Category: Missiles

Repercussions of Turkey Receiving the S-400

The first shipment of the S-400 missile has arrived at Murted Airbase, making it the first time that a major NATO member has made an arms deal with Russia. Following the failure to procure an air defence system from the U.S., Ankara inked an agreement with Moscow for the purchase of the S-400 missile defence system. The U.S. is outraged by this deal and was pushing Turkey to opt for U.S. Patriot Missiles instead, since the Russian missile system is viewed as incompatible with the NATO systems, including the most modern F-35 aircraft.

The S-400 Conundrum

Earlier, the U.S. demanded that Turkey should either scrap the deal or await sanctions in the light of the Countering American Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) if it proceeded towards the purchase. CAATSA allows Trump to impose any five of the twelve sanctions on states who make significant weapons deal with Russia. Turkey was also threatened that it would be excluded from the F-35 fighter jet program if the deal is not abrogated. Turkey was to receive 100 jets as it was part of the international consortium, which initially funded their development. To demonstrate its firm stance on the matter, the U.S. has halted Turkish pilots who were training on F-35 aircraft in the U.S.

The S-400 has the capacity to defeat U.S. stealth technology which is the stimulus for the U.S. to oppose the deal as it fears that it could be used to collect valuable intelligence on the 5th generation fighter jets. The U.S. wants to avert the situation in which intelligence regarding American-made jets that Turkey possesses, reaches Moscow as Russian technicians would maintain parts of the system.

During the G-20 Summit, President Trump requested his Turkish counterpart to let go of his ambitions of the S-400. However, Erdogan justified his decision by pointing out that it was the U.S. itself that didn’t cooperate with Turkey on its initial demands of Patriot Missiles and forced Turkey to resort to other suppliers. Furthermore, Turkey assured that it would not incorporate the S-400 in the NATO system and therefore, its installation won’t pose a threat to the security alliance. Furthermore, Turkey has also offered to establish a commission to clarify any technical issues. However, this offer has not been responded to by the U.S.

The Turkish defence minister has asserted that the purchase of the S-400 was not an option, rather a dire necessity in the light of dangerous security conditions. Turkey has ignored USA’s threat of making it ineligible for the F-35 Fighter Jet Program if it procures the S-400 missile defence system from Russia. Refusing to let go of the deal is indeed the manifestation of Erdogan’s desire of erecting a foreign policy that doesn’t infringe national sovereignty and serves the national interest.

Implications

U.S.-Tukey relations heightened during the Cold War as Turkey’s proximity with the Soviet Union rendered it a helpful ally which could be instrumental in monitoring the enemy, curtailing Soviet expansion and containing the Soviet Union in case of a war. In return, Turkey attained security assurances in the form of nuclear weapons stationed throughout the country to deter any Soviet attack. However, following the end of the Cold War, the nature of relations diluted due to the decline in shared interests. Moreover, following the invasion of Iraq, Turkey anticipates Washington as a destabilizing factor in the Middle East. The procurement of these weapons would have an impact beyond the Turkish economy as it is going to alter the strategic relations between Ankara and Washington.

The deal would further augment the relations between Russia and Turkey. Both states have surprisingly improved their relations taking into consideration recent developments: both sides support opposing groups in the Syrian conflict, a Russian plane was shot down by Turkey on its southern border in 2015, and a policeman shot Andrei Karlov, the Russian ambassador to Turkey, in an art gallery in Ankara in 2016. The positive refinement of their relations is indeed a monumental success on the part of Putin and Erdogan. At the moment, Turkey needs Russia to avert any assault by the Assad Regime on the rebel-held Idlib province where Turkey maintains certain peace-keeping groups yet backs certain rebel groups. Likewise, Russia has also aided Turkey militarily by combat operations to keep the Kurds under pressure (without causing any harm to the Assad regime). Consequently, Turkey needs to engage with Russia to secure its vital interests. The S-400 has the capacity to bring down a plane at a distance of 150 miles and intercept ballistic missiles within a range of 38 miles. Hence, it provides the Turkish Defense forces with an instrumental weapon to cover most of Syria. The deal can serve as the commencement of a new era of a relationship which can shape new regional alignment in the Middle East.

President Erdogan has expressed his concerns over depriving Turkey of F-35 jets and termed it as a “robbery” as Turkey has invested more than $ 1 Billion for its development. Though President Erdogan is quite confident that he would be able to negotiate the issue with President Trump and sanctions would not be imposed, it is yet to be seen whether or not the arrival of the initial parts of the S-400 triggers a round of international sanctions. Since there is no specified time frame to enact the sanctions under CAATSA, there is a likelihood that the U.S. might continue threats until the system becomes fully operational. This is based on the notion that the U.S. might require help from Turkey with respect to the ongoing conflict with Iran. If bilateral relations are strained, then Turkey can turn down the U.S. access to its airbases in case of a potential conflict with Iran.

As far as Russia is concerned, this deal has been beneficial at two levels. Firstly, it has opened a new window for the Russian defence industry. Apart from the S-400 deal, if Turkey is deprived of the F-35, then it would endure more opportunities for Russia to sell its Sukhoi Su-57 equivalent to Turkey as well. Secondly, this will also fracture the element of trust between NATO members; something that would be very pleasant for Russia as the military cooperation between Turkey and NATO would be jeopardized. Consequently, every step away from NATO will inevitably push it closer towards Russia.

The nature of the American response will also shape the cooperation between Russia and Arab countries, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egypt has signed an arms deal with Russia for the purchase of warplanes and the construction of nuclear reactors in Egypt for electricity generation. Likewise, Saudi Arabia is also interested in acquiring the S-400 system. Hence, in the future, if Congress refuses the sale of advanced weapons to these states, then they can curtail their reliance on the U.S. and move towards the diversification of their arsenals with Russian technology.

European states have remained silent until now, on how they are going to respond to Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 system. There is no assurance that European states might abide by the sanctions if imposed as they have mounting interests with Turkey, such as commercial engagement, obstruction in the influx of refugees and the passageway of oil and gas, which are no less important than the NATO cooperation. Alternatively, if sanctions are not brought into play, then the European countries can question the sanctions on Iran. Even though the nature of the threat from both issues is different, but the sanctions against Iran have been a conflicting point between the U.S. and European states. Hence, this case could be used against the U.S. to augment their stance that if the U.S. can put the security of NATO at risk, then why should European countries disassociate from the nuclear agreement which has the potential for regional and international security.

The policymakers in the U.S. will remain in the dilemma of which action to execute for Turkey’s defiance. Triggering sanctions would label Turkey as an adversary and might further thrust Turkey to the Russian influence. On the other hand, avoiding sanctions would undermine American threats and could serve as a green signal for other interested states to materialize similar deals, particularly India which has already signed the deal for acquisition with Russia last October. Hence, a very calculated strategy needs to be adopted to deal with the respective issue. There is a long-standing belief among thinkers in the U.S. that Turkey sees Washington as an indispensable ally. However, the installation of Russian military hardware in a NATO member echoes the decline of the U.S. hegemony over the NATO members and Turkey cruising towards Russia as Moscow offers them a more functional relationship rather than a symbolic one.

 

US-INDIA Strategic Trade Authorization (STA-1) and COMCASA: A Strategic Assessment

In the global order, political and economic trends are highlighting strategic realignments, shifts in alliances and cooperation among states at multiple levels. States adopt measures to preserve their strategic and national security interests. The major move towards multipolarity, specifically with the rise of China and India as major powers, is prominent. The prevailing discourse is that the U.S. included India in its grand strategy to advance it as a guarantor of strategic interests in the South Asia and Asia-pacific regions. It, however, took decades to materialize. Subsequently, it poses questions such as how these defense equipment related partnerships impact the regional and international strategic stability equilibrium? How does the development of emerging technologies add to uncertainties and create new operational challenges on top of existing political ones?

Recent developments in the U.S.-India strategic partnership endorse the deep and high pace trends of bilateral cooperation. The sanctioning of STA-1 (Strategic Trade Authorization) Status to India has a number of aspects that require assessment in the geo-political and regional contexts. Foremost, the STA-1 grants India a license for acquiring U.S. arms and also co-developing advanced military technologies, thus, boosting India military prowess. Meanwhile, the two countries have also signed a military-information sharing pact,  the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), at the 2+2 bilateral summit. It gives India access to U.S. communication and surveillance technologies to keep an eye on China and the neighborhood.  A new pact was signed for cooperation between the defense innovation organizations of the two states. Additionally, it was decided to conduct a new tri-Services joint exercise on the eastern coast in the coming year.

The deepening cooperation between New Delhi and Washington, with the inclusion of the naval component, directly impacts regional security and stability, particularly in the maritime domain. Advances in military technology pose serious implications for neighbors’ threat perception, while at the same time increasing their vulnerability.

The Strategic Trade Authorization (STA-1)

The Strategic Trade Authorization (STA-1) was announced by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross at the Indo-Pacific business forum. He stated, “India would be moved into Tier 1 of the Department of Commerce’s Strategic Trade Authorization license exception”. He stated that this regulatory change will enhance the bilateral defense trade relationship and result in a greater volume of U.S. exports to India. The significant features of the trade authorization agreement are as under.

  • First, the presumption of approval by the U.S. At American any license sought through a country in this category will move through the process as politically deemed approved.
  • Second, no political authority would now have to actively intervene to speed up the approval process. Earlier, the process would not move without authorized approvals at every juncture; therefore, the political factors dominate the agreement.

The validation of end-user authorization has proved to be a cumbersome process. This agreement allows one certificate for the entire project, after which no items related to that specific venture  need fresh validation. For instance, India and the U.S. agreed to start a project of fighter jets by naming it “Make in India”; this generic authorization would be eligible for the entire project including the transfer of the sensitive and dual use items. The undertaking would need in principle approval from government to government projects. This category helps private and government entities alike.

Assessment

Analyzing the STA-1 entails two aspects, whether it is a ‘product’ or ‘process’, at both the global and regional levels. When taking STA-1 as a ‘product’, the question arises as to whether India will acquire tier 1 weapons systems. In other words, India will be able to acquire the latest technology in defense from the U.S. such as AH-64E (Apache Guardian attack helicopter) and armed drones’, and fighter jets like F-22.

If we analyze it as a ‘process’, then the spectrum of analysis draws a number of assumptions. At the global level it has given India a status similar to NATO, Japan and South Korea. Hence, in U.S. strategic consideration it may serves the purpose in Indo-pacific strategic competition. The most popular observation is to make India muscular in order to cope with the strategic and military rise of China. In this regard, the clear observation is that China, Pakistan, and Russia are not part of the 37 countries who have STA-1 status. Traditionally, the countries in the STA-1 list are members of the four export control regimes, but the U.S. declared India in its federal legal notification. On the basis of India’s membership in three out of the four multilateral export regimes. The aggressive efforts of the U.S. can be seen in the process of India’s membership in three of the regimes such as the MTCR of 27th June 2016, the Wassenaar Arrangement of 7th December 2017, and the Australia Group of 19th January  2018. For the fourth one, the Trump administration is supporting efforts to create a niche with an exception for India to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA)

At the ‘Two plus Two’ dialogue in September 2018, Secretary Pompeo and Secretary Mattis with their Indian counterparts inked the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA). It is designed to provide a legal framework for the transfer of communication security equipment from the U.S. to India that would facilitate interoperability between their forces, and potentially with other militaries that use U.S.-origin systems for secured data links. The Indian Armed Forces are currently dependent on less secure communication systems on platforms like the C 130J and P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft. The scenario which is perceived is that if a U.S. ship detects any Chinese submarine movement near the Malacca Strait, it would be able to transfer information about its speed, location and direction to the Indian Navy in real time. Such surveillance may raise concerns for the state observed in terms of uninformed intrusion. Beyond that, in case India acquires armed drones from the U.S., the agreement will give the two nations the ability to share targeted information via live satellite feed that is monitoring the trade route of a specific convoy. Hence, such collaboration will certainly disrupt the equilibrium of South Asian regional stability and encourages competition in the Indian Ocean.

Such highly ambitious defence trade agreements indicate potential tensions, not only with  reference to fifth generation warfare but also naval dynamics. These developments may instigate neighbouring states (China, Pakistan) to focus keenly on enhancing the operational posture of the naval fleet, which binds states to counter any perceived threats.

 

Implications on Strategic Stability

 

Strategic stability, however, is ultimately the product of broader political, economic, and military dynamics among many players in which technology performs multiple roles including that of being an agent of change. The technological based strategic trade agreement with embedded dual-use technologies, however, might have a more direct impact on strategic stability due to highly leveraging effects, as described below.

In the Butterfly effects, small changes in initial conditions results in radically different outcomes like compelling an arms race environment. It is a great concern for regional strategic stability for China, Russia and Pakistan that the U.S. is easing export controls for high-tech product sales to India. This will lead to the risk of escalation into any future crisis. Additionally, the other factor is the safety and security of new imported technology.

With the Horseshoe nail effect, a small loss under the wrong conditions yields a large undesirable outcome; this refers to the inadvertent escalation of any military crisis and conflict between the border sharing countries. The open-ended development of military equipment in the neighborhood (India) alarms the whole region with its trajectory of economic, political and military intentions. Therefore, in the context of South Asia, the implications of growing defense and military cooperation indicate cautionary instability, the deepening of an existing trust deficit, and increased tensions in unresolved territorial disputes. Simultaneously, the consistent increase in military muscle along with the dedication of pursuing provocative conventional war fighting doctrines will combine to increase destabilization in the region. Some trends and trajectories lead by India in view of its existing defense cooperation are as follows. During the 2016 Doklam Crisis, India planned the deployment of Arihant SSBN (Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear).  Similarly, in the Pulwama Crisis of February 2019, they again put up the option of deploying Indian SSBN and other offensive strike capabilities.  India’s development and testing of Ballistic Missile Defense, ASAT (Anti-satellite weapons) also benefit from these two agreements.

The Transmutation effects involve the accumulation of small improvements in quality which may morph into a major new level of performance. It may instigate a competition of raising the level of strategic-military cooperation to advanced generation of weapons.

All these effects have significant potential to impact the nuclear thresholds and enhance the risks of unintended nuclear escalation due to misperception. On the basis of cooperation like COMCASA Due to the growing aspirations of India, apart from strategic and conventional arms development, it is thriving for space. India plans to launch 58 missions including 25 launch vehicles and 33 satellites, during the next five years.

Outlook for the Future

An updated definition of strategic stability needs to account for ways to bar global competition and successfully manage likely confrontation between the major powers and regional rivals.  Along with the use of communications, confidence-building measures, and other conflict-prevention mechanisms to bolster stability in the likely future absence of an arms control regime. The elements of trends, trajectories in developments, deployments and doctrines are exacerbating the regional arms race and leading to crisis instability. Therefore, technological asymmetry may lead to deterrence failure.

From the foreign policy aspect this Indo-U.S. partnership is for boosting the economy market and a continuation of the U.S. policy of aggressive support to India as a strategic investment. Yet, the growing influence of the scientific community, research and development and the undiminished support for the expanding military technology including missile capabilities and a high aspirations space program, directly generate pressure and strategic competition in the region and the world.

India’s Balanced Missile Defence Cooperation with the US and Russia

Over the last few years, India has embarked on an extensive and all-encompassing military modernization program that has carried serious repercussions for both its diplomatic and strategic ties. It has done this by expanding both its indigenously developed weaponry, and by signing various short and long-term hi-tech defence deals with the U.S., Russia and Israel to modernize its armed forces. In this, it has been able to balance its strategic relationship with the U.S. and Russia while acquiring advanced military hardware from both powers. Based on this, India’s military modernization plans have led to important long-term implications for the regional security and stability of South Asia.

In modernizing its military, India’s major focus has been to enhance its air defence capabilities by acquiring advanced missile defence systems. At, present India possesses a broad range of air defence systems which include various indigenously developed ballistic missile defence systems, as well as the Barak-8 missile defence system which it jointly developed with Israel. With a view to expanding its future capabilities it has also signed an agreement with Russia for the purchase of the S-400 anti-missile system last year, delivery of which is expected by 2020. In a recent development, India is also in the process of acquiring the ‘National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System-II (NASAMS-II) from the U.S. These, once acquired, would theoretically provide India with an extensive multi-layered missile shield by combining some of the world’s most advanced Missile Defence Systems available today. India would be able to comprehensively address a diverse array of threats ranging from ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, fighter jets and unmanned aerial vehicles.

India’s eagerness to purchase the S-400 from Russia is widely perceived by the U.S. as a destabilizing factor for enhanced Indo-U.S. strategic cooperation. In this regard the U.S. has proposed that India purchase its Terminal High Altitude Areas Defence (THAAD) and Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile defence systems instead, to further enhance their strategic ties. India, being a rational state and pursuing its national interest, is unlikely to do this at the cost of losing Russia as a major strategic partner. India’s acquisition of both the S-400 from Russia and the NASAMS-II system from the U.S. is thus evidence of it opting to choose the middle path by balancing its collaboration in missile defence between both of its strategic partners.

Coming back to the missiles themselves, both advanced systems (S-400 and NASAMS-II) hold immense significance for India’s air defence postures when compared with each other in terms of their overall capabilities. The NASAMS-II missile system’s batteries are equipped with a combination of various surface-to-air missiles, gun systems and advanced medium- range air-to-air missiles. At the technical level, the system is equipped with 3D surveillance radars, fire distribution centers, and command-and-control units. The Russian S-400 anti-missile system comprises of 8 launchers and up to 112 missiles. It can engage 80 targets at a time including cruise and ballistic missiles, UAVs, jet fighters, and support aircrafts at a longer range of up to400 kilometers, which no other current missile system in the world is capable of.

India is investing heavily in its multi-dimensional missile defence programs, building a sophisticated air defence shield with a capability of possibly fighting a two-front war against Pakistan and China. In this context it is assumed that India would likely utilize the S-400 as a major air defence shield against China whereas the NASAMS-II would be inclined more towards protecting India against any strike from Pakistan.

India intends to project itself as a technologically advanced country that is capable enough to establish ‘strategic deterrence’ based on the deployment of such advanced missile defence systems. This posture, however, becomes increasingly complex because of the short flight times and the 3,133 km long border (including the LOC) it shares with Pakistan, along with other geographical constraints which make accurately developing these systems a considerable challenge. Such challenges, for instance, were evident in the recent aerial dogfight between both countries following the Pulwama incident in which India’s air defense systems failed to deter Pakistan from striking back. This system had also led to costly casualties when an MI-17 helicopter was mistakenly hit in a friendly fire incident, possibly by an Israeli origin missile. In this regard the acquisition of and integration of the more advanced NASAMS-II system is likely aimed at surpassing such challenges and substantially upgrading India’s existing air defence systems in case of any such engagements in the future.

With India in pursuit of finding ground for a limited war against Pakistan, if India goes for a ‘comprehensive counter-force’ or ‘surgical-strike’ under the notion of the Cold Start doctrine (CSD), these missile defence systems could act as the most decisive factor in a future conflict. India would be in a much better position as compared to today, if it were able to neutralize Pakistan’s massive retaliation based on ‘full spectrum deterrence’ (FSD) by utilizing tactical missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads.

Pakistan has maintained credible nuclear deterrence against India to assure its security and preserve its sovereignty. India intends to neutralize Pakistan’s deterrence by opting for advanced missile defence systems which would likely put the regional security environment at much greater risk. Pakistan, though, wants peace and stability in the South Asian region but has a threat perception inclined more towards its Eastern border. India’s increasing missile defence capabilities, based on its evolving strategic ties with both the U.S. and Russia, would likely disturb the deterrence stability of South Asia even further. Based on these developments Pakistan needs to revisit both its strategic, as well as diplomatic outlook, specifically taking into account India’s ambitions of building one of the world’s most robust and integrated missile defence shields to date.

The writer is working as a Research Associate at Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) Islamabad.

 

Indian Hybrid war: Challenges for Pakistan

Change is the enduring feature of global politics. Similarly, warfare also evolves with changes in socio-political conditions and advancement in technologies. As, Clausewitz says, “Every age has its own type of war and it adopt itself to that prevailing environment”. In the present century, warfare has evolved from conventional direct military engagement to unconventional means, in which indirect methods and tools are used by states to accomplish strategic objectives. The strategic and security community calls it hybrid warfare, which Frank G Hoffman defines as “the combination of regular, irregular, guerrilla, terrorism, conventional, unconventional, cyber and informational warfare, conducted by both state and non-state actors”.

Hybrid warfare became a central theme of discussion for security and strategic analysts after the 2006 Lebanon war, in which Hezbollah successfully executed hybrid tactics against Israel which has strong military capabilities in the Middle East. Now the concept of a conventional war has become obsolete and has less relevance in military affairs. Hybrid war has replaced the traditional way of warfare, in which states use cyber-technology, propaganda, fake news and disinformation to exploit the internal fault lines of the target state. In this type of war, society as a whole is vulnerable to enemy’s maneuverings. The primary objective is to make the opponent internally weak, compel it to accept the aggressor’s terms of condition and change its behaviour. Hybrid actors create unrest in the enemy’s society through various tactics, while at the same time initiating military exercises at its borders. Thus, they engage the enemy military forces on different fronts.

Pakistan is currently the target of a hybrid war, particularly from its archrival India. After overt nuclearization in 1998, India failed to coerce Islamabad due to its strong conventional military and nuclear capabilities, and thus changed its strategy towards hybrid tactics. New Delhi is exploiting socio-ethnic and religious faultlines in Pakistan, are trying to pit socio-cultural identities against each other. They are creating a sense of insecurity among the Pakistani people and hatred towards the state by disseminating fake news, information and propaganda through modern digital technology, i.e. social media. India is working below the threshold and using both conventional and unconventional means to target Pakistan.

Conventionally, India is supporting separatist and militant groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch separatist militant organisations such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), etc. These groups target security forces, civilians, ethnic minorities, foreign citizens and religious minorities. New Delhi is also engaged in conducting covert operations inside Pakistan to destabilize it. The arrest of Indian spy agent Kulbhushan Yadav in 2016, by Pakistani security agencies, clearly shows New Delhi’s hand at work in subversive activities inside Pakistan. Yadav has confessed Indian involvement in Pakistan and the former’s support for separatist and militant organisations for its destabilization.

India is modernizing its military capabilities and violating the ceasefire agreement on the Line of Control (LOC) by targeting civilians, which is also a violation of international law and the ethics of war. They have also created the mantra of fake surgical strikes against Pakistan to demoralize both its society and security forces. Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, in his recent book ‘India’s ‘Surgical Strike: Stratagem, Brinksmanship and Response’, argued that New Delhi’s claim of surgical strikes is based on falsehood. He termed it as a phantom exercise aimed at diverting the international community’s attention from the Kashmir issue and the atrocities India is committing there.

At the same time, New Delhi has launched an international propaganda against Pakistan, labeling it as a terrorist sponsor state. They are convincing the international media and audience that their firing across the LOC is aimed at preventing terrorist infiltration into Indian occupied Kashmir. Due to India’s fake information campaign, propaganda and diplomatic efforts in tandem with its strategic partner the U.S., Pakistan was placed on the FATF grey list. As part of its information war, India has disseminated fake news regarding the recent terrorist attack in Sri Lanka, asserting it had been carried by Pakistani based terrorists. The claim was later denied by Sri Lankan military officials and confirms that terrorist infiltrated from Indian soil and were in coordination with people in India.

India has also launched hybrid warfare against the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The recent attacks on the Chinese consulate in Karachi and the Pearl Continental hotel in Gwadar claimed by BLA, were backed by India. The initial investigation of the Karachi attack carried out by the counter-terrorism department (CTD) have found the involvement of India’s Research and Analysis Wing. The Baloch militants recently issued a video stating they will target Chinese citizens and others working on the CPEC in Balochistan. The BLF Chief, Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch has also conveyed BLF’s targeting of Chinese nationals to the Chinese ambassador in Pakistan. Dr. Jumma Baloch, a former leader of Baloch separatism, revealed Indian support for the BLA and claimed the latter is not working for the projection of Baloch rights, but as a proxy of India. He has also launched a campaign against BLA and informed the Baloch people that they should not be fooled by BLA narratives.

To conclude, India failed to coerce Islamabad with military muscle and resorted to hybrid warfare against the soft targets of Pakistan. New Delhi wants to make Islamabad internally weak and destroy it, to settling issues with it on its own terms and conditions; this would  also create an opportunity for India to accomplish its hegemonic designs in South Asia. Islamabad has established credible nuclear and military capabilities to deter any Indian conventional adventure against it. Now it needs to counter Indian info war, propaganda, cyber-attacks and diplomatic offensive both at the domestic and international levels.

The author is an MPhil Scholar of International Relations at Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad.

Email: [email protected]

 

India-France Nuclear Connection and Implications for South Asian Stability

India’s French connection dates back to the 17th century under French colonial rule. The Indian Union territory Puducherry was ruled by the French until officially returned to India in 1954. Both countries carried forward with the political, commercial, and cultural ties established during that era. After Indian independence in 1947, diplomatic ties were developed, and since then the two states have been cooperating in all the major domains.

The Cold War hindered the deepening of the relationship, primarily because of India’s Non-Aligned Movement policy. However, the relationship improved as the Cold War ended. Landmark agreements like the Strategic Partnership Agreement of 1998 and the Civil Nuclear Agreement of 2008 were signed between the two countries to expand their relationship to the strategic domain. Regular exchanges between Heads of State/ Government have significantly improved bilateral ties. French President Francois Hollande’s visit to New Delhi as chief guest at India’s 67th Republic Day celebrations in 2016 made France the first country to receive such an honour. Cooperation between the two countries extended in various domains, ranging from a strategic partnership, defence cooperation, counter-terrorism, climate change, as well as economic and security-related issues.

Most recently, after the Pulwama crisis, France recognized India’s concerns regarding its security and urged Pakistan to put an end to the operations of terrorist groups operating on its territory. This clearly shows France’s inclination towards India in the region and the disregard of similar Pakistani concerns vis-à-vis India. Furthermore, France welcomed the listing of Masood Azhar as an international terrorist under the UN’s 1267 sanctions committee.

France has always supported India’s global endeavours and was the first country to support its desire for getting a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Besides this, France has supported India’s membership of export control regimes like Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, and Australia Group. It also supports India’s bid for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). France was the first country to enter into a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India after the latter was granted an exceptional NSG waiver in 2008; in several instances, it reaffirmed its support for building consensus among the regime members for early inclusion of India in the NSG.

Under the civil nuclear cooperation agreement between the two countries, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) and the French company Areva signed an agreement for the construction of six nuclear power plant (NPP) units in Jaitapur, Maharashtra. However, the construction thus far has faced constant delays, primarily because of the concerns about the economics and safety of the NPPs, local opposition, and the collapse of Électricité de France (EDF) that took over Areva’s operations in the year 2015, which resulted in the issues of ownership and pricing. The conclusion of any negotiations will now be according to the terms defined by EDF.

Another stumbling block in the process is the issue of nuclear liability. Though the French government had previously shown satisfaction over the issue when the nuclear insurance pool was established, yet problems continue to hold the liability issue hostage. This has also prevented India’s nuclear deals with other countries from materializing. One of the significant aspects which may also have caused the delay could be difficulties linked to the actualization of the Indo-Japan nuclear deal. Critical reactor components being used in the French nuclear reactors originate from Japan, and it may not be possible for France to export such reactors or parts to India unless the latter has an agreement with Japan.

There have been reports revealing that France is working on doubling its footprint in India by focusing on India’s ambitious project to build a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines. France gave a detailed presentation on the Barracuda-class – it’s latest LEU fueled nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) – to the visiting Indian Chief of Naval Staff in November 2017. India is reportedly developing six indigenous SSBNs and has gained substantial experience through operating Russian leased Akula class submarines. This experience and Russian help have allowed India to build its own Arihant and Aridhaman SSBNs. The NPT prohibits the transfer of nuclear delivery systems to any other state. SSBNs are considered as a nuclear weapon system under START. Therefore, any transfer of SSBNs would be regarded as a violation of the NPT. However, there are no laws that govern the transfer of SSNs or naval nuclear reactors. India could possibly follow the previous practice of initially starting cooperation in the domain of SSNs and later copying the associated naval nuclear reactor technology for use in its indigenously developed SSBNs.

India and France also enjoy a strong defence partnership. The Rafale aircraft deal is significant in this regard, which underwent intense negotiations for six years. The main sticking point in this agreement has been the pricing issue and the inclusion of an off-set clause on the part of India. After resolving these technical issues, France has finally agreed to provide 36 fighter jets to India for 8.8 billion dollars. The Rafale jet fighter aircraft is capable of carrying out all combat aviation missions: air superiority and air defence, close air support, in-depth strikes, reconnaissance, anti-ship strikes and the nuclear delivery. Rafale, with its multiple capabilities, is well suited for India to pursue its aggressive doctrines which demand air superiority. A nuclear role assigned to Rafale will be detrimental for South Asian stability and would raise questions over French adherence to the NPT. Though the end user license between India and France over the Rafale deal is not available in open source, yet, using Rafale in a nuclear role is possible for India. It has not shown any reluctance to use foreign supplied platforms in nuclear roles. Designating a nuclear role to BrahMos is one such example where India clearly stands in violation of the MTCR.

China has also expressed apprehensions about the weapons system, stating that India will deploy the 36 nuclear capable Rafale fighter jets in the border regions of China and Pakistan to enhance its offensive capability. They carry tactical nuclear warheads, and this means India’s nuclear deterrence capability will be significantly improved. Deployment of such dual-use platforms in a crisis situation only triggers misperception and miscalculation, instigating preemptive responses from the other side.

India’s recent defence cooperation deals and manufacturing of defence equipment, force restructuring and a continuous increase in defence spending makes it fourth on the list of top ten defence spenders of the world. Besides that, SIPRI ranked India as the second largest importer of major arms. This massive manufacturing and procurement of lethal weapon systems is justified by India as countering China under the umbrella of America’s ‘China threat theory.’ However, these developments alter the offence-defence balance between India and Pakistan and disturb strategic stability. India’s acquisition of lethal weapon systems like stealth aircraft, dual-use missiles (BrahMos) and S-400 defence system only undermines the credibility of South Asian nuclear deterrence.

                       

Tanzeela Khalil is a Visiting Fellow at Atlantic Council, Washington DC. The views expressed here are her own and do not necessarily reflect the policy of her organization in any way.

 

India’s Quest for NSG

India has a history of diverting dual-use items for military purposes. In 1974 India diverted the Canadian supplied ‘CIRUS’ reactor for producing plutonium for its nuclear weapons test, which was contrary to the understanding that civil nuclear technology will not be used for military purposes. As a result of this misuse of civilian nuclear technology, the U.S., along with some other states, decided to regulate civil nuclear trade by instituting Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Ironically, the same group granted a waiver to India in 2008 that helped New Delhi to conclude nuclear cooperation agreements with several NSG member states. On 13th May 2016, India applied for the membership of the NSG, which ironically was the same date on which it conducted nuclear tests in 1998.

U.S. has been the staunch advocate of granting NSG waiver and the membership to India for its own economic and political interests. While India is benefitting from this exemption and has been able to conclude civil nuclear cooperation agreements with over 16 countries, the U.S. has not been able to reap any commercial dividends from it. On the other hand, the commitments made by India in 2008 have not been fulfilled which include; identifying and separating civil and military nuclear facilities in a phased manner and work with the U.S. for the conclusion of Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT). On the other hand, technically Pakistan’s civilian and military program were already separate, and the only procedural process was required to notify that to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Indian policies and their actions are contradictory to each other.  India is modernizing its military muscle at a very rapid pace, which suggests that it will not be interested in any arms control initiative in the near future.  Moreover, advocates of Indian NSG membership should consider India’s proliferation record instead of blindly supporting India’s bid for NSG. The most significant example of India’s proliferation activity is the 1974 nuclear explosions for which India diverted nuclear fuel from Canadian reactors supplied for peaceful purposes, to conduct a nuclear test which resulted in the formation of NSG. India was the first country to divert peaceful nuclear technology for military use. Moreover, there is evidence that India has been involved in proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to Iran.   Indian Scientist Dr Prasad and former Chairman of Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, Dr Surendar, were sanctioned in 2004 by the U.S. for facilitating Iran’s WMD and missile program. They passed information to Iran on tritium extraction from heavy water reactors. In the chemical area, there is one confirmed transfer of 60 tons of thionyl chloride, a chemical that can be used in the production of mustard gas, from India to Iran in March 1989. In its 2016 rankings, the Nuclear Threat Initiative actually ranked India 21st out of 24 countries measured on the security of its nuclear material from theft.

Contrary to India, Pakistan never defied the non-proliferation regime. In fact, it supported the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) objectives. It did not sign the treaty because India refused to do so and kept pursuing its nuclear-weapon program. Since the negotiations for the NPT in 1968, every single non-proliferation initiative in the South Asian region came from Pakistan and has been refused by India.

India’s NSG membership will have a risk of negatively impacting global nuclear security. The waiver as well as effort for India’s NSG membership exclusively is in violation of all standing norms relating to nuclear proliferation. U.S. is supporting India’s bid by arguing that India’s nuclear record and commitment to non-proliferation norms qualified it as a ‘like-minded country’ to join other NSG member nations. However, this is not the case, and the U.S. failed to define “like-minded country”.  The U.S. is just supporting India for geopolitical and geo-economic reasons. The U.S. sees India as a counterweight to China in the region. Because of these developments, Pakistan’s concern is that India’s NSG membership could improve its access to nuclear technologies, which could have an impact on its nuclear weapons program capability. India is already modernizing its military muscle, and such membership will further help India to build its offensive weapons, intensifying arms race, and strategic instability in the region.

The international community is divided when it comes to Indian membership. While France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Mexico, are supporting India, China, New Zealand, and South Africa are opposing Indian membership. According to them, NSG 48 members are signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whereas India is not a signatory of the NPT. Membership of the NPT is a prerequisite to gain membership of the NSG. The NSG was meant to prevent in future what India had done. India’s NSG membership will damage the global non-proliferation regime and exacerbate the nuclear tensions in South Asia and potentially contributes to a nuclear arms race in Asia. Creating a country-specific exception for NSG membership would adversely impact international non-proliferation efforts besides highlighting volatility in South Asia and fueling an arms race. This will have the potential to term the NSG as irrelevant to the detriments of non-proliferation norms. NSG should consider membership for non-NPT states based on non-discriminatory and objective criteria, and political expediency or commercial interests should not override non-proliferation objectives. Only criteria-based approaches based on equality and non-discrimination. The NSG members should not make an exception to rules for one state.

 

Modi’s Realism 2.0: Implications for Regional Security

Nations around the world have been exhibiting increasing interest in the populist leaders, who tailor their rhetoric to appeal the common man and most often than not manipulate it to benefit their personal agendas. In other words, those that control vast sums of the world’s economy and political security become demagogues and exploit the interest and concerns of ordinary people for political power and victory. This list includes the likes of American president Trump, Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines and the ‘ticking time-bomb’ Indian Prime Minister who has won another term in the office.

What does it mean for Pakistan; its political analysts, policymakers and the academia when the populist demagogue Narendra Modi’s is slowly becoming the face of South-Asian Realism? If past actions, speeches and campaign slogans are any indicators, then the election victory suggests that more is to come during Modi’s second tenure.

There is a common theme that explains the basis of his actions and serves an indicator to hypothesise and predict the future course of action, based on ‘realism’, which is arguably the oldest political theory and is exhibiting yet another rebirth. This surge is also not isolated in geographic regions but has shown examples throughout the geopolitical landscape.

Two fundamental principles of Realism are competition and conflict. Meaning that political affairs are viewed as a zero-sum game where the loss of one, directly and inevitably equates to the gain of the other, which also establishes that conflict is necessary and unavoidable to maintain the sovereignty and existence of the state/country. Doing so puts the national interest at the topmost priority exclusive of the global political environment and its safety.

Modi’s first few decisions in his second term, the ministerial cabinet, is what will lay the groundwork for what this tenure will look like. Already significant changes have taken place after his re-election, which includes the replacement of about three dozen ministers and deputy ministers. The most important appointment is Amit Shah, who is the president of the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and was given the Home Affairs Ministry. Shah was a critical factor in Modi’s re-election and prefers to exploit nationalist and populist agenda. Under the portfolio of home affairs, the Kashmir issue can be further exacerbated as a threat to the local and national security of India. When the topic has been highly securitised in the minds of citizens, aggressive measures become the only way forward as a matter of saving face and pride. Close lookers of the Kashmir issue would have to keep their fingers crossed for the possibility of another ‘false-flag’ operation, to provide India with the justification for launching another surgical strike against Pakistan.

A sound decision that may add some balance and sensibility to the ministerial debate could be the appointment of former foreign secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar as India’s new Minister of External Affairs. Jaishankar is a veteran when it comes to foreign policy and relations with the other countries. He played a crucial role in India’s foreign policy in Modi’s first term. He had also served as the ambassador to US and China where he helped diffuse the tensions during Doklam crisis with China, and also helped broker the India-US nuclear deal when Manmohan Singh was the Prime Minister. One can expect that some actual diplomacy and civilised political thought will be behind India’s Ministry of External Affairs. However, not much hope can be pinned on him as far as Pakistan is concerned given his remarks, in his first public meeting as Foreign Minister.

India’s Ministry of Defence will be in the hands of Rajnat Singh who is a senior Member of Parliament from the BJP and in the past has been active when it came to Kashmir. In the coming days, it is unlikely that his involvement in Kashmir will slow down especially when the portfolio of defence will be under his purview. His first trip outside India’s capital was to Siachen glacier that has been one of the major irritants between the two South Asian neighbours. This not only indicates an active role that he is likely to play in defence but has also hinted to focus on military interactions that take place between India and Pakistan.

Modi himself will be overseeing departments of atomic energy and space and other areas that are significant policy issues. Meaning the populist stance that he held in his first term and then promised during his campaign will become a direct influence in these departments.  After the assertion Mr Modi made in a public rally during his election campaign that “We have the mother of nuclear bombs…” which, could also be a reference to India’s desire of building and testing ‘thermonuclear’ weapons because India’s earlier attempt to test thermonuclear weapons in 1998 was described by several western experts as a ‘dud’ or ‘fizzle.’

Modi’s past is not only filled with aggressive rhetoric but also actions. The exploitation of the country’s nationalist pride and the assurances that only he can deliver safety against foreign threats shows the reliance on populist principle as opposed to robust civil political and democratic practices. The Kashmir crisis that gained speed after the Pulwama incident is one example that is the most recent and clearly showed the Indian Prime Minister’s thirst for aggressive geopolitical conflict and competition. Given that Modi’s actions in Kashmir failed and were criticised internationally, his political future may have been brought into question. However, this did not deter his voter base from changing their opinion based on reason. Despite the backlash, Modi won with a higher majority, and the electoral win is likely to cement the idea that something similar can be done again and that it would not hinder the political climb he has set out for himself.

India has always had immensely hard-line policies when it comes to Kashmir which they argue as necessary to counter the ’30-year insurgency’ and recently with regard to Pakistan too. Since Modi’s campaign was filled with Realism centred promises this at best would continue as it was and in every other situation grow worse. Because of re-appointment of Mr Ajit Doval as National Security Advisor and the recent attacks on law enforcing agencies in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan), security planners and policymakers should remain vigilant and demonstrate the resolve to deal with the miscreants with an iron hand.

Zawar Haider Abidi is a former member of the Group of Experts with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee. Presently is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for International Strategic Studies Islamabad. He can be reached at [email protected].

Faraz Haider is a student of politics, international relations and economics at the Swinburne University of Technology in Melbourne, Australia. He can be reached at [email protected].

 

The Politics of S-400 Anti-Missile System: Implications for NATO and South Asia

Two of the closest U.S. allies – India and Turkey have opted to buy S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missile system from Russia – a move that the United States has stated could affect its military relationship with these two countries. To dissuade both its allies, the U.S. has adopted different approaches. It is threatening Turkey with expulsion from the F-35 aircraft project, while India is being offered replacements in the form of National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS-II), Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile defence systems. If the two countries refuse to give up on their S-400 deals, they could also face sanctions under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) instituted by the U.S. Congress to prevent arms purchases from the Russian entities.

Turkey has so far rejected the U.S warning, and there is little that the U.S. can do to prevent India from buying the Russian system that is considered more potent and cost-effective than the American air defence systems. Besides, procurement from Russia is without conditionalities and helps India maintain diversity in its weapon inventory, making it less dependent on a single source.

Potential Threat to NATO’s Integrity?      Turkey, a key NATO alliance partner, signed the agreement to buy S-400 missile system from Russia at the cost of $ US 2.5 billion, after it was refused the Patriot missile defence system by the United States. The U.S. is now offering the same system if Turkey agreed to give up on the Russian missile deal. Failure to comply with the U.S. demand would cost Turkey the most advanced F-35 fighter aircraft, and several Turkish companies that are part of the international consortium involved in building more than 900 parts for the F-35 aircraft, may lose their contracts.

The U.S. considers the S-400 missile system not compatible with the NATO systems, including the F-35 aircraft. Operational deployment of both systems, according to the U.S., would enable the S-400 to chart weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the F-35 aircraft. This is more of a ruse to prevent Russian ingress into the NATO heartland, and coerce Turkey to buy the U.S. Patriot air defence system. Instead, the deployment of the two systems could help NATO to understand the vulnerabilities of the dreaded S-400 system better since this system would be operated by Turkey and not the Russian experts. Nevertheless, to address the U.S. concerns, Turkey offered to constitute a joint technical working group, but the U.S. reservations are driven by political and commercial interests, and not necessarily a result of technical or security concerns.

The purchase of the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system by Turkey would not unravel the NATO alliance but could help Turkey to become more independent and autonomous in its weapons procurement. If the U.S. Congress decided to impose CAATSA related sanctions on its NATO partner, it may, however, cause a serious dent to the alliance credibility that is already under stress due to wavering U.S. commitments towards the NATO.

‘Boon’ for India and a ‘Bane’ for South Asia.            The Russian S-400 anti-missile system is likely to provide a significant boost to India’s national missile defence shield being developed to protect India’s major cities. At the same time, the perception that India can defend itself against the incoming missiles could also infuse a false sense of confidence amongst India’s senior decision makers who may be encouraged to adopt a more aggressive posture towards Pakistan.

India signed a deal worth $ US 5.43 billion for the purchase of S-400 missile system that the U.S. wants to be shelved in favour of its THAAD and PAC-3 systems. The U.S. has already agreed to sell NASAMS-II to India but has not raised the issue of incompatibility, as it did with Turkey, even though the two systems (S-400 and NASAMS) would form an integral part of India’s national missile shield. With little leverage over India’s defence procurement, the U.S. can only offer incentives in the form of F-21 aircraft (Indian version of F-16) or possibly F-35 aircraft, but may not be able to prevent India from purchasing the Russian S-400 missile system.

The threat of CAATSA related sanctions, if at all materialized, could hurt the U.S. military industry more than it would affect India. The U.S. may not be able to sell it’s Unmanned Aerial System ‘Sea Guardian’ that falls under Category-1 of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and India is the only non-NATO country that has been offered this system by creating exception mainly for commercial dividends at the expense of nonproliferation norms.

Despite these incentives by the U.S., India is unlikely to give up on its deep-rooted military cooperation with Russia that is helping India to build its next aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered submarines, besides several other advanced weapon systems through the transfer of technology, and with no strings attached. While India is likely to use the U.S. technology and the support to help improve its global image, but it won’t be at the cost of its defence collaboration with Russia.

The acquisition of S-400 anti-aircraft missile system would enable India to complete its multi-layered missile shield that comprises of different systems procured from various countries. India’s current plan includes deployment of indigenous Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) system as the outermost layer; the S-400 being acquired from Russia would form the second layer; Israeli Barak-8 as the third layer; indigenous Akash missiles as the fourth layer; and finally, the NASAMS-II would be the innermost layer. This complex arrangement has its own challenges of integration, but India’s missile shield was never intended, nor it can realistically provide protection from the incoming missiles from its neighbourhood, due to short flight time and geographical constraints. Acquisition of a missile shield had been a long-standing objective to build India’s image of a technologically advanced country, besides creating options for pursuing more aggressive posture towards its relatively smaller neighbour Pakistan.

The Road to Instability.         The choices made by Turkey and India would set the future trajectory of their bilateral relationship with the U.S., besides defining the limits of the latter’s influence in an increasingly complex global security environment. If both key allies remain unfettered and decide to go ahead with their military acquisition from Russia, it may encourage several other countries (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, etc.) that are lining up to purchase the S-400 system to resist the U.S. monopoly and diversify their military acquisitions.

The acquisition of S-400 missiles by Turkey would not unravel the NATO, nor would it provide immunity to the Indian cities from Pakistan’s capability to inflict unacceptable damage. It may, however, destabilize the NATO alliance and South Asia for different reasons. Turkey’s acquisition may encourage the other alliance partners to diversify their military procurements and reduce their reliance on U.S. security guarantees. India’s S-400 acquisition, on the other hand, could encourage it to adopt more aggressive conventional as well as nuclear postures.

In a future military crisis, India could possibly consider launching surgical strikes against Pakistan with enhanced confidence that its S-400 anti-aircraft system would deter Pakistan from responding, as it did in the most recent crisis that eventually led to the shooting down of the two Indian Air Force aircraft. The national missile defence shield, once completed, may also encourage the Indian leadership to operationalize their evolving thinking of a “comprehensive counterforce strike” against Pakistan – aimed at neutralizing Pakistan’s short-range ballistic missiles and create space for the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD).

If India could learn one sobering lesson from the most recent military crisis, it would know that the missile shield will not deter Pakistan from responding and cause unacceptable damage to the Indian cities. India’s national missile shield may offer some political dividends and enhance India’s military standing, but the attempt to exploit it for military gains against Pakistan would put to risk regional as well as global security.

Adil Sultan is a Visiting Research Fellow at King’s College London.

India’s Growing Counterforce Capabilities

India tested the Brahmos missile from its Su-30MKI aircraft in the Bay of Bengal on Wednesday, 22nd May this year. Brahmos is a supersonic cruise missile developed jointly by Russia and India. It can carry a 200-300kg warhead with a range of 290 km at 2.8 Mach speed. Since India’s inclusion in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it has been increasing the range of its missiles far beyond 400km.

A day earlier on 21st May, India also launched the RISAT-2B Earth-Observation Satellite. It is inclined 37 degrees to the equator and will focus on India and Pakistan primarily. It will have a resolution of 3.3 feet (1 meter) and can take an image of objects two to three times a day. Before this, India had launched the RISAT-2 into space for surveillance purposes in 2009. RISAT-2B is intended to replace RISAT-2. The satellite has X-band synthetic aperture radar which is capable of looking through clouds during day and night.

India has long been looking for credible options to counter Pakistan’s full spectrum deterrence. First, it developed limited war plans in the shape of the Cold Start Doctrine to operate below the nuclear threshold; now it is looking at counterforce options against Pakistan’s strategic nuclear weapons. In a crisis, it may try to eliminate the threat of Pakistan’s nuclear strike by destroying them in a counterforce first-strike. However, to successfully eliminate Pakistan’s strategic arsenal, India needs a range of precise and accurate weapons and effective guidance and surveillance systems. The recent tests of the Brahmos missile and the launch of surveillance satellites are, therefore, inherently linked to India’s counterforce capability against Pakistan.

For counterforce targets, one needs weapons with precise accuracy, required range, and sufficient speed. It is also necessary to possess modern Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for target assessment and acquisition. The destruction of targets can only be assured through the availability of these capabilities. Missing the target can alter the whole scenario; the adversary would be alerted about the decapitating strike against it.

India has also developed and tested various other missile systems in this regard. It is developing the Prahaar tactical ballistic missile with 150 km range and has also tested the 750 km Shourya hypersonic missile which can be launched from silos. The submarine-launched K-4 and K-15 can be used as second-strike capability, while the long-range Agni missiles can be used against Pakistan in a lofty trajectory. India has also been developing Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) for its Agni missiles. MIRVs increases the survivability of a missile and is a force multiplier as one missile can carry multiple independent warheads. The indigenously developed long-range nuclear-capable Nirbhay cruise missile has a range of 1000 km.

In addition to the current supersonic Brahmos missile, India plans to test its hypersonic version, Brahmos II in 2020, which has higher than Mach 5 speed, according to the chief of the Defense Research and Development Organization. The development of the hypersonic version will further shorten the warning time of the missile, thus increasing the chances of a successful first strike.

Other than the RISAT radar satellite, India has dual-use Cartosat-2 imagery satellite. In the coming months, it plans to launch an earth-imaging and mapping satellite, Cartosat-3, which also has strategic applications. The imagery from commercial satellites is also available to a country for military purposes.

With the growing sophistication of satellite technology, one can also differentiate between the type and nature of various weapons systems. For example, it is possible to distinguish between the F-16 and JF-17 aircraft through such surveillance systems. This makes target acquisition and destruction more credible. It is also worth mentioning that it is becoming possible to hunt and target the submarine-based second-strike capability with the growing anti-submarine war capabilities.

India has recently demonstrated its Anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) technology which can destroy the enemy’s ISR capabilities. However, the ASAT technology is also linked with ballistic missile defence (BMD) technologies. BMD technologies give the possessor the temptation to go first. The missiles surviving the first-strike can be put down by BMD systems. Since India is developing BMD technologies, these would act as a confidence booster for a counterforce first-strike against Pakistan.

Counterforce strategies will create first strike instability. Fears of a preemptive strike from India will make Pakistan think of using all its strategic nuclear weapons before they are decapitated. In this scenario, both sides’ priority would be to go first. Nuclear restraint will become difficult in this situation.

These developments will also cause an undesired arms race in the region. Pakistan and India would compete to maximize their forces, vis-à-vis each other’s capabilities. Hence, an action-reaction model of the arms race will intensify in the region. The fear of losing one’s nuclear weapons will result in a demand for more diverse and survivable weapons systems.

­Samran Ali is Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. He can be reached at [email protected]

The Encroaching Impact of Arms Trade on South Asia’s Geo-Politics

In his famous farewell address to the American Public in 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower had both defined and warned against the encroaching influence of what was then termed as the United States’ ‘Military-Industrial Complex.’ Speaking of the growing synergy between the U.S. military and their fast rising defense and arms industry, President Eisenhower (himself a highly decorated former U.S. General) had taken both time and considerable thought to highlight what he believed was a grave threat to the ideals of peace and prosperity for which the United States had stood for within the post-war scenario. What is more, he had said it right in the middle of the Cold War at a time when the U.S. was engaged in an arms race for survival with the Soviet Union.

Six decades later, as one surmises the far-reaching impact of the same Military Industrial Complex on the present day’s international politics, President Eisenhower’s warning seems like the realization of a cryptic prophecy more than anything. In fact, it has become increasingly difficult to find a parallel to the way the intersection of money and power affects global peace and prosperity, the way it is affected by the intersection of defense and foreign policy at the hands of the world’s arms industries.

This is best exemplified today by how lucrative arms contracts at the state level have increasingly come to take growing precedence over key foreign policy decisions, particularly by the world’s major powers. Thus, it is no secret that the world’s foremost arms importers enjoy considerably close ties with their suppliers. This is markedly apparent in the long history of relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia, which have increased manifold since the latter recently took over India as the World’s largest arms importer. The importance given to Saudi Arabia’s defense contracts in the U.S. is such that the entire diplomatic fallout from the Jamal Khashoggi affair last year was presented as an unnecessary inconvenience by none other than President Trump himself.

The same bonhomie is also visible in America’s growing defense and strategic ties with India. As the top importer of arms for the entire previous decade, India’s lucrative market for arms contracts is fuelled by its fast rising economy as well as its need to modernize its aging Soviet-era platforms.
While the bulk of India’s military hardware is sourced from Russian defense manufacturers, U.S. defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing have consistently eyed gaining a wider share of the Indian market. This includes the delivery of the first of 22 Apache attack helicopters and 15 Chinook helicopters made to the Indian Air force earlier this month.  It also includes a similar deal that was recently signed between the United States and India to purchase 24 Sea Hawk helicopters to further expand the latter’s naval capabilities.

Yet, perhaps the most lucrative opportunity for U.S. defense contractors coming out of India is the Indian Air Force’s latest tender for 114 fighter aircraft to replace its soviet era MiG squadrons. Worth around $18 billion, the Indian government’s requirements are based around developing an indigenous production base built on large-scale transfers of technology, training and maintenance operations. With the long-term goal of reducing its dependence on imports and developing its local arms industry, India’s requirements thus extend beyond the mere procurement of platforms. Instead, they involve a unique opportunity for the world’s foremost arms manufacturers to gain a long-term foothold within the Indian market, while simultaneously investing in the country’s rapid economic growth.

These aspects are clearly evident in Lockheed Martin’s most recent sales pitch to India regarding the F-21 Fighter Aircraft. Offered as an exclusive India only upgrade of the widely used F-16 fighter aircraft, the F-21 is being marketed as a highly viable solution to India’s modernization needs. With its production line planned on being based in India, Lockheed is aiming to build on last year’s announcement that it would be transferring the production of the F-16’s wings to its joint facilities in India by 2020.

If carried through, these developments are likely to have a serious impact on the trajectory of U.S.-India relations for many decades to come. This in turn would also significantly affect both China’s and Russia’s approach to South Asia, particularly with respect to Pakistan. In fact much of the discourse on the development of Indo-U.S. military ties is already based directly on the United States’ strategic rivalry with China over the Indo-Pacific region. They very raison d’être for the Quadrilateral alliance, and the re-designation of the U.S. Military’s Pacific Command to the ‘Indo-Pacific Command’ are all cases in point.

However, going back to President Eisenhower’s warning over the encroaching influence of the American Military Industrial Complex, the above developments assume a slightly different context when viewed from the perspective of the powerful U.S. defense lobby. While the benefits of supplanting Russian defense contractors with U.S. ones within India’s growing arms industry may not be stated as an explicit policy objective by the U.S. State Department or the White House, there are definitely many in Washington that would wholeheartedly welcome such a scenario.

From a purely realist perspective, many would consider the above developments simply as one of the many instances of realpolitik that characterize our world today. However, for the few idealists left amongst us, it is becoming increasingly difficult to assess whether major U.S. arms agreements are serving as a subordinate corollary to, or a key determining factor of, its foreign policy choices. As a super-power that has long predicated its actions on the ideals of maintaining peace, freedom and stability, it is quite troubling to witness its foreign policy so increasingly and unabashedly driven by power, greed and profitability, especially in this day and age.

 

The writer is a Senior Research Associate at the Strategic Vision Institute,   Islamabad. He can be reached at [email protected]