take away by force and transferred to jails and camps outside Kashmir. A larger number of girls have been abducted and placed at the disposal of Hindu mobs, who are known to use rape as a weapon of war of subjugation. This is being done to break the will of the populace who live under the constant threat of the bad news that security forces may bring about the custodial deaths of their family members. An engineered famine is being created to attain the same objective. This also shows that the Indian government has given up the intent and hope of ever winning the hearts and minds of the Kashmiri citizens. That any way would have been a long-drawn and difficult struggle, so they have in their judgement decided that total extermination of the Muslims is the best solution akin to Hitler’s strategy for the Jews during WWII.

That this level of state terrorism and crimes against humanity are allowed to go on is unprecedented. In Africa, tribal conflicts have seen such mindless violence but to see this being perpetrated by security forces of the largest democracy of the world, armed to the teeth against unarmed men, women and children is awful. Even more saddening is the world’s apathy toward this genocide and hateful massacre against a religious minority which has been stigmatised on the basis of Islamophobia. How can powerful officeholders ignore what is going? It’s not that they don’t know about these crimes; it sadly looks like the end of humanity!